US

Tag: US

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Aircraft Spare Parts to Taiwan

Press Release:
The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the Proposed Foreign Military Sales of Aircraft Spare Parts to Taiwan

(Arlington, Virginia, December 7, 2022)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of two possible Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Taiwan, supplying aircraft standard and nonstandard spare parts and related equipment at an estimated total cost of US$428 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sales on December 6, 2022.

The published Congressional Notifications (transmittal numbers 22-55 and 22-56) are for the expansion of the Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement for stock replenishment supply of aircraft standard and non-standard spare parts and related equipment. These two notifications include consumables, accessories, and repair and replacement support for the F-16, C-130, Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF), and all other Taiwan aircraft and systems or subsystems of U.S. origin, as well as other related elements of logistics and program support.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers commented on today’s sale, “We welcome the news that the U.S. government continues to support the sustainment of Taiwan’s air power. A modern, well-equipped air force is required to handle an all-phases approach to Taiwan’s national defense. That includes the parts and sustainability required to maintain operational rates commensurate with the threat from China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force.

The PLAAF’s grey zone activities represent a daily challenge to Taiwan’s sovereignty and national integrity. The upgrade program for Taiwan’s legacy F-16s is proceeding well, and in 2023 we can expect to see the first of Taiwan’s new F-16s start to arrive on the island. By 2026, Taiwan will have the largest and most modern fleet of F-16s in the Asia-Pacific – a capability well worth the investment and support. This too is true for Taiwan’s fleet of C-130s required for logistical support. Taiwan’s budget priorities should continue to ensure that its legacy equipment is well maintained, including through the procurement of parts.”

Hammond-Chambers added, “USTBC has been consistent in noting that the Biden Administration is focused on munitions and sustainment, and these congressional notifications are part of those types of programs. As we move into 2023, we can expect more arms sales in these two areas.”

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

Additional Data:

For more details on Taiwan arms sales, please visit our dedicated defense website at www.ustaiwandefense.com. The post “Taiwan Arms Sales Notified to Congress 1990-2022” contains charts showing a summary of arms sales data by year, along with a link to the raw data compiled by the Council from DSCA and other sources.

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Aircraft Spare Parts to Taiwan

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/ustbc-comments-on-the-proposed-fms-of-aircraft-spare-parts-to-taiwan/

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Additional Missiles and Radar Sustainment to Taiwan

Press Release:
The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the Proposed Foreign Military Sale of Additional Harpoon and Sidewinder Missiles and Radar Sustainment to Taiwan

(Arlington, Virginia, September 2, 2022)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of three possible Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan of AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder Missiles, AGM-84L-1 Harpoon Block II Missiles, as well as Contract Logistics Support for the Surveillance Radar Program (SRP) and related equipment, at an estimated total cost of US$1.106 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on September 2, 2022.

The published Congressional Notifications (transmittal numbers 22-44, 22-45, and 22-46) is for 100 AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder tactical missiles and 4 AIM-9X Block II tactical Guidance Units – along with containers, spare & repair parts, support & test equipment, documentation, training, and other support. It is also for 60 AGM-84L-1 Harpoon Block II missiles and 4 ATM-84L-1 Harpoon Block II exercise missiles. Also included are Harpoon Guidance Control Units (GCUs), Radar Seekers and Altimeters, Captive Air Test Missiles (CATMs) as well as containers, spare & repair parts, support & test equipment, documentation, training, and other assistance and support. Finally, today’s notifications included follow-on Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) for the Surveillance Radar Program (SRP). That includes program management, minor modifications and upgrades, spares and repair/return parts, documentation, as well as related elements of engineering, technical, logistical, and other program support.

These are not new capabilities. Taiwan already has AIM-9 and Harpoon missiles in its existing inventory, and the Taiwan Surveillance Radar Program (SRP) has now been up and running for near a decade. The US-Taiwan Business Council welcomes continued security assistance support for Taiwan. We expect the Biden Administration to continue to focus its efforts on munitions and sustainment, which fits with their “asymmetric” approach to Taiwan. This views arms sales to Taiwan only through the narrow prism of a D-Day style attack, rather than as an all-phases assessment of the Chinese threat.

The Council opposes this limited approach. As the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) recently demonstrated in its mock blockade, the island faces a range of threats that require a range of capabilities. To deny the island the ability to mount a full defense will, over-time, create new gaps in Taiwan’s defenses that the PLA can exploit. America’s current policy of strategic ambiguity does not allow for the U.S. to clarify that it would fill those gaps as they emerge.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers commented on today’s sale, “The Council has long opposed the ‘packaging’ of programs into a single batch of Congressional Notifications. It is an irregular use of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, where programs should be notified to Congress when they are ready, rather than bundled together. It raises the likelihood of politicized timing, and places stress on Taiwan’s budget process as its government has to manage the ebbs and flows of erratic sales.”

Hammond-Chambers added, “Notifying a bundle of programs in excess of US$1 billion tends to magnify the political impact of an arms sales announcement. In conjunction with the passage of the USS Antietam and USS Chancellorsville through the Taiwan Strait in the past week, we should consider today’s sale a part of the hard-power response to the PRC’s threats and irresponsible behavior after Speaker Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan.

However, if the intention is to both boost Taiwan’s national security and make a political point to China, notifying this sale at 5:00 pm on a holiday weekend is a failing grade. Attempts to bury so-called ‘sensitive’ arms sales announcements late in the day or before a 3-day weekend have happened in the past as well. It appears that one faction within the Biden Administration wants to make a solid point to the PRC about material support for Taiwan in the face of PLA pressure, while another seems to want to minimize that point by announcing it the evening before a long weekend.”

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Additional Missiles and Radar Sustainment to Taiwan

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/ustbc-comments-on-the-proposed-fms-of-additional-missiles-and-radar-sustainment-to-taiwan/

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Contractor Technical Assistance Support to Taiwan

Press Release:
The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the Proposed Foreign Military Sale of Contractor Technical Assistance Support to Taiwan

(Arlington, Virginia, July 15, 2022)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Taiwan of Blanket Order Contractor Technical Assistance Support, at an estimated cost of US$108 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on July 15, 2022.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 22-31) is for contractor technical assistance support consisting of unclassified spare and repair parts and assembly for tanks and combat vehicles. It also covers technical assistance, technical and logistical support, and other related elements.

The US-Taiwan Business Council acknowledges the need for sustainment of Taiwan’s military. This sale will help Taiwan maintain its vehicles, small arms, combat weapon systems, and logistical support items.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said, “As the US-Taiwan Business Council has previously noted, the Biden Administration’s security assistance policy through 2025 will focus on sustainment and munitions. Force modernization of Taiwan’s armed forces is no longer a priority. We expect to soon learn more about the new limits of U.S. security assistance to Taiwan after the June Monterey Talks and Special Channel talks in Washington, D.C. and Annapolis, Maryland.”

Hammond-Chambers added, “More information will allow us to better predict where U.S. policy will start to open up critical gaps in Taiwan’s all-phases approach to the defense of the island. The PLA will naturally focus on these emerging vulnerabilities, as they adapt to the shortcomings of U.S. policy. The US-Taiwan Business Council again calls on the Biden Administration to provide strategic clarity on where U.S. forces will fill gaps in Taiwan’s defense brought on by these changes to U.S. policy.”

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Contractor Technical Assistance Support to Taiwan

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/ustbc-comments-on-the-proposed-fms-of-contractor-technical-assistance-support-to-taiwan/

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Naval Spare and Repair Parts to Taiwan

Press Release:
The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the Proposed Foreign Military Sale of Naval Spare and Repair Parts to Taiwan

(Arlington, Virginia, June 9, 2022)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Taiwan of naval spare and repair parts, at an estimated cost of US$120 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on June 8, 2022.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 22-22) is for spare and repair parts for ships and ship systems, technical assistance, technical and logistical support, and other related elements of logistics support. The notification indicated that the equipment will be sourced from approved U.S. Navy vendors and/or U.S. Navy stock.

The US-Taiwan Business Council acknowledges the need for sustainment of Taiwan’s military. The upkeep of the Taiwan armed forces is an essential aspect of Taiwan’s overall force posture, and supports its efforts to ensure that its military operational rates are high.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said, “As the Biden Administration undertakes the most significant narrowing of U.S.-Taiwan security assistance since 1979, these types of notifications covering sustainment efforts are the most likely over the next 18-24 months. There appears to now be little to no U.S. support for substantial Taiwan force modernization efforts, so we should expect to see mostly sustainment and munitions programs through the remainder of President Biden’s term (or terms) in office.”

Hammond-Chambers added, “One significant impact this approach will have is to constrain force modernization for entire areas of Taiwan’s military capability. We are likely to see the loss of infrastructure, hollowing out of operational experience, and the loss of decades of expertise. Once lost, that expertise will not return to the Taiwan military. This creates new vulnerabilities for the Chinese military to exploit. Far from improving Taiwan security, as time progresses this new directed approach will supply the PLA with emerging areas of military weakness, heightening – not lessening – the likelihood of attack.”

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Naval Spare and Repair Parts to Taiwan

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/ustbc-comments-on-the-proposed-fms-of-naval-spare-and-repair-parts-to-taiwan/

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Contractor Technical Assistance for Taiwan’s Patriot Air Defense System

Press Release:
The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the Proposed Foreign Military Sale of Contractor Technical Assistance for Taiwan’s Patriot Air Defense System

(Arlington, Virginia, April 6, 2022)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Taiwan of Contractor Technical Assistance and related maintenance and sustainment articles and services for the Patriot Air Defense System, at an estimated cost of US$95 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on April 5, 2022.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 22-16) is for support of the Patriot Air Defense System in Taiwan, and helps underpin Taiwan’s efforts to modernize its armed forces and to maintain a credible defensive capability. It includes Contractor Technical Assistance support consisting of training, planning, fielding, deployment, operation, maintenance, and sustainment of the Patriot Air Defense System, associated equipment, and logistics support elements. It also includes Patriot Ground Support Equipment, spare parts, and consumables.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said: “The sustainment of Taiwan’s existing weapons systems is an essential commitment by its armed forces to maintain high operational rates for its legacy gear.” “The normalized and regularized process of assessing all requested weapons systems for Taiwan’s use must remain a top priority for the Biden Administration. That should entail the acceptance from Taiwan of Letters of Request (LoRs), so that a full inter-agency assessment – that includes the uniformed services – can ascertain the utility of the request.”

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Contractor Technical Assistance for Taiwan’s Patriot Air Defense System

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/ustbc-comments-on-the-proposed-fms-of-contractor-technical-assistance-for-taiwans-patriot-air-defense-system/

2019 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on the military power of China.

Reorganizing for Operations along China’s Periphery

China’s overall strategy toward Taiwan continues to incorporate elements of both persuasion and coercion to hinder the development of political attitudes in Taiwan favoring independence. Taiwan lost three additional diplomatic partners in 2018, and some international fora continued to deny the participation of representatives from Taiwan. Although China advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, China has never renounced the use of military force, and continues to develop and deploy advanced military capabilities needed for a potential military campaign.

Military Strategy and Doctrine

Taiwan persistently remains the PLA’s main “strategic direction,” one of the geographic areas the leadership identifies as having strategic importance, in authoritative military publications. Other strategic directions include the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and China’s borders with India and North Korea. PLA reforms have oriented each new theater command toward a specific strategic direction.

China’s Strategy and Capabilities Development in the Taiwan Strait

China appears prepared to defer the use of military force as long as it believes that unification with Taiwan over the long-term remains possible and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. China argues the credible threat of force is essential to maintain the conditions for political progress and prevent Taiwan from making moves toward independence.

For decades, China has refused to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue. Simultaneously, China’s leaders proclaim their desire for peaceful unification under the principle of “one country, two systems,” as emphasized in President Xi Jinping’s addresses opening the CCP’s 19th Party Congress.

The circumstances under which the mainland has historically warned it would use force have evolved over time. These circumstances have included:

  • Formal declaration of Taiwan independence
  • Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence
  • Internal unrest in Taiwan
  • Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons
  • Indefinite delays in the resumption of
    cross-Strait dialogue on unification
  • Foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal
    affairs and
  • Foreign forces stationed on Taiwan.

Key Takeaways

Key takeaways listed in the report include:

  • The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea.
  • Relations between China and Taiwan remained cool through 2018.
  • Bowing to Chinese pressure, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, and El Salvador switched diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing.
  • The PLA continued Taiwan Strait contingency preparations.
  • Although China advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, China has never renounced the use of military force; the circumstances under which China has historically warned it would use force remain ambiguous and have evolved over time.
  • China has an array of options for a Taiwan campaign, ranging from an air and maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some or all of Taiwan or its offshore islands.
  • PLA services and support forces continue to improve training and acquire new capabilities for a Taiwan contingency, but there is no indication China is significantly expanding its landing ship force necessary for an amphibious assault on Taiwan.
  • Taiwan’s advantages continue to decline as China’s modernization efforts continue.
  • To counter China’s improving capabilities,Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/2019-military-and-security-developments-involving-the-peoples-republic-of-china/

2018 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on the military power of China.

2018 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PDF)

2018 – Military Power Report Fact Sheet (PDF)

Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency

 

 
China appears prepared to defer the use of force as long as it believes that unification over the long-term remains possible and that the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. China argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintain the conditions for political progress and to prevent Taiwan from making moves toward de jure independence. China has refused for decades to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue. Simultaneously, China’s leaders proclaim their desire for peaceful unification under the principle of “one country, two systems,” most recently as part of President Xi Jinping’s address opening the CCP’s 19th Party Congress.

The circumstances under which the mainland has historically warned that it would use force have evolved over time in response to the island’s declarations of its political status, changes in PLA capabilities, and China’s view of Taiwan’s relations with other countries. These circumstances have included:

  • Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;
  • Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;
  • Internal unrest on Taiwan;
  • Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;
  • Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification;
  • Foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs; and
  • Foreign forces stationed on Taiwan.

Article 8 of China’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that China may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted.

The ambiguity of these conditions preserves China’s flexibility. In December 2017, Chinese Embassy official Li Kexin, in response to U.S. Congressional language recommending the U.S. Navy explore visiting Taiwan, stated that such a visit would prompt China to take Taiwan by force.

Key Takeaways

Key takeaways listed in the report include:
 

  • While China advocates for peaceful reunification with Taiwan, China has never repudiated the use of military force, and continues to develop and deploy increasingly advanced capabilities needed for a potential military campaign.
  • Circumstances that would prompt the use of force remain ambiguous, preserving China’s flexibility.
  • Multiple military options exist for a Taiwan campaign, ranging from an air and maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some or all of Taiwan or its offshore islands.
  • China could engage in a deliberate force buildup to signal an imminent military campaign or conduct a surprise campaign to force rapid military and political resolutions before other countries could respond.
  • Should the United States intervene, China would try to delay effective intervention and seek victory in a high-intensity, limited war of short duration.
  • The PLA aims to increase its ability to conduct complex joint operations.
  • Although ongoing reforms may decrease near-term readiness, in the long-term they should enable better planning and preparation for joint military operations across the Taiwan Strait. PLA services and support forces continue to improve training and acquire new capabilities for a Taiwan contingency.
  • Although the PLAN seeks to achieve maritime superiority within the first island chain and to deter a third party from intervening in a Taiwan campaign, there is no indication it is significantly expanding its landing ship force necessary for an amphibious assault on Taiwan.
  • Taiwan’s advantages continue to decline as China’s modernization efforts continue.
  • Taiwan’s transition to an all-volunteer force by 2019 will be costlier than anticipated, straining the limited defense budget and diverting funds from defense acquisition, training, and readiness.
  • To counter China’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.
  • The PLAA and PLANMC continue to equip, plan, and train for sustained amphibious operations.
  • The PLAN did not make significant additions to its amphibious fleet in 2017 but launched a YUZHAO LPD that could enter service in 2018.

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/2018-military-and-security-developments-involving-the-peoples-republic-of-china-2/

October 28-30, 2018 – US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2018

US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2018

US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2018

Event: US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2018

October 28-30,2018
Annapolis, Maryland

The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2018 will be held October 28-30, 2018 in Annapolis, Maryland. This will be the seventeenth annual event in a series of ongoing conferences addressing the future of U.S. defense cooperation with Taiwan, the defense procurement process, and Taiwan’s defense and national security needs.

This year, the conference will open with a discussion on Taiwan’s role in the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, and look at how Taiwan can increase regional engagement on defense and national security issues. We will then discuss Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept (ODC) and current operational and tactical thinking, examining how Taiwan can continue to develop its capabilities in order to meet its existing and future defense needs. The third session will look at ODC implementation across the air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains, and how companies can play a role in supporting this implementation. The last two sessions will look first at offsets under Taiwan’s Industrial Cooperation Program, and will then pivot to discuss Taiwan’s industrial security in the defense sector – including personnel security issues, digital security, as well as trade secrets and IP protection.

The first conference in this series was the St. Petersburg, Florida event where former Taiwan Minister of National Defense Tang Yiau-ming gave the keynote address in March of 2002. The second conference in the series was held in February 2003 in San Antonio, Texas, the third in October 2004 in Phoenix, Arizona, the fourth in September 2005 in San Diego, California, the fifth in September 2006 in Denver, Colorado, and the sixth in September 2007 in Annapolis, Maryland. Taiwan’s Minister of National Defense Chen Chao-min gave the keynote address at the seventh conference in the series, held in September 2008 on Amelia Island, Florida. The eighth conference was held in September 2009 in Charlottesville, Virginia, the ninth in October 2010 in Cambridge, Maryland, and the tenth in September 2011 in Richmond, Virginia. The eleventh conference was held in September 2012 in Hershey, Pennsylvania, and the twelfth in September 2013 in Annapolis, Maryland. The thirteenth conference in October 2014, the fourteenth in October 2015, and the fifteenth in October 2016 all took place in Williamsburg, Virginia. The sixteenth conference was held in October 2017 in Princeton, New Jersey.

Keynote Addresses & Conference Program
Keynote speakers will include senior representatives from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and from the U.S. government.

Conference sessions at the US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference feature a moderator and several speakers on the panel, and some sessions may include additional commentators. Each speaker gives a short presentation on the session topic from his or her own viewpoint and expertise. Those presentations are then followed by a moderator-led discussion among the panelists, as well as a moderator-driven question and answer period with the attendees. This format offers the maximum amount of time for exchanges among the panelists, as well as between the panel and the audience, allowing the sessions to become a forum for substantial and valuable interaction and discussion.

Registration is now open at the 2018 US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference website.

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/october-28-30-2018-us-taiwan-defense-industry-conference-2018/

October 15-17, 2017 – US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2017

US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2017

US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2017

Event: US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2017

October 15-17, 2017
Princeton, New Jersey

The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2017 will be held October 15-17, 2017 in Princeton, New Jersey. This will be the sixteenth annual event in a series of ongoing conferences addressing the future of U.S. defense cooperation with Taiwan, the defense procurement process, and Taiwan’s defense and national security needs.

This year, the conference will open with a policy discussion on the Trump Administration’s current and future policies in Northeast Asia from a variety of regional perspectives, and will examine its potential impact on Taiwan defense affairs in the short, medium, and long term. We will then discuss the threat and response options for Taiwan, and how the island could exploit its adversary’s weaknesses in both traditional and emerging domains – covering air, land, and sea, as well as cyber and space. The final two sessions will extrapolate on those responses, and will examine their potential implications on developing business opportunities for the defense and security industries in both Taiwan and the United States.

The first conference in this series was the St. Petersburg, Florida event where former Taiwan Minister of National Defense Tang Yiau-ming gave the keynote address in March of 2002. The second conference in the series was held in February 2003 in San Antonio, Texas, the third in October 2004 in Phoenix, Arizona, the fourth in September 2005 in San Diego, California, the fifth in September 2006 in Denver, Colorado, and the sixth in September 2007 in Annapolis, Maryland. Taiwan’s Minister of National Defense Chen Chao-min gave the keynote address at the seventh conference in the series, held in September 2008 on Amelia Island, Florida. The eighth conference was held in September 2009 in Charlottesville, Virginia, the ninth in October 2010 in Cambridge, Maryland, and the tenth in September 2011 in Richmond, Virginia. The eleventh conference was held in September 2012 in Hershey, Pennsylvania, and the twelfth in September 2013 in Annapolis, Maryland. The thirteenth conference in October 2014, the fourteenth in October 2015, and the fifteenth in October 2016 all took place in Williamsburg, Virginia.

Keynote Addresses & Conference Program
Keynote speakers will include senior representatives from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and from the U.S. government.

Conference sessions at the US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference feature a moderator and several speakers on the panel, and some sessions may include additional commentators. Each speaker gives a short presentation on the session topic from his or her own viewpoint and expertise. Those presentations are then followed by a moderator-led discussion among the panelists, as well as a moderator-driven question and answer period with the attendees. This format offers the maximum amount of time for exchanges among the panelists, as well as between the panel and the audience, allowing the sessions to become a forum for substantial and valuable interaction and discussion.

Registration is now open at the 2017 US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference website.

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/october-15-17-2017-us-taiwan-defense-industry-conference-2017/

2017 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on the military power of China.
2017 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PDF)

One major section is called Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency.

 

The PLA continues to develop and deploy military capabilities intended to coerce Taiwan or to attempt an invasion, if necessary. These improvements pose major challenges to Taiwan’s security, which has historically been rooted in the PLA’s inability to project power across the 100 nm Taiwan Strait, the natural geographic advantages of island defense, Taiwan’s armed forces’ technological superiority, and the possibility of U.S. intervention.

China appears prepared to defer the use of force as long as it believes that unification over the long term remains possible and that the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. China argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintain the conditions for political progress and to prevent Taiwan from making moves toward de jure independence. China has refused for decades to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue, despite simultaneously professing its desire for peaceful unification under the principle of “one country, two systems.”

The circumstances under which the mainland has historically warned that it would use force have evolved over time in response to the island’s declarations of its political status, changes in PLA capabilities, and China’s view of Taiwan’s relations with other countries. These circumstances have included:

  • formal declaration of Taiwan independence;
  • undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;
  • internal unrest on Taiwan;
  • Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;
  • indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification;
  • foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs; and
  • foreign forces stationed on Taiwan.

Article 8 of China’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that China may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The ambiguity of these “redlines” preserves China’s flexibility.

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/2017-military-and-security-developments-involving-the-peoples-republic-of-china/