Tag: U.S. Department of Defense

Update, December 23, 2022

On this date, U.S. President Joe Biden signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023.

Update, December 15, 2022

On this date, the U.S. Senate passed the bipartisan, bicameral text of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023 by a vote of 83-11.

The NDAA 2023 now goes to the President’s desk to be signed.

Update, December 8, 2022

On this date, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the bipartisan, bicameral text of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023 by a vote of 350-80.

Update, December 6, 2022

On this date, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) jointly released the the text of an agreement reached on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023. The NDAA now goes to the Senate and House for a vote.

The released text included multiple Taiwan provisions, including the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (see below selections from Subtitle A). A selection of the Taiwan provisions are reproduced below.

In summarizing these provisions, the HASC said:

Expresses congressional support for the U.S. defense relationship with Taiwan, requires additional measures to improve readiness related to Taiwan, and supports the use of joint military exercises with Taiwan, including the 2024 Rim of the Pacific exercise.

House Armed Services Committee (HASC)

Select Taiwan provisions

SEC.1263. Statement of Policy on Taiwan
(a)Statement of Policy. —Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et. seq.), it shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist a fait accompli that would jeopardize the security of the people on Taiwan.
(b)Fait Accompli Defined. —In this section, the term “fait accompli” refers to the resort to force by the People’s Republic of China to invade and seize control of Taiwan before the United States can respond effectively.

SEC.1264. Sense of Congress on Joint Exercises with Taiwan
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) joint military exercises with Taiwan are an important component of improving military readiness;

(2) the Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command possesses the authority to carry outsuch joint military exercises, including those that—
(A) involve multiple warfare domains and exercise secure communications between the forces of the United States, Taiwan, and other foreign partners;
(B) incorporate the participation of multiple combatant and subordinate unified commands; and
(C) present complex military challenges, including the multi-domain capabilities of a capable adversary;

(3) the United States should seek to use existing authorities more effectively to improve the readiness of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan; and

(4) the naval forces of Taiwan should be invited to participate in the Rim of the Pacific exercise, as appropriate, conducted in 2024.

SEC.1265. Sense of Congress on Defense Alliances and Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific Region
It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense should continue efforts that strengthen United States defense alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region so as to further the comparative advantage of the United States in strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China, including by—
…
(6) strengthening the United States partnership with Taiwan, consistent with the Three Communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), and the Six Assurances with the goal of improving Taiwan’s defensive military capabilities and promoting peaceful cross-strait relations;

Selection from Subtitle A—Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act:

SEC.5502. Modernizing Taiwan’s Security Capabilities to Deter and, if Necessary, Defeat Aggression by the People’s Republic of China.
(a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(5) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
(6) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) Taiwan Security Programs.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall use the authorities under this section to strengthen the United States-Taiwan defense relationship, and to support the acceleration of the modernization of Taiwan’s defense capabilities, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8).

(c) Purpose.—In addition to the purposes otherwise authorized for Foreign Military Financing programs under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), a purpose of the Foreign Military Financing Program should be to provide assistance, including equipment, training, and other support, to build the civilian and defensive military capabilities of Taiwan—
(1) to accelerate the modernization of capabilities that will enable Taiwan to delay, degrade, anddeny attempts by People’s Liberation Army forces—(A) to conduct coercive or grey zone activities; (B) to blockade Taiwan; or (C) to secure a lodgment on any islands administered by Taiwan and expand or otherwise use such lodgment to seize control of a population center or other key territory in Taiwan; and
(2) to prevent the People’s Republic of China from decapitating, seizing control of, or otherwise neutralizing or rendering ineffective Taiwan’s civilian and defense leadership.

(d) Regional Contingency Stockpile.—Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to sub section (h), not more than $100,000,000 may be used during each of the fiscal years 2023 through 2032 to maintain a stockpile (if established pursuant to section 5503(b)), in accordance with section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h).

(e) Availability of Funds.—
(1) Annual Spending Plan.—Not later than March 1, 2023, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a plan to the appropriate congressional committees describing how amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to subsection (h), if made available, would be used to achieve the purpose described in subsection (c).
(2) Certification.— (A) In General.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to subsection (h) are authorized to be made avail- able after the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, certifies not less than annually to the appropriate commit- tees of Congress that Taiwan has increased its defense spending relative to Taiwan’s defense spending in its prior fiscal year, which includes support for an asymmetric strategy, excepting accounts in Taiwan’s defense budget related to personnel expenditures, (other than military training and education and any funding related to the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency). (B) Waiver.—The Secretary of State may waive the certification requirement under sub-paragraph (A) if the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that for any given year— (i) Taiwan is unable to increase its defense spending relative to its defense spending in its prior fiscal year due to severe hardship; and (ii) making available the amounts authorized under subparagraph (A) is in the national interests of the United States.
(3) Remaining Funds. —Amounts authorized to be appropriated for a fiscal year pursuant to subsection (h) that are not obligated and expended during such fiscal year shall be added to the amount that may be used for Foreign Military Financing to Taiwan in the subsequent fiscal year.

(f) Annual Report on Advancing the Defense of Taiwan. —
(1) Initial Report. —Concurrently with the first certification required under subsection (e)(2), the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes steps taken to enhance the United States-Taiwan defense relation- ship and Taiwan’s modernization of its defense capabilities.
(2) Matters To Be Included. —Each report required under paragraph (1) shall include—
(A) an assessment of the commitment of Taiwan to implement a military strategy that will deter and, if necessary, defeat military aggression by the People’s Republic of China, including the steps that Taiwan has taken and the steps that Taiwan has not taken towards such implementation;
(B) an assessment of the efforts of Taiwan to acquire and employ within its forces counter- intervention capabilities, including— (i) long-range precision fires; (ii) integrated air and missile defense systems; (iii) anti-ship cruise missiles; (iv) land-attack cruise missiles; (v) coastal defense; (vi) anti-armor; (vii) undersea warfare, including manned and unmanned systems; (viii) survivable swarming maritime assets; (ix) manned and unmanned aerial systems; (x) mining and countermining capabilities; (xi) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; (xii) command and control systems; (xiii) defensive cybersecurity capabilities; and (xiv) any other defense capabilities that the United States determines, including jointly with Taiwan, are crucial to the defense of Taiwan, consistent with the joint consultative mechanism with Taiwan created pursuant to section 5506;
(C) an evaluation of the balance between conventional and counter intervention capabilities in the defense force of Taiwan as of the date on which the report is submitted;
(D) an assessment of steps taken by Tai- wan to enhance the overall readiness of its defense forces, including— (i) the extent to which Taiwan is requiring and providing regular and relevant training to such forces; (ii) the extent to which such training is realistic to the security environment that Taiwan faces; and (iii) the sufficiency of the financial and budgetary resources Taiwan is putting toward readiness of such forces;
(E) an assessment of steps taken by Taiwan to ensure that the Taiwan’s reserve forces and All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency can recruit, train, equip, and mobilize its forces; (iii) the efforts made by Taiwan to
address such shortages;
(F) an evaluation of— (i) the severity of manpower shortages in the military of Taiwan, including in the reserve forces; (ii) the impact of such shortages in the event of a conflict scenario; and (iii) the efforts made by Taiwan to address such shortages;
(G) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to boost its civilian defenses, including any informational campaigns to raise awareness among the population of Taiwan of the risks Taiwan faces;
(H) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to secure its critical infrastructure, including in transportation, telecommunications networks, satellite communications, and energy;
(I) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to enhance its cybersecurity, including the security and survivability of official civilian and military networks;
(J) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to improve the image and prestige of its defense forces among the population of Taiwan;
(K) an assessment of any significant gaps in any of the matters described in subparagraphs (A) through (J) with respect to which the United States assesses that additional action is needed;
(L) a description of cooperative efforts be-tween the United States and Taiwan on the matters described in subparagraphs (A)
through (K); and
(M) a description of any challenge in Taiwan to— (i) implement the matters described in subparagraphs (A) through (J); or (ii) United States support or engage ment with regard to such matters.
(3) Subsequent Reports.—Concurrently with subsequent certifications required under subsection (e)(2), the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit updates to the initial re- port required under paragraph (1) that provides a description of changes and developments that occurred in the prior year.
(4) Form.—The reports required under paragraphs (1) and (3) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
(5) Sharing of Summary.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly share any unclassified portions of the reports, pursuant to paragraph (4), with Taiwan, as appropriate.

SEC.5503. Increase in Annual Regional Contingency Stockpile Additions and Support ForTaiwan.
(a) In General.—Section 514(b)(2)(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h(b)(2)(A)) is amended by striking ‘‘$200,000,000’’ and all that follows and inserting ‘‘$500,000,000 for any of the fiscal years 2023, 2024, or 2025.’’.

(b) Establishment.—Subject to section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h), the President may establish a regional contingency stockpile for Taiwan that consists of munitions and other appropriate defense articles.

(c) Inclusion of Taiwan Among Other Allies Eligible for Defense Articles.—Chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2311 et seq.) is amended—
(1) in section 514(c)(2) (22 U.S.C. 2321h(c)(2)), by inserting ‘‘Taiwan,’’ after ‘‘Thailand,’’;
(2) in section 516(c)(2) (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)), by inserting ‘‘to Taiwan,’’ after ‘‘major non-NATO allies on such southern and southeastern flank,’’

(d) Annual Briefing.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 7 years, the President shall provide a briefing to the appropriate committees of Congress regarding the status of a regional contingency stockpile established under sub-section (b).

SEC.5504. International Military Education and Training Cooperation with Taiwan
(a) In General.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall establish or expand a comprehensive training program with Taiwan designed to—
(1) enhance interoperability and capabilities for joint operations between the United States and Taiwan;
(2) enhance rapport and deepen partnership between the militaries of the United States and Taiwan, and foster understanding of the United States among individuals in Taiwan;
(3) improve Taiwan’s defense capabilities; and (4) train future leaders of Taiwan, promote professional military education, civilian control of the military, and protection of human rights.

(b) Elements.—The training program required by subsection (a) should prioritize relevant and realistic training, including as necessary joint United States-Taiwan contingency tabletop exercises, war games, full-scale military exercises, and an enduring rotational United States military presence that assists Taiwan in maintaining force readiness and utilizing United States defense articles and services transferred from the United States to Taiwan.

(c) Authorization of Participation of Taiwan in the International Military Education and Training Program.—The Secretary of State is authorized to provide training and education to relevant entities in Taiwan through the International Military Education and Training program authorized under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 234 et seq).

SEC.5505. Additional Authorities to Support Taiwan.
(a) Drawdown Authority.—Section 506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2318(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following paragraph: “(3) In addition to amounts already specified in this section, the President may direct the drawdown of defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense, defense services of the Department of Defense, and military education and training, of an aggregate value of not to exceed $1,000,000,000 per fiscal year, to be provided to Taiwan.”

b) Emergency Authority.—Section 552(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2348a(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following: “In addition to the aggregate value of $25,000,000 authorized in paragraph (2) of the preceding sentence, the President may direct the drawdown of commodities and services from the inventory and resources of any agency of the United States Government for the purposes of providing necessary and immediate assistance to Taiwan of a value not to exceed $25,000,000 in any fiscal year”.

(c) Use of Special Defense Acquisition Fund.—The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall seek to utilize the Special Defense Acquisition Fund established under chapter 5 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2795 et seq.) to expedite the procurement and delivery of defense articles and defense services for the purpose of assisting and supporting the armed forces of Taiwan.

SEC.5506. Multi-Year Plan to Fulfill Defensive Requirements of Military Forces of Taiwan.
(a) Multi-Year Plan.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall engage for the purposes of establishing a joint consultative mechanism with appropriate officials of Taiwan to develop and implement a multi-year plan to provide for the acquisition of appropriate defensive capabilities by Taiwan and to engage with Taiwan in a series of combined training, exercises, and planning activities consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.).

(b) Elements.—The plan required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An identification of the defensive military capability gaps and capacity shortfalls of Taiwan that are required to— (A) allow Taiwan to respond effectively to (B) advance a strategy of denial, reduce the threat of conflict, thwart an invasion, and mitigate other risks to the United States and Taiwan.
(2) An assessment of the relative priority as aggression by the People’s Liberation Army or other actors from the People’s Republic of China; and signed by appropriate departments and agencies of Taiwan to include its military to address such capability gaps and capacity shortfalls.
(3) An explanation of the annual resources committed by Taiwan to address such capability gaps and capacity shortfalls.
(4) A description and justification of the relative importance of overcoming each identified capability gap and capacity shortfall for deterring, delaying, or defeating military aggression by the People’s Republic of China;
(5) An assessment of— (A) the capability gaps and capacity short-falls that could be addressed in a sufficient and timely manner by Taiwan; and (B) the capability gaps and capacity short-falls that are unlikely to be addressed in a sufficient and timely manner solely by Taiwan.
(6) An assessment of the capability gaps and capacity shortfalls described in paragraph (5)(B) that could be addressed in a sufficient and timely manner by— (A) the Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, and Direct Commercial Sales programs of the Department of State; (B) Department of Defense security assistance authorized by chapter 16 of title 10, United States Code; (C) Department of State training and education programs authorized by chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.); (D) section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2318); (E) the provision of excess defense articles pursuant to the requirements of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.); or (F) any other authority available to the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State.
(7) A description of United States or Taiwan engagement with other countries that could assist in addressing in a sufficient and timely manner the capability gaps and capacity shortfalls identified pursuant to paragraph (1).
(8) An identification of opportunities to build interoperability, combined readiness, joint planning capability, and shared situational awareness between the United States, Taiwan, and other foreign partners and allies, as appropriate, through combined training, exercises, and planning events, including—(A) table-top exercises and wargames that allow operational commands to improve joint and combined planning for contingencies involving a well-equipped adversary in a counter-intervention campaign; (B) joint and combined exercises that test the feasibility of counter-intervention strategies, develop interoperability across services, and develop the lethality and survivability of combined forces against a well-equipped adversary; (C) logistics exercises that test the feasibility of expeditionary logistics in an extended campaign with a well-equipped adversary; (D) service-to-service exercise programs that build functional mission skills for addressing challenges posed by a well-equipped adversary in a counter-intervention campaign; and (E) any other combined training, exercises, or planning with Taiwan’s military forces that the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State consider relevant.
(9) An identification of options for the United States to use, to the maximum extent practicable, existing authorities or programs to expedite military assistance to Taiwan in the event of a crisis or conflict, including— (A) a list of defense articles of the United States that may be transferred to Taiwan during a crisis or conflict; (B) a list of authorities that may be used to provide expedited military assistance to Tai- wan during a crisis or conflict; (C) an assessment of methods that could be used to deliver such assistance to Taiwan during a crisis or conflict, including— (i) the feasibility of employing such methods in different scenarios; and (ii) recommendations for improving the ability of the Armed Forces to deliver such assistance to Taiwan; and (D) an assessment of any challenges in providing such assistance to Taiwan in the event of a crisis or conflict and recommendations for addressing such challenges.

(c) Recurrence.—The joint consultative mecha- nism required in subsection (a) shall convene on a recur- ring basis and not less than annually.

SEC.5507. Fast-Tracking Sales to Taiwan Under Foreign Military Sales Program.
(a) Pre-Clearance Of Certain Foreign Military Sales Items.—
(1) In General.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, and in conjunction with coordinating entities such as the National Disclosure Policy Committee, the Arms Transfer and Technology Release Senior Steering Group, and other appropriate entities, shall compile a list of available and emerging military platforms, technologies, and equipment that are pre-cleared and prioritized for sale and release to Taiwan through the Foreign Military Sales program.
(2) Rules Of Construction.— (A) Selection Of Items.—The list compiled pursuant to paragraph (1) shall not be construed as limiting the type, timing, or quantity of items that may be requested by, or sold to, Taiwan under the Foreign Military Sales program. (B) Notifications Required.—Nothing in this Act may be construed to supersede congressional notification requirements under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et. seq.).

(b) Prioritized Processing of Foreign Military Sales Requests From Taiwan.—
(1) Requirement.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall prioritize and expedite the processing of requests from Taiwan under the Foreign Military Sales program, and may not delay the processing of requests for bundling purposes.
(2) Duration.—The requirement under paragraph (1) shall continue until the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that the threat to Taiwan has significantly abated.

(c) Interagency Policy.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly review and update interagency policies and implementation guidance related to Foreign Military Sales requests from Taiwan, including incorporating the preclearance provisions of this section.

SEC. 5508. Arms Exports Delivery Solutions for Taiwan and United States Allies in The Indo-Pacific.
(a) Appropriate Committees Of Congress Defined.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(b) Report Required.—Not later than March 1, 2023, and annually thereafter for a period of 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall transmit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report with respect to the transfer of all defense articles or defense services that have yet to be completed pursuant to the authorities provided by—
(1) section 3, 21, or 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2753, 2761, or 2776); or
(2) section 516(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)).

(c) Elements.—The report required by subsection (b) shall include the following elements:
(1) A list of all approved transfers of defense articles and services authorized by Congress pursuant to sections 25 and 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2765, 2776) with a total value of $25,000,000 or more, to Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, or New Zealand, that have not been fully delivered by the start of the fiscal year in which the report is being submitted.
(2) The estimated start and end dates of delivery for each approved and incomplete transfer listed pursuant to paragraph (1), including additional details and dates for any transfers that involve multiple tranches of deliveries.
(3) With respect to each approved and incomplete transfer listed pursuant to paragraph (1), a detailed description of— (A) any changes in the delivery dates of defense articles or services relative to the dates anticipated at the time of congressional approval of the transfer, including specific reasons for any delays related to the United States Government, defense suppliers, or a foreign partner; (B) the feasibility and advisability of pro- viding the partner subject to such delayed deliv- ery with an interim capability or solution, including drawing from United States stocks, and the mechanisms under consideration for doing so as well as any challenges to implementing such a capability or solution; (C) authorities, appropriations, or waiver requests that Congress could provide to improve delivery timelines or authorize the provision of interim capabilities or solutions identified pursuant to subparagraph (B); and (D) a description of which countries are ahead of Taiwan for delivery of each item listed pursuant to paragraph (1).
(4) A description of ongoing interagency efforts to support attainment of operational capability of the corresponding defense articles and services once delivered, including advance training with United States or armed forces of partner countries on the systems to be received. The description of any such training shall also include an identification of the training implementer.
(5) If a transfer listed pursuant to paragraph (1) has been terminated prior to the date of the submission of the report for any reason— (A) the case information for such transfer, including the date of congressional notification, delivery date of the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), final signature of the LOA, and information pertaining to delays in delivering LOAs for signature; (B) a description of the reasons for which the transfer is no longer in effect; and (C) the impact this termination will have on the intended end-user and the consequent implications for regional security, including the impact on deterrence of military action by countries hostile to the United States, the military balance in the Taiwan Strait, and other factors.
(6) A separate description of the actions the United States is taking to expedite and prioritize deliveries of defense articles and services to Taiwan, including— (A) a description of what actions the Department of State and the Department of Defense have taken or are planning to take to prioritize Taiwan’s Foreign Military Sales cases; (B) current procedures or mechanisms for determining that a Foreign Military Sales case for Taiwan should be prioritized above a sale to another country of the same or similar item; and (C) whether the United States intends to divert defense articles from United States stocks to provide an interim capability or solution with respect to any delayed deliveries to Taiwan and the plan, if applicable, to replenish any such diverted stocks.
(7) A description of other actions already undertaken by or currently under consideration by the Department of State and the Department of Defense to improve delivery timelines for the transfers listed pursuant to paragraph (1).

(d) Form.—The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

SEC.5513. Strategy to Respond to Influence and Information Operations Targeting Taiwan.
(a) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to—
(1) covert, coercive, and corrupting activities carried out to advance the Chinese Communist Party’s ‘‘United Front’’ work related to Taiwan, including activities directed, coordinated, or otherwise sup- ported by the United Front Work Department or its subordinate or affiliated entities; and
(2) information and disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and nontraditional propaganda measures supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that are directed toward persons or entities in Taiwan.

(b) Elements.—The strategy required under sub- section (a) shall include descriptions of—
(1) the proposed response to propaganda and disinformation campaigns by the People’s Republic of China and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan, including—(A) assistance in building the capacity of Taiwan’s public and private-sector entities to document and expose propaganda and disinformation supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated entities; (B) assistance to enhance Taiwan’s ability to develop a holistic strategy to respond to sharp power operations, including election interference; and (C) media training for Taiwan officials and other Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation campaigns;
(2) the proposed response to political influence operations that includes an assessment of the extent of influence exerted by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan on local political parties, financial institutions, media organizations, and other entities;
(3) support for exchanges and other technical assistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system’s ability to respond to sharp power operations; and
(4) programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center to expose misinformation and disinformation in the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda.

SEC.5525. Sense Of Congress on Expanding United States Economic Relations with Taiwan.
It is the sense of the Congress that—
(1) expanding United States economic relations with Taiwan has benefitted the people of both the United States and Taiwan, as Taiwan is now the United States 10th largest goods trading partner, 13th largest export market, 13th largest source of imports, and a key destination for United States agricultural exports;
(2) further integration would benefit both peoples and is in the strategic and diplomatic interests of the United States; and
(3) the United States should explore opportunities to expand economic agreements between Taiwan and the United States, through dialogue, and by developing the legal templates required to support potential future agreements.

Update, July 18, 2022

On this date, the Senate Armed Services Committee filed the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 in the U.S. Senate as S.4543. The NDAA was filed by Committee Chairman Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) and Ranking Member Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK).

The filed text included 3 Taiwan provisions:

SEC.1244. Defense of Taiwan
(a) Definitions – In this section:
(1) Deny – The term “deny” means to use combined joint operations to delay, degrade, and ultimately defeat an attempt by the People’s Republic of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan, resulting in—
(A) the termination of hostilities or at least the attempted fait accompli; or
(B) the neutralization of the ability of the People’s Republic of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan.
(2) Fait accompli – The term “fait accompli” refers to the strategy of the People’s Republic of China for invading and seizing control of Taiwan before the United States Armed Forces can respond effectively, while simultaneously deterring an effective combined joint response by the United States Armed Forcesby convincing the United States that mounting such a response would be prohibitively difficult or costly.

(b) Statement of Policy – Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), it shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli against Taiwan in order to deter the People’s Republic of China from using military force to unilaterally change the status quo with Taiwan.

SEC. 1245. Multi-Year Plan to Fulfill Defensive Requirements of Military Forces of Taiwan and Modification of Annual Report on Taiwan Asymmetric Capabilities and Intelligence Support
(a) Multi-year Plan – Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the American Institute in Taiwan, shall seek to engage with appropriate officials of Taiwan to develop and implement a multi-year plan to provide for the acquisition of appropriate defensive capabilities by Taiwan and to engage with Taiwan in a series of combined trainings, exercises, and planning activities, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.).

(b) Elements – The plan required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An identification of the defensive capability gaps and capacity shortfalls of Taiwan.

(2) An assessment of the relative priority assigned by appropriate officials of Taiwan to address such capability gaps and capacity shortfalls.

(3) An explanation of the annual resources committed by Taiwan to address such capability gaps and capacity shortfalls.

(4) An assessment of–
(A) the defensive capability gaps and capacity shortfalls that could be addressed in a sufficient and timely manner by unilateral efforts of Taiwan; and
(B) the defensive capability gaps and capacity shortfalls that are unlikely to be addressed in a sufficient and timely manner solely through unilateral efforts.

(5) An assessment of the capability gaps and capacity shortfalls described in paragraph (4)(B) that could be addressed in a sufficient and timely manner by—
(A) Department of Defense security assistance authorized by chapter 16 of title 10, United States Code;
(B) the Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Military Sales programs of the Department of State;
(C) the provision of excess defense articles pursuant to the requirements of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.);
(D) section 614(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; or
(E) any other authority available to the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State.

(6) An identification of opportunities to build interoperability, combined readiness, joint planning capability, and share situational awareness among the United States, Taiwan, and other foreign partners and allies, as appropriate, through combined trainings, exercises, and planning activities, including— 
(A) table-top exercises and wargames that allow operational commands to improve joint and combined war planning for contingencies involving a well-equipped adversary in a counter-intervention campaign;
(B) joint and combined exercises that test the feasibility of counter-intervention strategies, develop interoperability across services, and develop the lethality and survivability of combined forces against a well-equipped adversary;
(C) logistics exercises that test the feasibility of expeditionary logistics in an extended campaign with a well-equipped adversary;
(D) service-to-service exercise programs that build functional mission skills for addressing challenges posed by a well-equipped adversary in a counter-intervention campaign; and
(E) any other combined training, exercise, or planning activity with the military forces of Taiwan that the Secretary of Defense considers relevant.

SEC. 1251. Sense of the Senate on Supporting Prioritization of the People’s Republic of China, the Indo-Pacific Region, and Taiwan.
It is the sense of the Senate that the Senate— 
(1) supports the designations by the Department of Defense, as reflected in the 2022 National Defense Strategy and statements by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and other senior Department officials, of— 
(A) the People’s Republic of China as the Department’s pacing challenge;
(B) the Indo-Pacific as the Department’s priority theater; and
(C) a Taiwan contingency as the Department’s pacing scenario;

(2) underscores the importance of the Department continuing to prioritize the deterrence of aggression by the People’s Republic of China, particularly in the form of an invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China, as the Government of the People’s Republic of China expands and modernizes the People’s Liberation Army; and

(3) strongly urges the Department to manage force allocations across theaters to ensure, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), that the United States Armed Forces maintain the ability to deny a fait accompli against Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China in order to deter the People’s Republic of China from using force to unilaterally change the status quo with Taiwan.

Update, July 14, 2022

On this date, the U.S. House of Representatives passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (H.R. 7900) by a Yea/Nay Vote of 329-101.

The text of the legislation included 3 Taiwan provisions:

SEC. 1303. Sense of Congress on Taiwan Defense Relations
It is the sense of Congress that— 
1) the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. et seq.) and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation for United States-Taiwan relations;

(2) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes, is of grave concern to the United States;

(3) the increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the People’s Republic of China toward Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of the peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan;

(4) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan should be maintained;

(5) the United States should continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, including by— 
(A) supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities that support the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan, including anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and resilient command and control capabilities;
(B) ensuring timely review of and response to requests of Taiwan for defense articles and services;
(C) conducting practical training and military exercises with Taiwan that enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self- defense capability, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act;
(D) exchanges between defense officials and officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for the purposes of— (i) enhancing cooperation on defense planning; (ii) improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan; and (iii) improving the reserve force of Taiwan;
(E) identifying improvements in Taiwan’s ability to use asymmetric military capabilities to enhance its defensive capabilities, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act; and
(F) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and

(6) the United States should be committed to the defense of a free and open society in the face of aggressive efforts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to curtail or influence the free exercise of rights and democratic franchise.

SEC. 1312. Sense of Congress on Inviting Taiwan to the Rim of the Pacific Exercise
It is the sense of Congress that the naval forces of Taiwan should be invited to participate in the Rim of the Pacific exercise conducted in 2024.

SEC. 1313. Joint Exercises with Taiwan
(a) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) joint military exercises with Taiwan are an important component of improving military readiness and joint operability of both countries;
(2) the Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command, and other commands in the United States Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility, already possess the legal authority to carry out such exercises; and
(3) the United States should better use existing authorities to improve the readiness and joint operability of United States and Taiwanese forces.

(b) Authority Recognized
The Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command is authorized to carry out military exercises with Taiwan that—
(1) include multiple warfare domains and make extensive use of military common operations network used by United States, allied, and Taiwanese forces;
(2) to the maximum extent practical, incorporate the cooperation of 2 or more combatant and subordinate unified commands; and (3) present a complex military problem and include a force presentation of a strategic competitor.

Update, June 16, 2022

On this date, the Senate Armed Services Committee completed its markup draft of the NDAA 2023. In a vote of 23-3, the Committee voted to advance the bill to the Senate Floor for consideration.

The executive summary of the draft bill included Taiwan as an important priority:

Update, May 27, 2022

On this date, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023 was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives as H.R. 7900. It was then referred to the House Committee on Armed Services.

For the 2022 version of this post, see Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2022