U.S.-Taiwan

Tag: U.S.-Taiwan

2018 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on the military power of China.

2018 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PDF)

2018 – Military Power Report Fact Sheet (PDF)

Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency

 

 
China appears prepared to defer the use of force as long as it believes that unification over the long-term remains possible and that the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. China argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintain the conditions for political progress and to prevent Taiwan from making moves toward de jure independence. China has refused for decades to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue. Simultaneously, China’s leaders proclaim their desire for peaceful unification under the principle of “one country, two systems,” most recently as part of President Xi Jinping’s address opening the CCP’s 19th Party Congress.

The circumstances under which the mainland has historically warned that it would use force have evolved over time in response to the island’s declarations of its political status, changes in PLA capabilities, and China’s view of Taiwan’s relations with other countries. These circumstances have included:

  • Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;
  • Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;
  • Internal unrest on Taiwan;
  • Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;
  • Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification;
  • Foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs; and
  • Foreign forces stationed on Taiwan.

Article 8 of China’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that China may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted.

The ambiguity of these conditions preserves China’s flexibility. In December 2017, Chinese Embassy official Li Kexin, in response to U.S. Congressional language recommending the U.S. Navy explore visiting Taiwan, stated that such a visit would prompt China to take Taiwan by force.

Key Takeaways

Key takeaways listed in the report include:
 

  • While China advocates for peaceful reunification with Taiwan, China has never repudiated the use of military force, and continues to develop and deploy increasingly advanced capabilities needed for a potential military campaign.
  • Circumstances that would prompt the use of force remain ambiguous, preserving China’s flexibility.
  • Multiple military options exist for a Taiwan campaign, ranging from an air and maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some or all of Taiwan or its offshore islands.
  • China could engage in a deliberate force buildup to signal an imminent military campaign or conduct a surprise campaign to force rapid military and political resolutions before other countries could respond.
  • Should the United States intervene, China would try to delay effective intervention and seek victory in a high-intensity, limited war of short duration.
  • The PLA aims to increase its ability to conduct complex joint operations.
  • Although ongoing reforms may decrease near-term readiness, in the long-term they should enable better planning and preparation for joint military operations across the Taiwan Strait. PLA services and support forces continue to improve training and acquire new capabilities for a Taiwan contingency.
  • Although the PLAN seeks to achieve maritime superiority within the first island chain and to deter a third party from intervening in a Taiwan campaign, there is no indication it is significantly expanding its landing ship force necessary for an amphibious assault on Taiwan.
  • Taiwan’s advantages continue to decline as China’s modernization efforts continue.
  • Taiwan’s transition to an all-volunteer force by 2019 will be costlier than anticipated, straining the limited defense budget and diverting funds from defense acquisition, training, and readiness.
  • To counter China’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.
  • The PLAA and PLANMC continue to equip, plan, and train for sustained amphibious operations.
  • The PLAN did not make significant additions to its amphibious fleet in 2017 but launched a YUZHAO LPD that could enter service in 2018.

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Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2018

Update, December 12, 2017

On this date, President Trump signed the 2018 NDAA into law.

Update, November 30, 2017

On this date, Congress submitted the 2018 NDAA to the President for signature. The following Taiwan-related language was included in the final version of the bill:

SEC. 1259. Strengthening the Defense Partnership between the United States and Taiwan.

(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY. — It is the policy of the United States to reinforce its commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act and consistent with the “Six Assurances” as both governments work to improve Taiwan’s self-defense capability.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS. —It is the sense of Congress that the United States should—
(1) strengthen and enhance its longstanding partnership and cooperation with Taiwan;
(2) conduct regular transfers of defense articles and defense services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, based solely on the needs of Taiwan;
(3) invite the military forces of Taiwan to participate in military exercises, such as the “Red Flag” exercises;
(4) carry out a program of exchanges of senior military officers and senior officials with Taiwan to improve military-to- military relations, as expressed in section 1284 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2544);
(5) support expanded exchanges focused on practical training for Taiwan personnel by and with United States military units, including exchanges among services;
(6) conduct bilateral naval exercises, to include pre-sail conferences, in the western Pacific Ocean with the Taiwan navy; and
(7) consider the advisability and feasibility of reestablishing port of call exchanges between the United States navy and the Taiwan navy.

SEC. 1259A. Normalizing the Transfer of Defense Articles and Defense Services to Taiwan

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that any requests from the Government of Taiwan for defense articles and defense services should receive a case-by-case review by the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, that is consistent with the standard processes and procedures in an effort to normalize the arms sales process with Taiwan.

(b) REPORT. —
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date on which the Secretary of Defense receives a Letter of Request from Taiwan with respect to the transfer of a defense article or defense service to Taiwan, the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes—
(A) the status of such request;
(B) if the transfer of such article or service would require a certification or report to Congress pursuant to any applicable provision of section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776), the status of any Letter of Offer and Acceptance the Secretary of Defense intends to issue with respect to such request; and
(C) an assessment of whether the transfer of such article or service would be consistent with United States obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.).
(2) ELEMENTS.—Each report required under paragraph (1) shall specify the following:
(A) The date the Secretary of Defense received the Letter of Request.
(B) The value of the sale proposed by such Letter of Request.
(C) A description of the defense article or defense service proposed to be transferred.
(D) The view of the Secretary of Defense with respect to such proposed sale and whether such sale would be consistent with United States defense initiatives with Taiwan.
(3) FORM.—Each report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

(c) BRIEFING.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees with respect to the security challenges faced by Taiwan and the military cooperation between the United States and Taiwan, including a description of any requests from Taiwan for the transfer of defense articles or defense services and the status, whether signed or unsigned, of any Letters of Offer and Acceptance with respect to such requests.

(d) DEFINITIONS. —In this section:
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. —The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(2) DEFENSE ARTICLE; DEFENSE SERVICE. —The terms “defense article” and “defense service” have the meanings given such terms in section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794).
(3) LETTER OF REQUEST; LETTER OF OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. —The terms “Letter of Request” and “Letter of Offer and Acceptance” have the meanings given such terms for purposes of Chapter 5 of the Security Assistance Management Manual of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, as in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

Update, November 9, 2017

On this date, the conference report, reconciling the House and Senate versions of the bill, was filed.
The conference report was agreed to in the House on November 13, 2017 and in the Senate on November 16, 2017.

The conference report notes:

Strengthening the defense partnership between the United States and Taiwan (sec. 1259).
The House bill contained two provisions (secs. 1268 and 1270E) that would, respectively, express a sense of Congress to strengthen the defense of Taiwan and direct the Department to submit a report on the feasibility and advisability of naval port calls with Taiwan. The sense of Congress would encourage the Department to continue the transfer of defense articles and services, expand training and exercises with Taiwan, support practical military personnel training and exchanges between services, encourage Taiwan’s continued investment in asymmetric self-defense capabilities and support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief training.

The Senate amendment contained five similar provisions (secs. 1270, 1270A, 1270B, 1270C, and 1270D) that would respectively: express a sense of Congress encouraging strengthened bilateral relations between the United States and Taiwan through increased regular defense articles and defense services transfers, air defense training capability building, and multilateral exercises; reestablish naval port call exchanges between the U.S. and Taiwan at appropriate locations; direct the Department of Defense to enhance the undersea warfare capabilities of Taiwan; direct the Department to invite Taiwan’s military forces to participate in joint military exercises, particularly the annual ‘Red Flag’ aerial combat training military exercise; and direct the Department to submit a report on military exchanges between senior officers and officials of the United States and Taiwan, pursuant to section 1284 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328).

The House recedes with an amendment that would combine all seven provisions into one. The new provision would make a statement of policy regarding the commitment of the United States to Taiwan and express a Sense of Congress on steps that should be taken to strengthen the defense relationship between the two countries.

Normalizing the transfer of defense articles and defense services to Taiwan (sec. 1259A).
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1270G) that would require the Secretary of Defense, not later than 120 days after the date on which the Secretary receives a Letter of Request from Taiwan with respect to the transfer of a defense article or defense service to Taiwan, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report with details of the request. The provision would also direct that, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees with respect to the security challenges faced by Taiwan and the military cooperation between the United States and Taiwan, including a description of any requests from Taiwan for the transfer of defense articles or defense services and the status, whether signed or unsigned, of any Letters of Offer and Acceptance with respect to such requests. The Senate amendment contained no similar provision. The Senate recedes with a technical, clarifying amendment.

Update, September 18, 2017

On this date, the U.S. Senate passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2018 by Yea-Nay Vote of 89 – 8. Sections 1268 and 1270E were not changed from the House version. However, Section 1270G – normalizing the transfer of Defense Articles and Defense Services to Taiwan – is not included in the Senate version.

The bill now awaits reconciliation and final signature.

Update, July 14, 2017

The NDAA, as H.R.2810, was introduced in the House on June 7, 2017. On July 14, the U.S. House of Representatives passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2018. Several Taiwan-related initiatives were included.

Section 1268 deals with a sense of Congress on strengthening Taiwan defense:

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) codified the basis for commercial, cultural, and other relations between the United States and Taiwan, and the Six Assurances are an important aspect in guiding bilateral relations;

(2) Section 3(a) of that Act states that ‘‘the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability’’;

(3) the United States, in accordance with such section, should make available and provide timely review of requests for defense articles and defense services that may be necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;

(4) Taiwan should significantly increase its defense budget to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;

(5) the United States should support expanded exchanges focused on practical training for Taiwan personnel by and with United States military units, including exchanges between services, to empower senior military officers to identify and develop asymmetric and innovative capabilities that strengthen Taiwan’s ability to deter aggression;

(6) the United States should seek opportunities for expanded training and exercises with Taiwan;

(7) the United States should encourage Taiwan’s continued investments in asymmetric self-defense capabilities that are mobile, survivable against threatening forces, and able to take full advantage of Taiwan’s geography; and

(8) the United States should continue to—
(A) support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercises that increase Taiwan’s resiliency and ability to respond to and recover from natural disasters; and
(B) recognize Taiwan’s already valuable military contributions to such efforts.

Section 1270E deals with a report on Naval Port of Call Exchanges between the United States and Taiwan:

(a) Report Required.–Not later than September 1, 2018, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the following:
(1) An assessment of the feasibility and advisability regarding ports of call by the United States Navy at ports on the island of Taiwan.
(2) An assessment of the feasibility and advisability of the United States to receiving ports of call by the Republic of China navy in Hawaii, Guam, and other appropriate locations.

(b) Form.–The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.–In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means–
(1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

Section 1270G deals with a sense of Congress on normalizing the transfer of defense articles and defense services to Taiwan:

(a) Sense of Congress.–It is the sense of Congress that any requests from the Government of Taiwan for defense articles and defense services should receive a case-by-case review by the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, that is consistent with the standard processes and procedures in an effort to normalize the arms sales process with Taiwan.

(b) Report.–
(1) In general.–Not later than 120 days after the date on which the Secretary of Defense receives a Letter of Request from Taiwan with respect to the transfer of a defense article or defense service to Taiwan, the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes–
(A) the status of such request;
(B) if the transfer of such article or service would require a certification or report to Congress pursuant to any applicable provision of section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776), the status of any Letter of Offer and Acceptance the Secretary of Defense intends to issue with respect to such request; and
(C) an assessment of whether the transfer of such article or service would be consistent with United States obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.).
(2) Elements.–Each report required under paragraph (1) shall specify the following:
(A) The date the Secretary of Defense received the Letter of Request.
(B) The value of the sale proposed by such Letter of Request.
(C) A description of the defense article or defense service proposed to be transferred.
(D) The view of the Secretary of Defense with respect to such proposed sale and whether such sale would be consistent with defense plans.
(3) Form.–Each report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

(c) Briefing.–Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees with respect to the security challenges faced by Taiwan and the military cooperation between the United States and Taiwan, including a description of any requests from Taiwan for the transfer of defense articles or defense services and the status, whether signed or unsigned, of any Letters of Offer and Acceptance with respect to such requests.

(d) Definitions.–In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.–The term “appropriate congressional committees” means–
(A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(2) Defense article; defense service.–The terms “defense article” and “defense service” have the meanings given such terms in section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794).
(3) Letter of request; letter of offer and acceptance.–The terms “Letter of Request” and “Letter of Offer and Acceptance” have the meanings given such terms for purposes of Chapter 5 of the Security Assistance Management Manual of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, as in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

June 28, 2017

On this date, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) announced details of the committee’s markup of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018. During the markup, 277 amendments — offered by both Republican and Democratic members — were considered and adopted. The committee voted unanimously to report the bill.

In a summary document provided following the markup, the SASC stated that the bill:

Reestablishes regular ports of call by the U.S. Navy at Kaohsiung or any other suitable ports in Taiwan and permits U.S. Pacific Command to receive ports of call by Taiwan; directs the Department to implement a program of technical assistance to support Taiwanese efforts to develop indigenous undersea warfare capabilities, including vehicles and sea mines; and expresses the sense of Congress that the United States should strengthen and enhance its long-standing partnership and strategic cooperation with Taiwan.

This post will continue to track the Taiwan-related language in the 2018 NDAA, as circumstances warrant.

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Taiwan Arms Sales Notified to Congress, 1990-2017

Taiwan Arms Sales 1990-2017

Taiwan Arms Sales 1990-2017

Updated Chart: Taiwan Arms Sales Notified to Congress, 1990-2017

Shows clearly notification packaging/bundling and the long freeze.

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The Trump Administration Announces U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the decision by the U.S. Department of State to announce its approval of seven possible Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan, with a total value of US$1.363 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sales on June 29, 2017. A direct commercial sale was also notified, bringing the total to approximately US$1.4 billion.

The published FMS Congressional Notifications (transmittal numbers 16-67, 16-68, 16-69, 16-70, 16-73, 16-74, and 16-75) were for SM-2 Block IIIA All-Up Rounds, associated equipment and technical support (US$125 million); MK 54 Lightweight Torpedo Conversion Kits, spare parts and other support and assistance (US$175 million); MK 48 Mod 6AT Heavyweight Torpedoes, other support, spare parts, training, and assistance (US$250 million); Hardware, software, and other upgrades to the AN/SLQ-32(V)3 Electronic Warfare Systems supporting Taiwan’s KEELUNG Class destroyers (US$80 million); AGM-154C JSOW Air-to-Ground Missiles, spare/repair parts and other support and assistance (US$185.5 million); AGM-88B HARMs and Training HARMs, spare/repair parts, testing, and other support and assistance (US$147.5 million); SRP Operations and Maintenance follow-on sustainment (US$400 million).

The US-Taiwan Business Council welcomes these Congressional notifications in adherence to the Taiwan Relations Act, which obligates the U.S. to help enable Taiwan’s self-defense. However, it has been 562 days since the last arms sale to Taiwan in late 2015. The Council questions the impact that delays in consideration and execution of Taiwan arms requests are having on the island’s ability to maintain its self-defense capabilities.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers noted that “support for Taiwan remains an essential aspect of the U.S. national security posture in Asia, particularly as increased cross-Strait tensions would fundamentally threaten stability in the region. The U.S. is legally and historically committed to providing Taiwan with arms of sufficient quantity and quality to provide for its own self-defense. Arms sales have long been a mainstay of U.S. security relations with the island, supporting U.S. efforts to deter coercion from the PRC and help provide for Taiwan’s self-determination.”

Hammond-Chambers added “The Council supports the return to a normal and regular process for assessing all Taiwan arms sales requests and sales. Packaging several years’ worth of items drives up the overall dollar value of each tranche of notifications. Each Taiwan arms sale also becomes a rare and compelling event, drawing significantly more attention than it might otherwise garner. This creates a more substantial opportunity for Chinese protests and posturing in response to each sale, protests that have had a deterrent effect on U.S. willingness to release needed but advanced systems to Taiwan – such as new-build fighters and submarines. It would be in the U.S. interest to provide less of an impetus for Chinese protests in response to Taiwan arms sales, and moving away from packaging would be a substantial step in the right direction.”

The Trump Administration Announces U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan

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2017 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on the military power of China.
2017 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PDF)

One major section is called Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency.

 

The PLA continues to develop and deploy military capabilities intended to coerce Taiwan or to attempt an invasion, if necessary. These improvements pose major challenges to Taiwan’s security, which has historically been rooted in the PLA’s inability to project power across the 100 nm Taiwan Strait, the natural geographic advantages of island defense, Taiwan’s armed forces’ technological superiority, and the possibility of U.S. intervention.

China appears prepared to defer the use of force as long as it believes that unification over the long term remains possible and that the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. China argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintain the conditions for political progress and to prevent Taiwan from making moves toward de jure independence. China has refused for decades to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue, despite simultaneously professing its desire for peaceful unification under the principle of “one country, two systems.”

The circumstances under which the mainland has historically warned that it would use force have evolved over time in response to the island’s declarations of its political status, changes in PLA capabilities, and China’s view of Taiwan’s relations with other countries. These circumstances have included:

  • formal declaration of Taiwan independence;
  • undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;
  • internal unrest on Taiwan;
  • Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;
  • indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification;
  • foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs; and
  • foreign forces stationed on Taiwan.

Article 8 of China’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that China may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The ambiguity of these “redlines” preserves China’s flexibility.

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2016 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on the military power of China.
2016 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PDF)

One major section (beginning on page 86) is called Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency.

 

There have been no signs that China’s military posture opposite Taiwan has changed significantly. The PLA continues to develop and deploy military capabilities intended to coerce Taiwan or to attempt an invasion, if necessary. These improvements pose major challenges to Taiwan’s security, which has been based historically upon the PLA’s inability to project power across the 100 nm Taiwan Strait, the natural geographic advantages of island defense, Taiwan’s armed forces’ technological superiority, and the possibility of U.S. intervention.

China appears prepared to defer the use of force as long as it believes that unification over the long term remains possible and that the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits.

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Admiral Harris – Commander, United States Pacific Command – Statement on Taiwan

 

Free and fair democratic elections in January on the island of Taiwan reflect shared values with the U.S. The U.S. maintains its unofficial relations with Taiwan through the American Institute in Taiwan and we continue supporting Taiwan’s security. USPACOM will continue to fulfill U.S. commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act; continued arms sales to Taiwan are an important part of that policy and help ensure the preservation of democratic government institutions.

 

Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., USN
Commander, United States Pacific Command
Statement to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee
Tuesday, February 23, 2016

Hearing Details & Video
Admiral Harris’ Written Statement

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The Obama Administration Announces U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan

 

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the decision by the U.S. Department of State to announce its approval of possible Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan sales on December 16, 2015.

 

The published Congressional Notifications (transmittal numbers 15-27, 15-44, 15-45, 15-72, 15-74, 16-01, 16-05, and 16-06) were for two of the four FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided missile frigates that that the U.S. authorized by law for transfer to Taiwan a year ago, and associated materials (at a refurbishment and upgrade cost of US$190 million); 36 AAV-7 Assault Amphibious Vehicles (US$375 million); 13 MK 15 Phalanx Block 1B ship defense Close-In Weapon Systems, upgrade kits, ammunition, and support (US$416 million); 208 Javelin guided missiles, technical assistance, logistics, and program support (US$57 million); 769 BGM-71F-series TOW 2B Aero Radio Frequency anti-armor missiles, support, and training (US$268 million); 250 Block I-92F MANPAD Stinger missiles, related equipment and support (US$217 million); Taiwan Advanced Tactical Data Link System (TATDLS) and Link 11 communication systems integration (US$75 million); Follow-on support for Taiwan’s MIDS/LVT-1 and JTIDS previously procured (US$ 120 million).[i]

 

Taiwan is poised to elect a new President on January 16, 2016. The timing of this announcement is therefore useful as a modest signal to China that the U.S. has equities in the peaceful transition of power on the island, and that it supports Taiwan’s democratic system. However, the Taiwan Relations Act states that “the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” In light of this recent sale, the US-Taiwan Business Council poses a number of questions for the Obama Administration:

 

  1. Why did it take over four years to prepare this arms package? The last U.S. arms sale to Taiwan took place on September 21, 2011.
  2. Why isn’t Taiwan being offered any new capabilities to counter changes to the Chinese threat over this period?
  3. What impact are delays in consideration and execution of Taiwan arms requests having on the island’s ability to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability?

 

The contents of the arms package announced today – along with the unprecedented four-year delay since the last arms sale – raises serious questions as to whether it serves as a response commensurate to the threat posed by China’s military. The past four years has seen increased Chinese force modernization efforts, and according to the U.S. Department of Defense “the PLA has developed and deployed military capabilities to coerce Taiwan or to attempt an invasion, if necessary.”[ii]

 

The Obama Administration’s focus on China military-to-military engagement and other initiatives in which China’s cooperation is viewed as crucial, such as on climate change efforts, is directly and negatively impacting U.S. willingness to maintain consistent and credible support for Taiwan’s self-defense. This in turn directly impacts the seriousness with which China views our intentions to assist Taiwan.

 

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers noted that “There have been myriad initiatives in U.S.-Taiwan bilateral security relations since the last arms sale in 2011. However, while China has deployed new fighters, submarines, and missiles during the last four years, the U.S. has consistently refused to consider providing Taiwan access to similar platforms, or even aiding their indigenous development.”

 

“In addition, the process for considering, assessing, and processing Taiwan arms sales is broken. The contorted efforts to provide the minimum over an extended period has amounted to long delays and to the U.S. providing only second-hand equipment and additional munitions for systems already in Taiwan’s inventory. The U.S. is placing its China priorities ahead of our legacy and legal requirement to provide for Taiwan’s self-defense. We see no effort to meaningfully address China’s modernization efforts with new capabilities for Taiwan – not because they are unneeded, but because the political cost to China relations is perceived as being too high. Yet that perception was roundly debunked by the Council and Project 2049 in our 2012 report on Chinese reactions to arms sales.”[iii]

 

Hammond-Chambers also said “The process that has seen the bundling of Taiwan arms sales into large packages has run its course. The arbitrary manner in which programs are considered, the absence of a broader strategy for providing Taiwan consistent material support, and the long delays in processing and notifying them to Congress is hampering Taiwan’s ability to mount a serious defense. By bundling programs into packages, the U.S. forces Taiwan to buy all necessary equipment at once rather than in an orderly year-on-year process. If requests go unaddressed for years, or programs are long delayed, how can Taiwan reasonably maintain domestic political support for them, or develop the budget for its ongoing force modernization?”

 

The US-Taiwan Business Council supports the return to a normal and regular process for assessing all Taiwan arms sales requests and sales. Additionally, the Council believes that the bilateral security relationship needs to be clear about what new capabilities should accompany ongoing training and exchanges in aid of Taiwan’s self-defense – including addressing quantitative issues impacting its fighter fleet, its requirement for submarines to complicate Chinese invasion scenarios, as well as further improvements in Taiwan’s missile defense capabilities.

 

[i] As of 1:00 pm on December 16, 2015. For details, see the DSCA website at http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales
[ii] See: “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015” http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf
[iii] See: “Chinese Reactions to Taiwan Arms Sales” http://www.us-taiwan.org/reports/2012_chinese_reactions_to_taiwan_arms_sales.pdf

Press Release: The Obama Administration Announces U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan (PDF)

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The DPP’s National Defense Agenda

DPP’s  Defense  Agenda

Frequently Accessed

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 1 – DPP’s  Defense  Agenda
DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 4 – New Chapter for Taiwan‐U.S. Defense Partnership
DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 5 – China’s Military Threats against Taiwan in 2025
DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 6 – New Generation of Soldiers
DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 9 – Taiwan’s Military Capacities in 2025
DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 12 – Preparing the Development of Indigenous Defense Industry
 

 

On May 26, 2015 the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) think tank New Frontier Foundation released four “blue papers” covering the DPP’s national defense agenda. (Press Conference)

The first of these papers (Defense Policy Blue Paper 9) has been completely translated into English, but in the remaining reports only the forewords have been translated. Forewords are written by DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen.

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 9 – Taiwan’s Military Capacities in 2025

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 10 – Information Protection and Strategic Communications

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 11 – Refinement of Veteran Affairs

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 12 – Preparing the Development of Indigenous Defense Industry

 

 

On December 5, 2014, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) think tank New Frontier Foundation released its eight “blue paper” covering the DPP’s national defense agenda.

Titled “Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief,” the paper calls for the Taiwan armed forces to expand their role and mission in order to improve military effectiveness in contingencies other than war.

English language foreword by DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen

Report Announcement

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 8 – Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

 

 

On October 6, 2014, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) think tank New Frontier Foundation released its seventh “blue paper” covering the DPP’s national defense agenda.

Titled “Bolstering Taiwan’s Core Defense Industries,” the paper calls for reviving the domestic defense industry, with the goal of elevating Taiwan’s capacity to produce its own defensive equipment and weaponry.

English language foreword by DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen

Report Announcement

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 7 – Bolstering Taiwan’s Core Defense Industries

 

 

On August 22, 2014, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) think tank New Frontier Foundation released its sixth “blue paper” covering the DPP’s national defense agenda.

Titled “New Generation of Soldiers,” the paper calls for initiating reform of internal military affairs with personnel considerations as a core value, and strengthening the connection between the military and society.

English language foreword by DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen

Report Announcement

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 6 – New Generation of Soldiers

 

 

On March 3, 2014, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) think tank New Frontier Foundation released its fifth “blue paper” covering the DPP’s national defense agenda.

In announcing the report, DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang firmly stressed the need for Taiwan to pursue stronger defense capabilities. He stated that the DPP will take full responsibility of becoming the catalyst for strengthening national defenses by encouraging indigenous defense production, especially for submarine capabilities. He also stated that Taiwan must “promptly adjust its national defense strategy, military strategy, and operational concepts” to meet growing Chinese military threats and “establish Taiwan’s self-defense capability.”

The report itself stated that Taiwan should focus on fostering private investment in indigenous R&D, next-generation weapons, and cyber warfare.

Both the Chinese and English versions have been compiled into one document (the English translation begins on page 37).

Report Announcement

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 5 – China’s Military Threats against Taiwan in 2025

 

 

On June 6, 2013 the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) think tank New Frontier Foundation released four “blue papers” covering the DPP’s national defense agenda. (Press Conference, Report Announcement)

The first report covers the overall strategy and philosophy behind the DPP’s national defense policy. The second report covers recommendations on transforming the quasi-governmental Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST), and on strengthening the nation’s military-industrial and research capabilities. The third report covers recommendations for Taiwan’s National Security Council (NSC), while the fourth outlines the DPP’s plans to strengthen military cooperation between Taiwan and the United States.

The first paper has been completely translated into English, but in the remaining reports only the forewords have been translated.

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 1 – DPP’s  Defense  Agenda

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 2 – Transforming  the  CSIST: Strengthening Indigenous Defense Research and Development

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 3 – An Accountable National Security Council

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 4 – New Chapter for Taiwan‐U.S. Defense Partnership

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2015 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on the military power of China. 2015 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PDF)

One major section (beginning on page 56) is called Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency.

 

Security in the Taiwan Strait is largely a function of dynamic interactions between and among mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States. China’s strategy toward Taiwan has been influenced by what it sees as positive developments in Taiwan’s political situation and approach to engagement with China. However, China’s overall strategy continues to incorporate elements of persuasion and coercion to deter or repress the development of political attitudes in Taiwan favoring independence.

China and Taiwan have made progress in expanding cross-Strait trade/economic links and people-to-people contacts. Alongside positive public statements about the Taiwan Strait situation from top leaders in China following the re-election of President Ma Ying-jeou in 2012, there have been no signs that China’s military posture opposite Taiwan has changed significantly.

The PLA has developed and deployed military capabilities to coerce Taiwan or to attempt an invasion, if necessary. These improvements pose major challenges to Taiwan’s security, which has been based historically upon the PLA’s inability to project power across the 100 nm Taiwan Strait, natural geographic advantages of island defense, Taiwan’s armed forces’ technological superiority, and the possibility of U.S. intervention.

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/2015-military-and-security-developments-involving-the-peoples-republic-of-china/