

2025 年台灣 軍事防衛能量

Taiwan's Military Capacities in 2025

新境界文教基金會
國防政策諮詢小組
2015 年 5 月

New Frontier Foundation
Defense Policy Advisory
Committee
May, 2015

國防政策

藍皮書

在彙整執政經驗與學者專家見解，以鼓勵對國防議題的理性深入討論，並作為民主進步黨政見與政策的參考。

國防政策藍皮書第九號報告
DEFENSE POLICY BLUE PAPER NO. 9

2025 年台灣軍事防衛能量

Taiwan's Military Capacities in 2025

新境界文教基金會
國防政策諮詢小組

2015 年 5 月

New Frontier Foundation
Defense Policy Advisory Committee
May, 2015

序言

我國處於複雜的安全環境，面臨到不僅有軍事上的威脅，更有其他諸如天災、人為意外、傳染病、網路入侵與恐怖攻擊等等新興威脅型態。台灣需要採取整體國防的途徑，並調整國軍的角色與任務，才能有效因應此一複雜的安全環境，並兼顧到台灣社會發展需求。

政府、社會與軍隊共同構成國防的整體，因此整體國防的目標就是從這三個面向上的連結、支援到整合成一個民力與戰力結合的國防體。在政府面向上，建立應變韌性並營造軍隊創新改革環境是首要。在社會面向上，振興本土國防產業是民進黨國防政策的主軸。

在國軍面向上，首要核心任務仍為建立有效嚇阻與防衛的能量，以嚇阻中國對台軍事冒進，形塑台海穩定。同等重要的，針對保障國防相關的政府或民間資產免於受到其他國家實體與網路的襲擾，國軍責無旁貸。其次，國軍將支援其他部會或地方政府因應天災、人為意外、傳染病所需的防救能量。並針對有助於區域穩定（如海外災害防救）、國際秩序（如網路安全）與普世價值（如海外人道救援）等任務，在國防安全無虞與環境許可下，全力提供支援。

Foreword

Taiwan exists in a complex security environment, facing not only military threats, but other perils such as natural and manmade disasters, epidemics, cyber and terrorist attacks, etc. Taiwan must thus approach national defense in a holistic way, adjusting the roles and missions of the nation's armed forces to respond effectively to this complex security environment, while also accounting for the needs of the development of Taiwan's society.

The government, the society, and the armed forces together make up the totality of the national defense. Therefore, the objective of "whole-of-nation defense" should be to join together these three facets to support a national defense apparatus that combines the strengths of both the civilian and military sectors. For the government, building up responsive resilience and creating an environment conducive to innovation and reform within the armed forces are the top priorities. As for the society, revitalizing the domestic defense industry is a central axis of the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) defense policy.

In the military realm, the establishment of effective deterrence and defense capabilities remains the core mission, maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait by deterring Chinese military aggression toward Taiwan. Just as importantly, however, the military also have an unavoidable role to play in preventing both physical and cyber intrusions against either the government's defense-related assets or private property by any other country. Additionally, the military must assist in providing the required rescue capabilities to other agencies or local governments in responding to natural and manmade disasters or epidemics. As well, any mission that will enhance regional security (such as foreign disaster relief), contribute to the international order (such as cyber security), and advance universal values (such as foreign humanitarian assistance), should be undertaken with full support, so long as the conditions permit and there is no national security risk.

考量未來 10 年的威脅與機會，民進黨重返執政後將以更為縝密戰略規劃，更堅定的決心，更創新的方法，提供國軍達成前項任務所需的人、物與財力資源。

在人力資源上，必須從國防戰略、軍事作戰構想與戰術需求的整體架構思考，並從人力資源自社會獲得的管道、透過軍中培養與運用、而後帶著高度競爭力回到社會等上、中、下游每個環節進行改革與精進。兵役制度的轉型需要更長的轉換期，面臨遽增的國防安全風險，當務之急是先修補馬政府兵役政策的缺失。基於（一）建立優質戰力能量為最終目標，（二）建立人力優質化帶動優質戰力的良性循環以及（三）兼顧役男生涯規劃等三項考量下，未來兵力制度的全面檢討將朝向以下五個方向邁進：

一、役男徵集入營接受四個月軍事訓練，暫不變動。但我們將提高軍事訓練的效率，並提供部隊見習的機會。

二、檢討現有部隊人力結構，以增加聘僱人員、國防文官與委外等措施降低志願役士兵需求數量。志願役軍士官兵視專業及其養成期程之不同，於獲得管道、薪給予以明顯區別。

三、在既有考選、甄選管道外，新創「優選」管道，選拔優秀且專業發展潛能者，獎勵從軍，結合軍文專業教育予以長期培養。

In thinking about the threats and opportunities of the next ten years, the DPP will utilize more meticulous strategic planning, more resolute determination, and more innovative methods to provide the military with the human, material, and financial resources to meet the missions outlined above upon returning to government.

The issue of human resources must be considered on the basis of a comprehensive framework of national defense strategy, operational concepts, and tactical requirements. Further, the talents drawn from the society at large, after undergoing the training and experience within the military, should be able to bring highly competitive skills and expertise upon returning to the private sector. The conditions in each phase of this cycle—the upstream, midstream, and downstream—must be improved and upgraded. The transformation of military service system needs longer period of transiting time. Facing the increasing defense security risk, the most urgent task is to mend the flaw caused by Ma's military service policies. Based on 1) the building up of competent combat capabilities as the primary objective; 2) create a virtuous cycle of creating competent human assets driving more competent talent to join the armed forces; and 3) taking into account the individual career planning of conscripts, the future planning of the military service policy will be in the follow five directions:

- (1) There will be no change for the time being to the current four-month compulsory military training requirement for all males of service age. We will raise the efficiency of military training and provide opportunities for trainees to work with volunteers.
- (2) Examine the human power structure of the military. Reduce the required number of volunteers by measures such as civilian employees, defense officials, or outsourcing. Recruiting channels and salary of volunteers will be differentiated according to their professions and training period.
- (3) Create a “selection” recruit channel for young talents who have professional potential and provide incentives for them joining the armed forces. A combined military and civilian professional education will enable the long-term cultivation of leadership talent.

四、精進後備制度，於現有召集管道外，創建由志願役軍士官兵甄選所組成的地區後備部隊。

五、珍惜國軍現有人力資源，未經全面檢討戰略構想與兵力規模前，「勇固案」暫不實施，以五年內即將離開現役之軍士官為優先對象，實施優質化再教育，培養返回民間所需的專業技能。

民進黨重返執政將會營造更開放的討論平台，讓包括兵役制度在內的所有國防改革相關政策，能夠在取得社會與朝野共識後，會在執政十個月後的第一本「四年期國防總檢討」中定案發佈。

在物力資源上，民進黨許諾：將提供國軍財力負荷許可內最優質的武器裝備，除全面提升單兵個人裝備外，延續現有採購案外，民進黨將以國際合作、本土研製的途徑，主動面對下一代兵力整建的到來，置建軍重點於以下方向：

一、整合國軍現有資電作戰與民間能量，成立第四軍種，肩負捍衛數位國土，使國防相關之資產與基礎設施免於組織性駭客與恐怖份子的網路侵襲。

二、強化飛彈防護能量以及研製可在飛彈突襲下存活的可恃戰力（如：潛艦、無人飛行系統、無人水下載具與垂直或短場起降戰機）。

(4) Augment the current reserve forces system by creating units of local reserves made up of volunteer officers and soldiers.

(5) In order to preserve the competent cadre in the military, any further force downsizing such as “Yong Ku Program” will be suspended before the completeness of a comprehensive assessment of operational concepts and force size. Re-education programs should be provided to inculcate professional skills in demand in the private sector, targeting as priority the officers who are anticipated to leave the service within the next five years.

In returning to power, the DPP will create a more open platform to discuss all policy proposals relating to the defense reform including military service issues. After forming a firm bipartisan and societal consensus, we will publicize our policies in our first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) within 10 months of assuming office.

In the area of material resources, the DPP pledges to provide the highest quality weapons and equipment that our financial resources will possibly allow. In addition to a complete upgrade of individual personal gear and continuing the currently outstanding procurement orders, the DPP will utilize an approach combining international cooperation and indigenous production to proactively meet the challenge of building up a next-generation military. In doing so, we will adhere to the following priorities

(1) Combine cyber and electronic warfare capabilities present within the civilian sector with existing military capabilities in this area to make up a “Fourth Service” to defend the digital territory and safeguard defense-related assets and critical infrastructure from cyber-attacks orchestrated by organized hackers and terrorists.

(2) Strengthen missile defense capabilities and develop capabilities that can survive missile attack (such as submarines, unmanned aerial systems, unmanned underwater vehicle, and vertical and/or short take-off and landing [V/STOL] aircraft).

三、強化不對稱戰力（如：水雷、巡弋飛彈與網攻能量）以阻止敵人掌握台海制空與制海權，並打亂敵人全面進犯之作戰節奏。

四、維持現有海空投射能力以維護海上運輸線安全，並可執行海外人道救援與災害救助。

五、建立快速應變地面部隊，維持高度戰備狀態，輔以志願役地區後備部隊，能在無預警或極短預警的條件下，於城鎮地區遂行反突襲與災害防救任務。

民進黨承諾將會依台灣經濟成長率穩定增加國防預算，讓國軍獲得優質的人物力資源，以達成任務。同時，我們將更加嚴謹財政紀律與戰略規劃，善用納稅人對國防的貢獻。我們也會採取聰明投資的途徑，讓國防今天的人物力需求，成為明天台灣社會進步的動力與資產。

台灣國防需要真正的改變，必須從政府、社會與軍隊三個面向全面地進行。重振戰力不僅只靠引進光鮮的武器裝備，更需要同時從深層的國防思維與軍隊文化改起。這會是個艱鉅的任務，但，容不得拖延。

蔡英文

新境界文教基金會 董事長

(3) Increase asymmetric capabilities (such as sea mines, cruise missiles, and cyber warfare) to deny adversaries from air and sea control, as well as disrupt the operational tempo of the adversary's all-our assault.

(4) Preserve the existing air and naval projection capabilities and maintain the security of the sea lines of communication, as well as undertaking foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions.

(5) Establish a rapid response ground force that is kept in a state of high readiness, supplemented by volunteer local reserve units with the ability to deploy to urban areas to respond to attacks or carry out disaster relief tasks on very short or no warning.

The DPP is committed to making steady increases to the national defense budget corresponding to Taiwan's economic growth, providing the armed forces with quality human and material resources to accomplish its missions. At the same time, we will exercise more rigorous fiscal discipline and utilize strategic planning to make the most effective use of the contributions from our taxpayers. We will also implement smart investment approaches to make the national defense manpower and material requirements of today into the assets and engines of Taiwan's social development of tomorrow.

Taiwan's defense will need genuine reform, starting from the government, society, and the military to initiate progress in all three dimensions. The revitalization of combat capabilities is not only a matter of introducing new weapons systems and equipment, but requires initiating changes from the deeper level of defense mindset and military culture. This will be a challenging task that must, nevertheless, be undertaken without delay.

Ing-Wen Tsai

President, New Frontier Foundation

摘要

這本國防政策藍皮書承續一年前所發佈的第五號藍皮書《二〇二五年中國對台軍事威脅評估》(2014年3月)，經過更多與外界的討論後，針對因應中國軍事威脅而我國應有的建軍重點提出相關的政策建議。

首先，針對未來台灣所面臨的軍事威脅與我國國防資產應當掌握的國際貢獻，這本藍皮書提出威脅與機會的評估。國防小組認為基於威脅與機會評估所得，未來國軍建軍宜以以下三個優先順位擇要進行：

第一順位為：(一) 高風險但現有戰力明顯不足之威脅，為對國防相關設施之網路攻擊，應為國軍大幅改善之處。(二) 不容任何疏失之威脅，包括中國以傳統武力進行恫嚇、中國全面進犯奪取台灣，應為維持並持續改善之處。(三) 國際高需求度且國內參與意願高的機會，但國軍卻能力不足的項目，資安合作屬此。此一類別的四項威脅或機會，應當為未來十年國軍建軍的重點。

第二順位所列者為：(一) 高風險但現有戰力足堪因應之威脅，如境內發生天災或疫情；或(二) 高風險但現有戰力明顯不足之威脅，但非國防部能獨力負責者，如對民間關鍵基礎設施之網路攻擊；或(三) 國際高需求度且我國參與意願高的機會，而國軍能力足夠的項目，如海外災害防救。此一類別的三項威脅或機會，多須藉由精進跨部會協調整合，才能增進任務整體效果，應列為十年國軍建軍的次要重點。

Summary

This defense policy blue paper follows blue paper No. 5, *China's Military Threat Against Taiwan in 2025*, published last year (March, 2014). After many discussions with outside experts and stakeholders, this paper puts forth a policy proposal of the most critical priorities in building defense capabilities to respond to the Chinese military threat.

First of all, this paper provides an assessment of the risks and opportunities with regard to the future military threat that Taiwan faces, as well as the global contributions that are feasible for our defense assets to make. The defense policy advisory committee believes that in accordance with this assessment of risks and opportunities, the future military force build-up should proceed based on the following ranking of priorities:

Priority #1: (1) Where risks are high but existing capabilities are clearly insufficient to meet the threat—particularly, in facing cyberattacks on defense-related assets—there should be areas designated for large-scale improvements; (2) threat areas that absolutely cannot be neglected, such as that of Chinese conventional military coercion or all-out invasion, should see continuing improvement; (3) capabilities that are globally in high demand, and for which the domestic desire for participation is strong, yet the capacities of the armed forces are currently insufficient—such as cyber security cooperation. These should be the priority areas of military force build-up over the next 10 years.

Priority #2: (1) Areas of high risk where current capabilities are sufficient to respond, such as domestic natural disaster or epidemics; or (2) areas of high risk where capabilities are clearly insufficient to meet the threat but in which military is not exclusively responsible, such as cyberattacks against civil critical infrastructure; or (3) capabilities that are globally in high demand, domestic desire for participation is strong, and for which the national armed forces possess sufficient capacity to provide, such as foreign disaster relief (FDR). The three categories of threats and opportunities in this category require multi-faceted advancements in inter-agency coordination and integration to achieve significant improvements in the effectiveness of completing the missions. They should be classified as the secondary priorities for the next ten years of military force build-up.

第三順位所列者為：國際需求度次高而我國參與意願不低的機會，現有戰力足堪掌握運用，如維護海上交通線安全與海外人道救援，此一類別的機會均可在完成前二順位的同時一併精進。

其次，為達成「整體國防」的國防戰略目標，這本藍皮書建議民進黨於重返執政後，在兵役制度、建軍方向與預算支持等三個重要議題上努力的方向。

在兵役制度上，應全面檢討現行制度，所謂「全面」，並非推翻現有制度，而是從國防戰略、軍事作戰構想與戰術需求的整體架構思考，而是從人力資源上、中、下游的整體檢討，是從人力資源自社會取得、透過軍中培養與運用、而後帶著高度競爭力回到社會等各個面向每個環節進行改革與精進。基於台灣獨特的社會發展，兵役制度設計勿需一味仿效外國或自陷非徵即募的迷思，而是發展出具有台灣特色、符合國家安全與社會發展的制度。建議民進黨在兵役制度的規劃應基於以下三項原則：

（一）建立優質戰力能量為最終目標：確保國家安全為任何兵役制度規劃之前提，建立因應 21 世紀威脅的 21 世紀國防戰力為民進黨國防政策的整體目標之一；

（二）建立人力優質化帶動優質戰力的良性循環：兵役制度是長期性的規劃，應先求軍內改革，培養軍事與民間專長並重互用的軍旅環境，以有助於發展其個人競爭力為募兵誘因。

Third priority: Capabilities that are in global demand, where domestic motivation to participate exists, and the armed forces possess sufficient capacities to be utilized, such as maintaining secure sea lines of communication and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA). This category of opportunities can be pursued together with the first two priority areas.

In order to meet the objective of “whole-of-nation defense”, this blue paper makes recommendations for the direction in which the DPP should focus its efforts if it assumes power—namely, the military service system, force buildup, and budgetary support.

With regard to the military service system, the existing system must be comprehensively reviewed. “Comprehensive” does not necessarily signify overturning the current scheme, but rather, ensuring that the policy is grounded within a comprehensive plan that flows from a national defense strategy, operational concepts, and tactical requirements. As well, the overall environment for each phase in the human resource cycle—upstream, mid-stream, and downstream—should be reformed and improved with the aim of drawing quality talent from the broader society, providing meaningful training and experience during military service, and equipping service members with competitive skills upon return to the civilian sector. Given the unique development path of Taiwan’s society, it makes no sense for its military service system to blindly reproduce a foreign model or to follow self-imposed constraints regarding either volunteer or conscription. Instead, a system should be developed that reflects the particular characteristics of Taiwan’s social development and national defense requirements. The DPP is thus recommended to implement a military service scheme in accordance with the following three principles:

(1) The establishment of competent combat capabilities is the most ultimate goal: Safeguarding national security is the most basic precondition for the design of any military service system. Building a 21st century force capable of meeting the threats of the 21st century is the goal of the DPP’s defense policy.

(2) Creating a virtuous cycle of creating competent human assets driving more competent talent to join the armed forces: Planning of the military service system should be a long-term task that should begin with internal reforms within the military to cultivate an environment of mutually reinforcing professional skill demands between the civilian and military sectors, such that opportunities for career skills development can be a recruitment incentive.

(三) 兼顧役男生涯規劃：在達成前項良性循環之前，於過渡期間內，顧及屆齡役男生涯規劃，軍事訓練將予以精進，但四個月的訓期暫不更動。

具體的改革建議包括以下五項：

(一) 役男徵集入營接受四個月軍事訓練，暫不變動。但可考慮採取專才專用、整合性訓練、訓駐合一等精進措施，使得接受軍事訓練的役男能發揮所長，在過渡期間內，緩和人力不足的問題：

(二) 提升現行考選、甄選之志願役軍士官的專業性。視軍事專業之不同，於獲得管道、專業養成期程、薪給予以明顯區別。同時，可考慮透過軍轉文與國防文官考試，擴大國防部與其他軍事機關文官數量，擴大非機敏性業務委外規模，逐步降低專業軍人需求數量，並增加專業軍人的專業性。

(三) 考慮創設「優選」管道，選拔優秀且具備專業發展潛能者，由國防部與國防產業公司獎助，透過與發展專長相符之學術單位之合作，同時接受軍文專業教育，完成教育後投入軍旅與國防產業，再行進階培養。

(四) 檢討改進現行動員制度、組織與作業，以能遂行支援災害防救任務。創設由志願甄選之軍士官組成的地區後備部隊，依志願役軍士官比例給予薪給，每兩週入營兩天，保持高度戰備以能迅速就位支援戰備應變部隊。

(3) Take the career planning of draft-age males into greater consideration: During the transition period before the above-described virtuous cycle is achieved, take into account the career planning of conscription-eligible males by improving the quality of military training, while leaving unchanged for the time being the four-month compulsory basic training requirement.

Recommendations for substantive reform include the following five items:

(1) Make no change to the four-month basic training requirement for now, but consider professional skill-specific utilization of manpower and implementing integrated, on-site training to enable draftees to realize their talents, while addressing the manpower shortage during the transition phase.

(2) Raise the level of professional specialization of officers entering service through the established channels. Based on different military specialties, we will make obvious differentiation of recruit channels, required time for professional training, and salary scales. At the same time, it may also be possible to reduce the overall number of professional active duty service members needed by expanding the number of civil service personnel in the Ministry of National Defense (MND) as well as other defense-security related agencies through a “military-to-civilian” transition program and the defense civil servant special examination, as well as outsourcing of non-sensitive functions. This would also have the effect of elevating the professionalism of career soldiers.

(3) Create a “selection” recruit channel for young talents who have professional potential. Then the candidates will receive scholarships from the MND and the defense industry. Partnered with matching academic institutions for professional development, the candidates can receive both civilian and military professional education at the same time. Upon graduation, they can enter military service and the defense industry to receive more advanced training.

(4) Evaluate the current system, organization, and operation of mobilization for supporting disaster relief missions. Create units of local reserve forces made up of volunteer officers and soldiers, compensated according to the same proportion of pay scale as active duty, who will be in training two days every two weeks, thus maintaining rapid reaction units at all times that are in a state of high readiness and ready for immediate deployment in support.

(五) 珍惜國軍現有人力資源，未經全面檢討戰略構想與兵力規模前，「勇固案」暫不實施。以五年內即將離開現役之軍士官為優先對象，實施優質化再教育，培養返回民間所需的專業技能(第二專長，例如資安管理)，透過營區內、外的軍、產、學、研跨界合作實施。同時，有效時間管理，杜絕人力閒置，除快速應變部隊外，其餘部隊專注於教育訓練，達成人力優質化目標。

民進黨重返執政後，建議隨即進行包括兵役制度在內的國防改革議題的公開理性討論，在執政十個月後的第一本「四年期國防總檢討」中發佈兵役制度定案。也將基於尊重軍事專業的客觀文人領軍精神，由身負聯合作戰指揮官之參謀總長主導下，發佈台灣首次之「國家軍事戰略」，並形成四年更新一次之慣例。

在建軍議題上，建議民進黨重返執政後致力於以下重點軍力的發展：

(一) 即刻補強國軍資訊作戰能力：以建立世界級網路攻防能量為目標。並逐步擴大至國整體數位國土之防護，讓台灣不僅是資訊強國，也將會是資安強國。於此同時，台灣應主動分享資安經驗與技術，建立與民主國家間資安合作體系。具體的措施包括：在現有的陸、海、空軍軍種外，整合現有國軍資訊、通訊與電子相關之單位與能量，成立獨立的第四軍種。

(5) Preserve the existing military cadre by halting implementation of the “Yong Ku Program” for further force downsizing, pending a thorough evaluation rooted more firmly in a defined strategic concept and corresponding manpower requirement. Provide officers anticipated to leave service within five years with quality retraining in professional skills in demand in the private sector (such as cyber security management) through cross-sector cooperative effort between the military, industry, academia, and research institutions. Simultaneously, through effective time management, eliminate the phenomenon of idle human resources by focusing all units on education and training, except for those on high readiness for rapid deployment, to move toward the goal of upgrading the quality of personnel.

If the DPP is to return to government, it should immediately proceed with an open policy discussion of necessary defense reform policies, including to the military service system, and announce its plans for the system in the administration's first QDR, to be published within 10 months of assuming office. In the spirit of civilian leaders deferring to the professional expertise of uniformed leadership, the administration should then direct the Chief of the General Staff to supervise the production of Taiwan's inaugural “National Military Strategy,” which should also be made into a new quadrennial practice.

In the area of force buildup, the DPP is recommended to address the following priorities in force development upon returning to government:

(1) Immediately reinforce the armed forces' information warfare capabilities, with the establishment of a world-class cyber warfare capability as the ultimate objective, while also gradually expanding the comprehensive defense of the national digital territory, to make Taiwan into not just a world leader in information technology, but also one in information security. Simultaneously, Taiwan should take the initiative to share its experience and skills in this area to form a system for cyber security cooperation among democratic nations. An essential first task toward accomplishing this goal would be combining all competences relating to information, communications, and electronics currently present across all military units, to establish an independent Fourth Service alongside the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

(二) 增強飛彈防禦能量：未來 10 年，網路襲擾與導彈攻擊將會是中國對台遂行武力恫嚇的主要工具，也必然是對台全面進犯時的第一擊主力。面對中國導彈威脅從未減輕的事實，台灣需增強導彈防禦能量，具體措施包括：以自製與外購並行的方式，擴大現有飛彈防禦之密度至能涵蓋所有主要海空基地，具有能抵抗四波全面性攻擊的存彈，並增強各飛彈防禦單位機動性與獨力作戰能力。空海軍基地與設施強化工程應予持續，跑道搶修能量應持續精進外，核心的政軍指揮管制中心除強化抗炸能量外，應建立備援中心或機動指管設備。

(三) 建立能在敵飛彈突襲下高存活戰力：高存活戰力用以阻卻敵人在飛彈奇襲後掌握制空與制海，粉碎敵速戰速決的計算。為建立能在敵飛彈突襲下高存活戰力，具體措施包括：未來空軍除繼續完成現有戰機的升級外，建議以外購或研製方式，以取得具有垂直或短場起降能力的戰機為首要。建議民進黨在重返執政後將啟動真正的潛艦國造，以 2025 年前完成第 1 艘新構型的潛艦下水為目標，並建立國內船廠完整之潛艦設計、製造、維修能量與提高自製率。

(四) 持續研發不對稱武器：不對稱武器負有打亂敵作戰節奏之任務，以增加解放軍犯台困難度與不確定性，爭取戰力重整以遂行抵抗反擊的時間。而國軍過去業已研製出性能優異、相對價廉的不對稱武器，未來應持續維持研製動能。

(2) Strengthen missile defense capacity: In the next 10 years, cyberattacks and missile attacks will become the primary tools of Chinese military intimidation toward Taiwan, and will also become the first strike measures in an attempt for complete takeover. In light of the reality that the Chinese missile threat toward Taiwan has never diminished, Taiwan must increase and strengthen its capacity for missile defense. Substantive measures to this end would include expanding the density of existing missile defense capacity, through foreign procurement in parallel with indigenous production, to cover all essential air and naval bases; ensuring the maintenance of sufficient munitions to defend against four waves of all-out military assault; and enhancing the mobility and independent operating capability of each missile defense unit. Apart from continuing to harden air and naval facilities, improve rapid runaway repair capabilities, and strengthening anti-explosive defenses at core command and control centers, it may also be desirable to establish backup or mobile command and command centers.

(3) Build up high combat survivability to withstand enemy missile strikes: High combat survivability is important for deterring the adversary from seizing control of the air and sea space following a missile strike, and for thwarting the enemy's plans for achieving a speedy victory from a distance. To take substantive measures for developing high combat survivability under missile strike conditions, it is recommended that the air force, apart from completing the existing plans for upgrading the jet fighter fleet, make it a priority to acquire aircraft with V/STOL capability either through foreign procurement or through domestic development and production. In addition, plans for indigenous submarine development should be implemented in earnest following DPP's return to government, with the goal of completing the first domestically designed/produced submarine by the year 2025, while building up the domestic shipbuilders' capacities for design, production, maintenance as well as raising the percentage of self-produced components.

(4) Continue the research and development of asymmetric capabilities: Asymmetric capabilities are responsible for disrupting the operational tempo of the adversary's combat operations and increasing the degree of difficulty and uncertainty associated with a takeover of Taiwan by the PLA, with the aim of gaining additional time for replenishing forces and organizing a counterattack. Taiwan's military has previously produced high quality and relatively inexpensive asymmetric capabilities, and this research and development momentum should be sustained.

(五) 轉型地面兵力：濱海阻擊與城鎮作戰將是國軍地面部隊的主要任務，並必須認知到可能將面對：無海空的有效支援或保護、敵人掌握機先且敵情不明、國內社會陷入混亂等極為不利的戰場環境。目前仍嫌鈍重的地面部隊組織與部署方式，難以因應此種時地因素下的戰鬥。我們具體建議：地面部隊應強化遠程火力打擊能力，並與海軍岸置反艦火力密切配合，有效構成濱海阻擊能力。現階段，強化首都衛戍，重新釐清首都衛戍範圍與兵力部署。建立高戰備可快速應變之具有能立即打擊解放軍特種作戰的常備地面部隊能量，負有防止解放軍在第一擊前後奪取機場、港口、重要政軍指揮管制中心與首都地區的任務。具有可迅速動員、就位與作戰的後備地面部隊能量，可支援常備部隊共同擔負因應解放軍 2 個加強師之任務。

(六) 維持制空與制海既有戰力：在研製海軍水下戰力與空軍新一代戰機的同時，現有戰力應予維持、升級。這些主戰載台不僅是國軍防衛主力，也可支援海外人道救援與災害防救任務。目前我空軍主戰兵力 F-16 A/B 與 IDF 戰機正進行升級，替代 AT-3 的新款高級教練機亦可能在 2016 年前定案。海軍部分，隨著中大型水面艦艦齡老化，海軍未來水面艦更新需求龐大，將在預算許可範圍下選擇最關鍵性項目優先推動，並以國艦國造與細水長流的方式執行。

(5) Transforming ground forces: Coastal defense and urban combat are the main missions of ground forces, which must be cognizant of the scenario that they may face, including extremely unfavorable conditions such as lack of support or protection from air and naval forces, capture of critical initiatives by the adversary in unknown whereabouts, social chaos and confusion, etc. The current makeup, organizational structure, and deployment of our ground forces, which still emphasize heavy force, would be severely challenged in responding to these types of combat conditions and factors. We therefore recommend: strengthening ground units' long-range firepower and strike capability, in close coordination with the firepower of the navy's surface-to-ship missiles, to form an effective coastal defense capability; bolstering the current capital garrison forces by clarifying its scope and the designation of associated units; creating well-equipped ground units capable of rapid response to PLA special operations forces, to be tasked with defending against PLA incursion. such as seizing airports, seaports, essential government and military command and control centers, and the capital area, following an initial missile strike. With specialized rapid-response units, the activated reserve ground forces can support standing units to jointly confront two of the PLA's reinforced divisions.

(6) Maintain existing capabilities for air and sea control: While in the process of developing and producing the Navy's new generation underwater combat capabilities and the Air Force's next generation fighters, the existing capabilities must be preserved and upgraded. These combat platforms not only make up Taiwan's primary defensive capabilities, but can also be used to support FHA/FDR missions. Presently, our main air combat capabilities are undergoing upgrades to the F-16 A/B and IDF aircraft, while the program of new model AT-3 advanced trainers should be initiated in 2016. As for the Navy, it faces immense needs in the future for updates and upgrades to the current aging fleet of mid- and large-sized surface vessels. Within reason of budgetary constraints, the acquisition of these items should be prioritized, with an emphasis on domestic production over a steady, extended time span.

在國防預算議題上，國防小組針對我國、美國、中國、南韓、新加坡、以色列、英國、德國、法國、澳洲與日本等 11 個國家進行國防預算的比較，得出結論為：我國國防預算逐年探底的主要原因，是政府缺乏決心與規劃來增加國防預算。相形於其他國家普遍維持國防預算穩定成長率，台灣的國防預算成長卻嚴重遲滯，在 2001-2008 年民進黨第一次執政期間，尚維持平均 2.7% 的成長率，但自 2009-2014 年國民黨執政期間，國防預算平均成長率竟出現 -1.4% 的負成長，不禁令人搖頭。

同時，我國國防預算的編列亦嚴重缺乏穩定性，相對於各國穩定的成長，台灣的國防預算增減起伏的頻率與幅度均大，在預算獲得不確定性高的狀況下，國防預算是否能夠獲得善用實令人存疑。

民進黨已再三宣示：重返執政之後，將努力恢復國防預算至 GDP 3% 之水準。國防小組建議：國防預算不足是事實，增加國防預算有其必要，但更重要地，在於增加的預算需要在完整的戰略規劃架構下，經嚴謹的財務紀律，用於正確的方向。特別在國家財政赤字高漲之際，政府的國防預算應與經濟發展契合，振興本土國防產業的國防政策應當堅持。因為只有國內經濟成長，特別是自足的本土國防產業，國防預算才有穩定成長的空間。

因此，國防小組建議：國防預算應當增加，而且以經濟發展的速度等比增加，且視本土國防產業的發展重點擇要增加。新增之預算 70% 集中於國防自主研發為重點的軍事投資項下，因為只有武器裝備真正的提升，才可能在不損及戰力的國家安全前提下，降低所需的專業軍人數目，降低人員維持費用的比例。新增預算用於人員維持費的不宜超過 10%，人員維持費仍應控管在國防年度支出 50% 以下。■

On the issue of the national defense budget, the defense policy committee undertook a comparison between Taiwan's and 10 other countries, including the U.S, the PRC, South Korea, Singapore, Israel, the U.K., Germany, France, Australia, and Japan, and concluded that the principal reason that the level of our own spending on national defense has dipped year after year is the lack of resolve on the part of the government to plan for raising defense spending as a policy priority. Relative to the other countries, which mostly maintain a stable rate of increase in their defense spending levels, the growth of Taiwan's defense budget is in severe decline. During the first DPP government between 2001 and 2008, the national defense budget grew at an average annual rate of 2.7%. But under the KMT administration between 2009 and 2014, Taiwan's yearly military spending actually appears to have a negative growth rate of -1.4%..

At the same time, the defense budgeting process also lacks predictability. In comparison with the steady increases observed in other countries, Taiwan's spending swings between growth and decline with relatively high frequency and wide ranges. Under conditions of high budgetary uncertainty, it is questionable whether the resources that are allocated can be most effectively utilized.

The DPP has already committed on multiple occasions to endeavor to restore the defense budget to the level of GDP 3%. The defense policy committee advises that while the level of spending is undeniably insufficient, increasing the budget must be done within a complete framework of strategic planning. The government must insist, as a matter of policy, that the defense budget correspond with the country's economic growth while promoting indigenous defense industries. Only with economic growth, and particularly a self-sufficient domestic defense industry, can we carve out space for a stable and sustainable growth in the military budget.

Accordingly, the defense policy advisory committee recommends that defense spending be increased at a geometric rate in accordance to the rate of economic growth and favor the development of the domestic defense industry. Of the newly added spending, 70% should be concentrated toward investing in indigenous defense research and development, because only through a genuine upgrading of arms and equipment will it be possible to decrease the number of required professional soldiers—and therefore, decrease the proportion of financial resources devoted toward personnel costs—without negatively impacting national security or undermining defense capabilities. The amount of the increased spending allocated toward personnel costs should not exceed 10%, and these costs should continue to make up less than 50% of the total annual defense spending. ■

壹、民進黨對於中國軍事威脅的重視

與中國保持良性經貿與文化互動的同時，民進黨從未漠視中國人民解放軍近年來擴張軍備的事實，也從未輕忽此一事實對於台灣的國家安全與區域的和平穩定所帶來的威脅。

在第一次執政之前，民進黨即由中國事務部邀集學者專家不定期針對中國軍事威脅提出書面評估。執政期間，即便擁有中央執政的行政資源，民進黨對於中國軍事威脅的獨立評估仍持續至 2004 年，執政的民進黨政府更在 2006 年提出我國首部《國家安全報告》（2008 年發佈更新版）。而國民黨政府不僅在 2008 年執政前鮮少對於中國軍事威脅同樣的關注外，執政後其國安團隊也迄今未再發佈《國家安全報告》，坐實社會對國民黨政府輕忽國防之指責，也突顯國民黨政府對於中國軍事威脅日益嚴重的漠視。

而同一期間，民進黨即便在野，仍保持對於中國軍事威脅的高度重視。2009 年 3 月，由民進黨執政期間的前國防部長蔡明憲帶領下，由前立法委員李文忠、前國防部機要張國城、前國安會諮詢委員陳文

**相較於國民黨政府，民進黨即便
現在在野，仍保持對於中國軍事
威脅的高度重視**

政、國防專家陳宗逸、前國防部機要蘇紫雲共同所撰寫《建立「持久與不對稱」的戰力：台灣國防建軍建議》，針對中國即將在 2010

年前後達成軍力「質量超越台軍」的目標，懇切提出建立 7 項核心戰力與 3 項制度改革的建議。2012 年，民進黨在原有智庫架構下新增國防政策諮詢小組（以下簡稱國防小組），以更多元參與的途徑，進行國防政策相關研析與準備。2014 年 5 月，在智庫發佈的國防政策藍皮書第 5 號報告《2025 年中國對台軍事威脅評估》，對中國國防科技與戰力的發展以及解放軍針對我國之資訊襲擾、導彈攻擊、制空權與制海權等威脅提出前瞻性的分析與相關的因應建議。經徵詢更多學者專家（包括 11 位退役軍方人員）的意見（彙整如下所列）後，1 年後的今天，我們針對中國對台軍事威脅未來的建軍因應方向，提出更具體的方案。

I. DPP's Emphasis on the Chinese Military Threat

While maintaining positive economic and cultural interaction with China, the DPP has never lost sight of China's continuous military expansion, nor has it ever neglected the threat that China poses to Taiwan's national security, and to the peace and stability in the region.

Before its first term in power, the DPP's China Affairs Department periodically invited scholars and experts to submit written assessment reports on China's military threat. While in office, the party's independent assessments of China's military threat continued until 2004, despite access to central governmental resources. Furthermore, it was a DPP government that presented Taiwan's first "National Security Report" in 2006 (updated in 2008). On the other hand, before taking office in 2008, the KMT government rarely paid the same level of attention to the Chinese military threat, and its national security team has never presented a "National Security Report" since assuming office. This has confirmed the public's criticism towards the KMT's negligence on national security, and has also highlighted the KMT's ignorance towards China's growing military threat.

In the meantime, even while out of office, DPP maintains a high degree of attention on the Chinese military threat. In March 2009, a group headed by former DPP Minister of Defense Michael Tsai,

Compared with KMT administration, even while out of office at this moment, DPP maintains a high degree of attention on the Chinese military threat

and comprised of former DPP Legislator Lee, Wen-chung, former Ministry of Defense Secretariat Chang, Kuo-cheng, former National Security Council Senior Advisor York Chen, military expert

Chen, Tsung-yu, and former Ministry of Defense Secretariat Su, Tzu-yun co-authored a paper titled "Establishing 'Sustainable Asymmetric' Warfare: Suggestions on Taiwan's Military Development". This publication proposed seven recommendations towards establishing core military power and three recommendations for institutional reform aimed to address the PLA's goal to surpass Taiwan's military in 2010. In 2012, the DPP established the Defense Policy Advisory Committee (hereinafter the Defense Committee) under its original think-tank structure in order to conduct national defense policy research and analysis in a multi-dimensional way. In May 2014, the DPP published its fifth defense paper titled *China's Military Threats against Taiwan in 2025*, proposing forward-looking analysis and recommendations for countermeasures towards China's defense technology and military development, and the PLA's information warfare, missile attacks, airpower, and sea power. Today, after a year of further consulting with scholars and experts (including eleven retired military personnel), we have established a more specific proposal on Taiwan's military development to face China's military threat.

貳、外界的建議

在國防政策的研析與準備過程中，國防小組向來本著「政策擬定與實踐都應當是多元參與的過程。只有跨軍文、跨部門、跨領域、跨國界的協調整合，才足以因應日趨複雜的國防議題」（國防政策第 1 號藍皮書《民進黨的國防議題》）。自 2012 年 9 月至 2015 年 4 月底，國防小組計召開 36 次會議，參與的退役軍方人員已逾 110 人次。在針對我國未來建軍方向的重大議題上，整理外界的建議（與國防小組的回應）如下：

（一）未來的建軍規劃不應只從威脅面向思考，而應從國家利益與整體發展上，掌握可能的機會，以發揮國防資產的效益與潛能。（國防小組的回應：在進行國防安全威脅風險評估時，加列機會評估）

（二）軍事戰略不外「建立戰力」與「運用戰力」，前者是文人的政策指導，後者是軍人的作戰構想。為尊重軍人專業，文人應將後者留給軍人來研擬。（國防小組的回應：本藍皮書作出政策建議，重返執政後，由參謀總長領導參謀本部研擬出我國首部的《國家軍事戰略》）

（三）政府財力有限，建軍規劃應有預算的考量，民進黨應在提出自我研製或向外採購武器裝備項目時，概略提出可能的財力負擔與國防預算增加的幅度。（國防小組回應：本藍皮書在政策建議所涉及之重大軍備議題，已在之前的藍皮書中提出相關預算概括需求與配置）

（四）軍事能力的基礎是人，就兵役議題與兵力精簡的「勇固案」，藍皮書中應當有所討論。（國防小組回應：本藍皮書業已針對未來兵役制度的精進提出政策建議，並建議暫緩「勇固案」）

（五）應有前瞻創新的思考，應針對未來的威脅，提出達成「有效嚇阻」與「防衛固守」的國軍具體任務，而非新創一個抽象的口號。（國防小組回應：本藍皮書業已針對未來國軍達成「有效嚇阻」與「防衛固守」的具體任務提出政策建議）

II. External Recommendations

In the process of researching, analyzing, and preparing defense policies, the Defense Committee has always followed the principle that the development and practice of policy should be a multi-dimensional process. Only with interaction between civilians and the military, interdepartmental, interdisciplinary, and cross-border coordination and integration, will it be sufficient to respond to the growing complexity of defense issues” (Defense Policy Blue Paper No. 1, *DPP's Defense Agenda*). From September 2012 to late-April 2015, the Defense Committee convened a total of 36 meetings, with more than 110 retired military personnel involved. External recommendations (and Defense Committee responses) on major issues for the future direction of Taiwan's military development are as follows:

1. Future planning should not just be considered in regards to threat, but should take into account national interests and overall development, taking advantage of possible opportunities to bring the effectiveness and potential of defense assets into play. (Defense Committee response: Add opportunities for evaluations during national security threat risk assessment.)

2. Military strategic planning encompasses both the buildup and the application of combat power, with the former being civilian policy guidance, while military personnel conceives the latter. Civilians should defer to the professional judgment of the uniformed military to elaborate the latter. (Defense Committee Response: Policy recommendations proposed in this blue paper will be implemented by the General Staff Headquarters led by the Chief of the General Staff after the DPP returns to power, to produce Taiwan's first “National Military Strategy”.)

3. With limited financial resources, military planning must also integrate budget considerations. When the DPP proposes the domestic production or foreign procurement of weaponry, it should outline the estimated financial burden and the rate of increase on the defense budget. (Defense Committee Response: Major weaponry issues proposed in this blue paper was accompanied by information on relevant budget needs and disbursements in our previous papers.)

4. Personnel forms the foundation of military capacity. The “Yung Ku” program aimed to reform military service system and forces downsizing should be discussed in this blue paper. (Defense Committee Response: This blue paper has put forward policy recommendations for the future of military service systems, and proposed to suspend the “Yung Ku” program.)

5. Suggest putting forth forward-looking and innovative proposals to address future threats and achieve “effective deterrence” and “resolute defense”, instead of creating a new abstract slogan. (Defense Committee Response: This blue paper has put forward policy recommendations for specific tasks for the military to achieve “effective deterrence” and “resolute defense” in the future.)

(六) 後備部隊將會是未來建軍的重點之一，現在的後備制度徒具形式，無法因應緊急事態，藍皮書中應思考後備制度變革。(國防小組回應：本藍皮書業已針對未來後備制度的精進提出政策建議，未來可考慮建立由志願役官兵組成之地區後備部隊)

(七) 國軍應當充實資訊戰攻防的能量，資訊戰所需要的硬體與軟體要視之為武器彈藥，資訊戰的人才要視之為戰士培養。但資訊安全所跨越的領域甚廣，國防部的權責邊界要清楚劃定。(國防小組回應：本藍皮書業已針對國軍在國防相關資產與民間關鍵基礎設施的資安權責分別評估風險，將資安裝備與軟體視為武器裝備將會列入未來第十二號藍皮書《振興本土國防產業的準備》一併考量)

參、國防安全威脅與機會評估

根據 2014 年 5 月智庫所發佈的國防政策藍皮書第 5 號報告《2025 年中國對台軍事威脅評估》中對於中國軍力對台威脅的評估結論，除了民族主義外，中國決意成為與美國平起平坐的太平洋強權，地處第一島鏈樞紐的台灣對於中國地緣戰略不言自明。基於此，從 2010 年起，中國在釣魚台列嶼與南海的領土爭議上，改採強勢作為；2013 年藉劃設東海防空識別區，宣示中國在第一島鏈內的勢力範圍；2015 年在台海中線附近劃設民航航線，毫不退讓。諸多作為均在達成於 2020 年起將防禦前線擴大至第一島鏈與第二島鏈間水域的戰略目標。

中國迄今仍不願放棄以武力犯台，而犯台之準備也從未因兩岸關係的和緩有所放鬆。

中國解放軍將持續邁向於 2020 年具備對台大規模作戰的決勝能力的目標，對台灣的安全形成明顯且險峻的威脅

中國解放軍將持續邁向於 2020 年具備對台大規模作戰的決勝能力的目標。隨著中國軍事科技的研發，與人物力龐大資源的帶動，未

來十年解放軍的武器裝備性能將會大幅躍進，對台灣的安全形成明顯且險峻的威脅。

6. Reserve forces will be one of the main focuses of future military development. The current reserve system is superficial and cannot respond to emergency situations. This blue paper should reflect on reforming the reserve system. (Defense Committee Response: This blue paper has put forward policy recommendations for future improvements to the reserve system. The establishment of local reserve forces combined with volunteer personnel should be considered.)

7. The military should enhance its existing offensive and defensive capabilities in information warfare. Hardware and software in information warfare should be regarded as ammunition, and information warfare personnel should be regarded as soldiers. However, information security covers a very wide field, so the powers and responsibilities of the Ministry of Defense need to be defined clearly. (Defense Committee Response: This blue paper has individually assessed the military's capabilities and responsibilities in defense related assets and civil infrastructure's information security. To regard information warfare hardware and software as weaponry will be considered in the defense blue paper No. 12.)

III. National Defense Threats and Opportunity Assessment

According to the findings in the assessment of the Chinese military threat towards Taiwan in the Defense Policy Blue Paper No. 5 (*China's Military Threats Against Taiwan in 2025*) published in May 2014, in addition to nationalism, China is determined to become an equal Pacific power as the United States. In light of this, Taiwan, which is located in the hub of the first island chain, has extraordinary strategic value to China. Based on this, China has become increasingly aggressive on territorial disputes on Diaoyutai (Senkakus) and the South China Sea from 2010 onwards; in 2013, China designated its air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, declaring its sphere of influence within the first island chain; in 2015 it designated civil aviation routes near the Taiwan Strait midline. Many of these actions were aimed at extending China's defensive frontline toward the waters between the first and second island chain by 2020.

China has never excluded the possibility of taking over Taiwan with force, nor has it slowed down its preparations after cross-strait relations have improved. The PLA will continue to move towards achieving the capacity to decisively wage full-scale war against

The PLA will continue to move towards achieving the capacity to decisively wage full-scale war against Taiwan by 2020. It is a clear and dangerous threat for Taiwan's security

dangerous threat for Taiwan's security.

Taiwan by 2020. With the development of Chinese military technology, and the driving force of vast human resources, the PLA's weaponry will leap forward substantially in the coming decade, becoming a clear and dan-

根據國防政策藍皮書第 5 號報告《2025 年中國對台軍事威脅評估》所提出的未來十年內國防安全威脅，國防小組針對各項威脅發生的可能性、可能產生對社會活動與政府運作之威脅與國軍目前因應權責與能力進行評估如下：

（一）中國對我發動全面性的進犯或傳統武力的恫嚇：中國始終不願放棄以武力犯台，且奪取並控制台灣攸關中國地緣戰略利益，無論兩岸關係如何和緩，中國從未放鬆對台軍事準備，全面犯台或軍事恫嚇的可能性從未消失。唯一旦中國採取此等野蠻的軍事冒進，無論成敗，將大傷其和平崛起形象，引起周邊國家敵視，且現階段國軍因應中國全面犯台與軍事恫嚇能力雖略顯不足，但解放軍亦難具備在 2020 年對台決勝能力的完全自信，國軍不對稱反制武器的部署，亦可大幅增加中國全面犯台的可能成本，增加解放軍犯台失敗的風險。評估未來 10 年兩項威脅的可能性仍屬中等，但基於國家安全零不良率的思維，嚇阻中國軍事冒進、維持政府整體應變韌性與抵抗中國全面犯台仍為我國國防核心任務。

（二）中國以網路戰對我數位國土的襲擾，將對台灣社會活動與政府運作形成威脅，並可能破壞關鍵基礎設施，造成國人生命財產的損失，且因網路攻擊具有隱匿、偽冒、難以追查辨識與不易究辦之特性，發動攻擊者多能逃脫責任，更是中國對台進行非傳統武力軍事恫嚇的極佳選項。而且一旦中國決意軍事冒進以武力全面進犯台灣，要達成遠戰速勝、首戰決勝，解放軍必先在軍事行動前或同時取得資通訊優勢，以資電戰全面性打擊台灣，迅速摧毀或癱瘓國軍資通訊戰力，也極可能會針對我政府、民生、經濟目標進行干擾或破壞，動搖民心士氣，減低台灣軍民抵抗意志與能力。因此，就中國對我網路襲擾，無論是對國防相關資產（國防部主管）或民間關鍵基礎設施（非國防部主管）不僅可能性高，可能造成的傷害亦高。如專家在國防政策於藍皮書第 5 號報告《2025 年中國對台軍事威脅評估》中所作的評估，國防部對資安威脅向以實體隔離的消極性防禦因應，國軍現有資訊戰力嚴重不足，資通訊系統脆弱性仍高。

According to the national defense threats in the coming decade identified by the Defense Policy Blue Paper No. 5 (*China's Military Threats Against Taiwan in 2025*), the Defense Committee's assessment of the occurrence of potential threats and the probable threats it may bring to social activities and governmental operations, and the military's responsibility and capacity to respond are as follows:

1. China launching a full-scale invasion or intimidation with conventional forces: China has been reluctant to rule out the option of invading Taiwan by force. Furthermore, to seize control of Taiwan is aligned with China's geostrategic interests, regardless of how positive cross-strait relations may be, China has never eased its military preparations against Taiwan. The possibility of a full-scale invasion or military intimidation on Taiwan has never disappeared. However, once China takes on such brutal military aggression, it will sap its peaceful rising image regardless of its outcome, causing hostility among neighboring countries. Additionally, although the military's response capability to China's full-scale invasion and military intimidation is slightly insufficient, it is also difficult for the PLA to develop full confidence for a complete victory against Taiwan in 2020. The deployment of Taiwan's asymmetric countermeasure weapons can also substantially increase China's overall cost for a full-scale invasion, increasing the risk of PLA's failure. The possibility of these two threats to occur in the next decade is moderate, but with zero-defect on national security as principle, deterring Chinese military aggression, maintaining the government's overall flexibility and resistance to China's full-scale invasion is still the core task of Taiwan's national defense.

2. China's attacks on Taiwan's digital territory via cyber-warfare will cause threats to Taiwan's social activities and the government's operation, and may damage critical infrastructure, resulting in the loss of people's lives and property. Also, because cyberattacks are anonymous, camouflaged, difficult to identify, and difficult to investigate, attackers are usually able to evade responsibility. This makes cyber-warfare an excellent option for China intimidation towards Taiwan with non-conventional forces. Furthermore, if China launches a full-scale invasion on Taiwan, it is necessary for China to use cyber-warfare to attack Taiwan first to quickly destroy or paralyze the military's cyber and communication ability to gain fast and decisive victory or decisive first strike. It is also very likely that China will interfere or sabotage Taiwan's governmental, civil, and economic targets, to shake morale, and reduce Taiwan's military and civilians will and ability to resist. Therefore, China's cyber-warfare intimidation, whether for defense-related assets (under MND administration) or civilian key infrastructures (non-MND administration) is not only a high probability, but also with high possibility for casualties. As experts assessed in the Blue Paper No. 5, the MND responds passively to cyber-attacks through the use of physical entity quarantines. The military's cyber-warfare capabilities are highly insufficient, and the information communication system is still highly vulnerable.

(三) 與其他國家發生軍事對峙：隨著中國的軍事崛起，武力投射能力大增，近年來東海與南海常生緊張對峙的情勢。2000 年後無論民進黨或國民黨執政，我國在東海與南海爭端議題向來採取和平處理的途徑，不捲入中國與周邊國家的爭端中。且現階段我國海空投射能力，尚足以及時提供必要支援，與中國以外其他國家發生軍事對峙的危機之可能性不高。

(四) 境內發生恐怖攻擊事件：我國支持民主國家對於極端宗教團體恐怖主義行為的反制措施，但我國的參與僅限於非軍事性的奧援，且國內對於宗教自由尊重度高，對於多元族群的包容度，恐怖份子在我國境內發動恐怖攻擊的動機不高。國軍支援境內反恐任務，就已知可能的恐怖攻擊型態，現有戰力足夠包括事後搶救復原在內的應變任務。

(五) 境內發生天災或疫情：國內發生天災的頻率高，平均每年有將近 5 次颱風災害須動用到國軍防救，而未來氣候變遷將使得原本常態性的災害，造成更嚴重的損害，天災與疫情的發生可能性與所將造成的衝擊不容低估。救災已是國軍法定任務；在未來，國軍在災害防救任務的必要性與重要性不可避免地將日益提高。

前述可能的威脅型態之風險評估，如表 1 所列：

表 1 未來十年國防安全威脅風險評估

威脅類型	可能性	衝擊	國防部職責	軍力現況
中國全面進犯奪取台灣	中	高	主要	不足
中國以傳統武力進行恫嚇	中	高	主要	不足
與其他國家發生軍事對峙	低	低	主要	足夠
對國防相關設施之網路攻擊	高	高	主要	嚴重不足
對民間關鍵基礎設施之網路攻擊	高	高	目前無	嚴重不足
境內發生恐怖攻擊	低	中	支援	足夠
境內發生天災或疫情	高	高	支援	足夠

3. Military confrontation with other nations: With the rise of China's military, and the increase of its force projection capabilities, tension has risen in the East China Sea and South China Sea in recent years. After 2000, both the DPP and KMT administrations have taken peaceful measures in the East China Sea and South China Sea disputes and refrained from getting involved with disputes between China and neighboring countries. Furthermore, Taiwan's current naval and air projection capability are still sufficient to provide necessary timely support. The possibility of the occurrence of military confrontation with nations other than China is unlikely.

4. Terrorist attacks at homeland: Taiwan supports democratic countries against extremist religious terrorism, but our participation is limited to non-military aid. Furthermore, Taiwan shows high respect for religious freedom, and high tolerance to diverse ethnicity, so the motivation for terrorists to launch attacks in our country is not high. The military supports a domestic counterterrorism mission. The current military capabilities (including rescue and recovery missions) are sufficient to respond to any known patterns of possible terrorist attacks.

5. Domestic natural disasters or epidemics: Taiwan has a high frequency of natural disasters. An average of nearly five typhoons per year requires military assistance for rescue and recovery. Climate change will cause the original norm of disasters, to bring more serious damage. The likelihood of natural disasters and epidemic and the impact caused cannot be underestimated. Disaster relief is already one of the military's legal mandates; in the future, the military's necessity and importance on disaster relief mission will inevitably increase.

The risk assessment of possible patterns of threat afore-mentioned, is listed in Table 1:

Table 1. Military Security Threat Risk Assessment for the Next Ten Years

Threat Type	Probability	Impact	MND Role	Current Force
China's Full-Scale Invasion	Medium	High	Primary	Insufficient
China's Coercion with Conventional Force	Medium	High	Primary	Insufficient
Military Confrontation with Other Nations	Low	Low	Primary	Sufficient
Cyber Attacks on Defense-related Assets	High	High	Primary	Highly Insufficient
Cyber Attacks on Civilian Infrastructure	High	High	Currently None	Highly Insufficient
Terrorist Attacks at Homeland	Low	Medium	Supportive	Sufficient
Natural Disasters or Epidemics	High	High	Supportive	Sufficient

除了因應威脅之外，國防資產也能有其他正面之國際貢獻。從更高的國家戰略層次思考，區域乃至全球的秩序與安全攸關臺灣的發展與繁榮，而臺灣作為國際社會中負責任的成員，必須摒除自掃門前雪的心態，為區域與全球的穩定作出貢獻。而臺灣在災害防救及人道救援的能量與經驗正是我們能對國際社會的貢獻之一，也是我們與周邊友邦建立安全與共的信任關係之重要途徑。除了海外災害防救及人道救援外，國防小組也針對種種可能的機會，提出評估如表 2，並詳述如後：

表 2 未來十年國防之國際貢獻評估

機會類型	可能需求	可能風險	國內政策	軍力現況
海外軍事介入	低	高	不介入	不足
海外人道救援	中	中	選擇性參與	足夠
海外災害防救	高	低	積極	足夠
國際資安合作	高	低	積極	嚴重不足
參與反恐行動	中	高	傾向非軍事性	不足
維護海上交通線安全	中	低	積極	足夠

在高需求的項目上，國防小組評估：海外災害救助與國際資安合作是兩項國際社會對台灣協助需求度最高的項目。前者，如同專家所評估，我國海軍的運量在東亞國家（不含中國）居第二位，僅次於印尼；空軍的運量在東亞國家（不含中國）也居第二位，僅次於日本。海空運運量總和在東亞國家（不含中國）居第二位，僅次於印尼。台灣不僅有足夠的海空運輸能量能夠執行海外災害防救中最關鍵性的救難物質前運任務，而其地理位置的優勢更能大幅提昇此類任務的效能。在 2013 年的海燕颱風海外災害防救任務中，國軍更扮演積極的角色，前運物資與救災人員到帛琉與菲律賓。而後者，資訊安全需要跨國在技術與執法上的合作，台灣擁有豐富的經驗與樣本可提供此等協助，也願意與各國展開此等合作。唯這些經驗與樣本多在民間部門，國防部在明顯強化資訊戰力之前，所能做的貢獻有限。

Besides responding to external threats, defense assets can also have other positive aspects in international contributions. Looking from a higher strategic level of national interests, regional or global order and security are critical to Taiwan's development and prosperity. Taiwan, as a responsible member of the international community, must put aside the mindset of caring only about its own business, and contribute to regional and global stability. Experience in disaster relief and humanitarian aid is Taiwan's way of contributing to the international community, and also an important way we build relationships of trust with our surrounding allies. In addition to overseas disaster relief and humanitarian aid, the Defense Committee has also made assessments for other possible opportunities for international contribution, shown in Table 2, and discussed in detail later:


Table 2. Military's International Contribution in the Next Ten Year

Type	Probability	Risk	Policy	Force Status
Overseas Military Intervention	Low	High	Non-Intervention	Insufficient
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance	Medium	Medium	Selective Participation	Sufficient
Foreign Disaster Relief	High	Low	Active	Sufficient
International Cooperation on Information Security	High	Low	Active	Highly Insufficient
Counterterrorism Operations	Medium	High	Non-Military Participation	Insufficient
Maritime Security Enforcement	Medium	Low	Active	Sufficient

On high demand items, the Defense Committee assesses: Overseas disaster relief and international cooperation on information security are two of the most needed items of the international community from Taiwan. The former, as assessed by experts, Taiwan's naval shipment is ranked second in East Asia (excluding China) only to Indonesia; air lift is ranked second in East Asia (excluding China) only to Japan. Sea and air shipments combined are ranked second in East Asian countries (excluding China) only to Indonesia. Taiwan not only has enough air and naval capacity to perform the most critical task of transporting rescue material in overseas disaster relief, but its geographical advantages also greatly enhances the effectiveness of such tasks. During the Typhoon Haiyan overseas disaster relief mission in 2013, the military played an active role, transporting supplies and relief workers to Palau and the Philippines. The latter, information security needs international cooperation in technology and law enforcement. Taiwan has sufficient experience and can provide samples of such assistance, and is also willing to work with other nations to expand such cooperation. However, these experiences and samples are usually in the private sectors. The MND will have limited contribution before significantly enhancing its cyber-warfare capabilities.


參與反恐行動、海外人道救援與維護海上交通線安全等三項屬中度需求項目。以軍事力量參與反恐行動的風險性高，除有人員可能傷亡外，亦容易引來恐怖份子對我境內發動恐怖攻擊。加上國軍反恐作戰相關訓練與裝備有限，未來宜保持目前以非軍事方式參與國際反恐行動。以軍事力量投入海外人道救援，國軍海空運輸能量雖然足夠，但部分人道救援任務區域涉及當地國內部爭戰，不僅政治敏感，人員傷亡不有可能，目前我國仍以非軍事方式、由非政府組織人員參與海外人道救援任務，但考慮普世人道價值的保障與增進我國與周邊國家間的友誼，可選擇較無政治敏感度之地區與執行方式投入持久性人道救援任務。目前反海盜的熱點區域離台灣遙遠，但維護台灣周邊水域之海上交通線安全對高度依賴貿易的我國至為重要，現有海巡兵力輔以國軍兵力支援足夠於周邊水域執行此類任務。海外軍事介入通常以軍事同盟為基礎，需要攻勢性武力投射能力。而目前我國並無此等條約義務，國軍建軍導向仍為防衛性質，以保衛台灣國家安全。基於需求度低、政治敏感度高、人員傷亡可能高與國軍無此攻勢性武力投射能量，未來仍應維持不介入此等海外軍事介入行動。

根據表 1 與表 2，國防小組評估未來國軍戰力提升應優先因應的威脅與應優先掌握的機會，建議優先順位如圖 1 所示：



Involvement in counterterrorism operations, overseas humanitarian aid and maritime traffic security enforcement are three of the items with moderate demand. Involvement in counterterrorism operations with military forces poses a high risk of casualties, and can also easily provoke terrorists to launch terrorist attacks domestically. Additionally, the military's counterterrorism operations training and equipment are limited. Taiwan should maintain its current non-military involvement in the international counterterrorism operations. Although the military has adequate air and naval capacity to invest military humanitarian aid overseas, some mission areas involve civil wars, being not only politically sensitive, but also with a high possibility of casualties. Currently, Taiwan maintains its non-military involvement with NGO personnel involved in humanitarian relief missions overseas. However, considering protecting the universal humanitarian values and to promote friendship between Taiwan and neighboring countries, we can consider choosing less politically sensitivity areas to implement persistent humanitarian aid mission. The current anti-piracy hot spots are far away from Taiwan, but maintaining security in surrounding waters is crucial for a Taiwan that highly depends on trade. Currently, the Coast Guard supported military forces are adequate to support such missions in the surrounding waters. Overseas military intervention is usually based on military alliances, and requires offensive military force projection capability. Currently, Taiwan has no such obligations. The military's development is still focused on its defensive nature to defend Taiwan's national security. Based on its low demand, high political sensitivity, high possibility of casualties, and the lack of offensive military force projected capabilities Taiwan should maintain its non-involvement in overseas military interventions.

According to Table 1 and Table 2, the Defense Committee assesses the priority of threats and opportunities for the military to address and enhance its combat capabilities accordingly in the future is recommended as shown in Figure 1:



第一順位所列者為：(一) 高風險但現有戰力明顯不足之威脅，為對國防相關設施之網路攻擊，應為國軍大幅改善之處。(二) 不容任何疏失之威脅，包括中國以傳統武力進行恫嚇、中國全面進犯奪取台灣，應為維持並持續改善之處。(三) 國際高需求度且國內參與意願高的機會，但國軍卻能力不足的項目，資安合作屬此。此一類別的四項威脅或機會，應當為未來十年國軍建軍的重點。

第二順位所列者為：(一) 高風險但現有戰力足堪因應之威脅，如境內發生天災或疫情；或(二) 高風險但現有戰力明顯不足之威脅，但非國防部能獨力負責者，如對民間關鍵基礎設施之網路攻擊；或(三) 國際高需求度且我國參與意願高的機會，而國軍能力足夠的項目，如海外災害防救。此一類別的三項威脅或機會，多須藉由精進跨部會協調整合，才能增進任務整體效果，應列為十年國軍建軍的次要重點。

第三順位所列者為：國際需求度次高而我國參與意願不低的機會，現有戰力足堪掌握運用，如維護海上交通線安全與海外人道救援，此一類別的機會均可在完成前二順位的同時一併精進。

未列入優先順位者，或因威脅發生機率低或衝擊性低（如：境內發生恐怖攻擊或與其他國家發生軍事對峙），或因機會的國際需求度低而所生風險高（如：海外軍事介入或參與反恐行動），除因國際情勢丕變而需調整外，在國防預算有限的客觀條件下，仍以達成前列三項優先順位為先。

肆、二十一世紀的軍人

過去，馬總統未能善盡引導國防政策的職責，互其任期從未提出國家安全戰略指導文件，非但是民主化的倒退，更讓國防部無法善盡縝密的戰略規劃，在兵役制度上造成許多問題。

Priority #1: (1) Where risks are high but existing capabilities are clearly insufficient to meet the threat should be areas designated for large-scale improvements; (2) the threats that cannot be neglected include China's intimidation with conventional weaponry, and China's full-scale invasion against Taiwan. This requires Taiwan's military to maintain its attention and continue to improve; (3) capabilities that are globally in high demand, and for which the domestic desire for participation is strong, yet the capacities of the nation's armed forces are currently insufficient—such as information security cooperation. These should be the top priority areas of military development over the next 10 years.

Priority #2: (1) Areas of high risk where current capabilities are sufficient to respond, such as domestic natural disaster or epidemics; or (2) areas of high risk where capabilities are clearly insufficient to meet the threat but in which a non-MND agency is independently responsible, such as civilian critical infrastructure and cyberattacks; or (3) capabilities that are globally in high demand, domestic desire for participation is strong, and for which the national armed forces possess sufficient capacity to provide, such as foreign disaster relief (FDR). The three categories of threats and opportunities in this category require multi-faceted advancements in inter-agency coordination and integration to achieve significant improvements in the effectiveness of completing the missions. They should be classified as the secondary priorities for the next ten years of military development.

Priority #3: Capabilities that are in global demand, where domestic motivation to participate exists, and the armed forces possess sufficient capacities to be utilized, such as maintaining secure sea lines of communication and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA). This category of opportunities can be pursued together with the first two priority areas.

Non-prioritized items are threats with low probabilities or low impact (i.e. terrorist attacks at homeland or military confrontation with other countries), or with low degree of international demand with high risk (i.e. overseas military intervention or participation in counterterrorism operations). Unless there are changes in the international situation and the need to adjust rises, it is best to focus on the first three items under limited defense budget.

IV. The 21th Century Soldier

Throughout President Ma Ying-jeou's administration, he has failed to fulfill his responsibility of guiding the national defense policy and has never proposed national security strategy guidelines. Not only does this represent a reversal in Taiwan's democratic progress, but the absence of a detailed, comprehensive strategic planning by the Ministry of National Defense also causes problems for the military service system.

對此，我們深以為戒。在野期間，不僅提出前瞻性的「十年政綱」，也透過智庫持續的政策研究，逐漸擘劃出國家安全與國防政策的完整架構。基於落實民主價值，這些經過開放程序的研究成果，在未來執政後，將透過更多元透明的平台，整合各界意見，讓國防政策的規劃能更趨縝密。也正因為對於民主價值的堅信，我們拒絕政治化國家安全與國防議題，不願在選前倉促決策，不讓選舉考量左右國家安全議題應有的理性討論，在兵役制度的議題上，各項解決兵役懸崖的可能方案將在民進黨執政後隨即進行公開理性的討論，於取得社會與朝野共識後，在執政十個月後的第一本「四年期國防總檢討」中發佈。

民進黨認為：兵役制度在落實「整體國防」的價值，達成「民力即戰力、戰力即民力」的目的，民間人物力能量投注於國防，使得國防資源無虞；而國防貢獻於社會發展，使得國防投資更有效益。未來我們要改善的「戰力缺口」，不是招募人數達成率的數字，而是足以因應 21 世紀綜合性安全需求的軍士官兵素質與專業。民進黨對兵役制度的規劃基於以下三項原則：

（一）建立優質戰力能量為最終目標：確保國家安全為任何兵役制度規劃之前提，建立因應 21 世紀威脅的 21 世紀國防戰力為民進黨國防政策的整體目標之一；

（二）建立人力優質化帶動優質戰力的良性循環：兵役制度是長期性的規劃，應先求軍內改革，培養軍事與民間專長並重互用的軍旅環境，以有助於發展其個人競爭力為募兵誘因。

（三）兼顧役男生涯規劃：在達成前項良性循環之前，於過渡期間內，顧及屆齡役男生涯規劃，軍事訓練將予以精進，但四個月的訓期暫不更動。

The DPP took this seriously as a precautionary tale and, while in opposition, not only proposed a forward looking Ten-Year Policy Platform, but also, through continuous research at its think tank laid out a complete framework for national security and defense policy step by step. In order to fully exercise democratic values, these research results attained through an open process will be used to stimulate more policy discussions and opinions from various sectors, in order to make the planning of national defense policy even more rigorous. And because of our firm belief in democratic values, we refuse to politicize the issues of national security and defense. We will not make hasty policy decisions prior to the elections to let campaign tactics manipulate the national security agenda that requires rational discussion. On the military service system, we have the ideas and preparations in place so that as soon as the DPP comes to power, we can immediately facilitate rational public discussions of different possible solutions to the military manpower cliff. After reaching bipartisan and social consensus, the first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) would be released within 10 months of the presidential inauguration.

The DPP believes that the military service system should reinforce the values of “whole-of-nation defense” and help reach the goal of incorporating civilian-based combat capability — introducing the civilian human and material resources to enrich the national defense resources, and conversely contributing the national defense resources to stimulate social development to increase the effectiveness of defense-related investment. In the future, we will improve the manpower gap, not by making up the numbers for the rate of achievement in volunteer recruiting, but by raising the officers’ quality and professionalism that meet the comprehensive security requirements of the 21st century. The DPP’s plans for the military service system are based on three principles:

1. The establishment of competent combat capabilities is the most ultimate goal: Safeguarding national security is the most basic precondition for the design of any military service system. Building a 21st century force capable of meeting the threats of the 21st century is the goal of the DPP’s defense policy.

2. Creating a virtuous cycle of creating competent human assets driving more competent talent to join the armed forces: Planning of the military service system should be a long-term task that should begin with internal reforms within the military to cultivate an environment of mutually reinforcing professional skill demands between the civilian and military sectors, such that opportunities for career skills development can be a recruitment incentive.

3. Take the career planning of draft-age males into greater consideration: During the transition period before the above-described virtuous cycle is achieved, take into account the career planning of conscription-eligible males by improving the quality of military training, while leaving unchanged for the time being the four-month compulsory basic training requirement.

全面檢討募兵制的「全面」，並非推翻現有制度，而是從國防戰略、軍事作戰構想與戰術需求的整體架構思考，而是從人力資源上、中、下游的整體檢討，是從人力資源自社會取得、透過軍中培養與運用、而後帶著高度競爭力回到社會等各個面向每個環節進行改革與精進。依憲法第 20 條（與大法官釋字第 490 號解釋文）與兵役法第 1 條的要義，並基於台灣獨特的社會發展，兵役制度設計勿需一味仿效外國或自陷非徵即募的迷思，而是發展出具有台灣特色、符合國家安全與社會發展的制度，以下為民進黨對精進現行制度的五個方向與目標，將在執政後立即透過公開討論的方式，以達成政策完善規劃之目標：

（一）役男徵集入營接受四個月軍事訓練，暫不變動。但可考慮採取專才專用、整合性訓練、訓駐合一等精進措施，使得接受軍事訓練的役男能發揮所長，在過渡期間內，緩和人力不足的問題：

（二）提升現行考選、甄選之志願役軍士官兵的專業性。視軍事專業之不同，於獲得管道、專業養成期程、薪給予以明顯區別。同時，可考慮透過軍轉文與國防文官考試，擴大國防部與其他軍事機關文官數量，擴大非機敏性業務委外規模，逐步降低專業軍人需求數量，並增加專業軍人的專業性。

（三）考慮創設「優選」管道，選拔優秀且具備專業發展潛能者，由國防部與國防產業公司獎助，透過與發展專長相符之學術單位之合作，同時接受軍文專業教育，完成教育後投入軍旅與國防產業，再行進階培養。

With regard to the military service system, the existing system must be comprehensively reviewed. “Comprehensive” does not necessarily signify overturning the current scheme, but rather, ensuring that the policy is grounded within a comprehensive plan that flows from a national defense strategy, operational concepts, and tactical requirements. As well, the overall environment for each phase in the human resource cycle—upstream, midstream, and downstream—should be reformed and improved with the aim of drawing quality talent from the broader society, providing meaningful training and experience during military service, and equipping service members with competitive skills upon return to the civilian sector. Based on Article 20 of the ROC Constitution (in particular the Grand Justice Interpretation No. 490) and Article 1 of the Military Service Act as well as the unique development path of Taiwan's society, it makes no sense for its military service system to blindly reproduce a foreign model or to follow self-imposed constraints regarding either volunteer or conscription. Instead, a system should be developed that reflects the particular characteristics of Taiwan's social development and national defense requirements. Below are the DPP's five directions and goals to improve the current system. We will immediately initiate public discussions soon after inauguration in order to meet the goal of completing a comprehensive policy planning.

1. Make no change to the four-month basic training requirement for now, but consider professional skill-specific utilization of manpower and implementing integrated, on-site training to enable draftees to realize their talents, while addressing the manpower shortage during the transition phase.

2. Raise the level of professional specialization of officers entering service through the established channels. Based on different military specialties, we will make obvious differentiation of recruit channels, required time for professional training, and salary scales. At the same time, it may also be possible to reduce the overall number of professional active duty service members needed by expanding the number of civil service personnel in the MND as well as other defense-security related agencies through a “military-to-civilian” transition program and the defense civil servant special examination, as well as outsourcing of non-sensitive functions. This would also have the effect of elevating the professionalism of career soldiers.

3. Create a “selection” recruit channel for young talents who have professional potential. Then the candidates will receive scholarships from the MND and the defense industry. Partnered with matching academic institutions for professional development, the candidates can receive both civilian and military professional education at the same time. Upon graduation, they can enter military service and the defense industry to receive more advanced training.

(四) 檢討改進現行動員制度、組織與作業，以能遂行支援災害防救任務。創設由志願甄選之軍士官兵組成的地區後備部隊，依志願役軍士官比例給予薪給，每兩週入營兩天，保持高度戰備以能迅速就位支援戰備應變部隊。

(五) 珍惜國軍現有人力資源，未經全面檢討戰略構想與兵力規模前，「勇固案」暫不實施。以五年內即將離開現役之軍士官為優先對象，實施優質化再教育，培養返回民間所需的專業技能(第二專長，例如資安管理)，透過營區內、外的軍、產、學、研跨界合作實施。同時，有效時間管理，杜絕人力閒置，除快速應變部隊外，其餘部隊專注於教育訓練，達成人力優質化目標。

民進黨重返執政後，為順暢完成過渡期，第一年的檢討準備年特別重要。除隨即進行公開理性的討論，在執政十個月後的第一本「四年期國防總檢討」中發佈兵役制度定案。也將基於尊重軍事專業的客觀文人領軍精神，由身負聯合作戰指揮官之參謀總長主導下，發佈台灣首次之「國家軍事戰略」(並形成四年更新一次之慣例)，不僅將成為台澎防衛作戰計畫的野戰指導，並使兵役制度之發展契合國家軍事防衛之需求。在第一年中，我們也將完成相關二項配套方案，包括：

(一) 為達善用並培育人力資源之目的，將持續國防組織科層扁平化，盤整內部規章以簡化行政程序，引進科技化管理以提高行政效益(於2017年降低幕僚與勤務單位官士兵行政業務量至現有負荷70%以下、野戰部隊至50%以下，減少會議次數至現有頻率50%以下)。

(二) 啟動跨部會之社會人力專業需求調查，以確定軍隊專業與社會專業相符程度、需求類別與數量，以此鎖定國軍優質人力之主要來源與確立實施人才優質化之導向。

4. Evaluate the current system, organization, and operation of mobilization for supporting disaster relief missions. Create units of local reserve forces made up of volunteer officers and soldiers, compensated according to the same proportion of pay scale as active duty, who will be in training two days every two weeks, thus maintaining rapid reaction units at all times that are in a state of high readiness and ready for immediate deployment in support.

5. Preserve the existing military cadre by halting implementation of the “Yong Ku Program” for further force downsizing, pending a thorough evaluation rooted more firmly in a defined strategic concept and corresponding manpower requirement. Provide officers anticipated to leave service within five years with quality retraining in professional skills in demand in the private sector (such as cyber security management) through cross-sector cooperative effort between the military, industry, academia, and research institutions. Simultaneously, through effective time management, eliminate the phenomenon of idle human resources by focusing all units on education and training, except for those on high readiness for rapid deployment, to move toward the goal of upgrading the quality of personnel.

Upon returning to power, the DPP will place specific emphasis on the first year as “a year for review and preparation” in order to ensure a smooth military transition. Besides jump-starting a transparent and rational public discussions, within 10 months from taking office, the first QDR will be published and the policy of military service system will be included. Taiwan's first National Military Strategy (NMS) will also be issued by the Chief of the General Staff to demonstrate respect for military professionals under an objective leadership of a civilian commander-in-chief. The NMS will also be updated and published every four years. The NMS will not only be the source of field artillery guidance for the Taiwan-Penghu defense combat plans, but also allow the military service system to develop in accordance with national defense needs. In the first year of the DPP administration, we will also complete two supporting programs, including:

1. Continue the streamline of defense organizations in order to maximize the utilization and cultivation of human resources. Consolidate internal regulations to reduce administrative red tape. Introduce scientific management in order to enhance the administrative efficiency. (Namely, by 2017, reduce the administrative workload to below 70% for the officers and soldiers of assistant and duty units, below 50% for field artillery, and reduce the number of meetings to below 50% of current frequency.

2. Initiate a cross-agency survey of manpower and skills in demand by the private sector to verify the compatibility between military and civilian professions, and the category and quantity of manpower demand. The survey will help target the main source for elite forces and establishing the guidance for quality improvement of military talents.

伍、二十一世紀的戰力

根據圖 1 所示的建軍三大優先順位方向，民進黨重返執政後將致力於以下重點軍力的發展：

（一）即刻補強國軍資訊作戰能力：以建立世界級網路攻防能量為目標。並逐步擴大至國整體數位國土之防護，讓台灣不僅是資訊強國，也將會是資安強國。於此同時，台灣應主動分享資安經驗與技術，建立與民主國家間資安合作體系。建議具體的措施有：

（A）在現有的陸、海、空軍軍種外，整合現有國軍資訊、通訊與電子相關之單位與能量，成立獨立的第四軍種。資安能量高度依賴高素質人力，因此，人力的養成將是第四軍種建軍的重點，藉由靈活的組織、彈性的人事制度與高度的對外連結，吸引民間優秀資安科技人物力資源為國防所用，並經國防之教育與訓練，回饋於國家整體數位國土之防護。同時，以資安管理為屆退人員實施優質化再教育的重點項目，迅速補實民間資安管理之人力需求。

（B）除人力資源外，第四軍種之武器裝備發展以下列為優先：網路即時監控系統、網路戰情指管系統、網路滲透攻擊系統、對阻斷服務式攻擊及先進式持續性威脅攻擊偵測防護系統、惡意程式分析鑑識系統、精簡客戶端作業系統、安全行動裝置與網路攻防演練系統。

（二）增強彈道飛彈防禦能量：未來 10 年，網路襲擾與導彈攻擊將會是中國對台遂行武力恫嚇的主要工具，也必然是對台全面進犯時的第一擊主力。中國導彈數量的成長幅度雖會減緩，但隨著新型飛彈的服役、精準度的強化與彈頭的多元化後，中國對台的導彈威脅將不減反增。在籌建高存活戰力（見下敘）的同時，增強導彈防禦能量具體措施如下：

V. 21th Century Capabilities

As shown in the three force building priorities shown in graph 1, the DPP administration will focus on the following Armed Forces development:

1. Immediately shore up information warfare capability: Aim at building a world-class cyber defense and attack power, and gradually expand to overall digital homeland defense. Let Taiwan not only be a world leader in information technology power but also a world leader in information security. Meanwhile, Taiwan should proactively share its information security experience and technology to establish a collaborative information security system among the democratic countries. The suggested measures include:

(A) Integrate existing military units and capacities of IT, communications, and electronics to establish an independent fourth service branch alongside the current Armed Forces consisting of Army, Navy, and Air Force. The power of information security is highly dependent on high-quality manpower. Therefore, the establishment of the fourth branch will focus on talent cultivation. Through nimble organization, a flexible HR system and intensive external connections, we can attract highly competitive civilian talents in information security technology for national defense purpose, and through defense education and training, the civilian resources can be devoted to the country's overall digital homeland protection. At the same time, highlight the information security management as an integral part of quality improvement re-education program for the retiring service members.

(B) Besides human resources, the weapon development for the fourth branch will be prioritized as follows: real-time internet surveillance system, cyber warfare intelligence command and control system, network penetration attack system, reconnaissance and protection system against denial-of-service attacks and advanced persistent threats, malware detection and forensics system, thin client terminal operating system, secured mobile devices, and cyber security exercises system.

2. Strengthen ballistic missile defense capability: In the next 10 years, network interference and guided missile attacks will be the main tools of China's military threat to Taiwan, and they will necessarily be the main first strike force when China launches an all-out offensive against Taiwan. Though the growth rate of China's guided missiles will slow down, China's missile threat against Taiwan will continue to rise as the new types of missiles enter service along with enhanced strike precision and multifunctional warheads. In conjunction with building a high combat survivability (see below for details), take the following concrete measures to strengthen our ballistic missile defense capability.

(A) 以自製與外購並行的方式，擴大現有飛彈防禦之密度至能涵蓋所有主要海空基地，具有能抵抗四波全面性攻擊的存彈，並增強各飛彈防禦單位機動性與獨力作戰能力。

(B) 空海軍基地與設施強化工程應予持續，跑道搶修能量應持續精進外，核心的政軍指揮管制中心除強化抗炸能量外，應建立備援中心或機動指管設備。

(三) 建立能在敵飛彈突襲下高存活戰力：飛彈防禦與高存活戰力是攸關我國嚇阻北京軍事冒進的核心戰力。前者用以降低導彈對我軍民設施之傷害；後者用以阻卻敵人在飛彈奇襲後掌握制空與制海，粉碎敵速戰速決的計算。然而，隨著中國導彈質量提高，海空武力投射能力大增，過去空軍、海軍以進駐花蓮佳山基地與遠洋機動的戰力保存方式將不再有效，難以在導彈突襲後發揮戰力。面對此一嚴峻挑戰，建立能在敵飛彈突襲下高存活戰力的具體措施如下：

(A) 未來空軍的主戰載台的發展除繼續完成現有戰機的升級外，民進黨在重返執政後，將以外購或研製方式，以取得具有垂直或短場起降能力的戰機為首要，方能在中國飛彈突襲後，在跑道被毀進行修復時，傳統戰機尚無法升空迎戰前，與防空飛彈共同擔任關鍵性的阻卻敵人掌握我國領空制空權的任務。

(B) 擴大現有的潛艦戰力，除了擔任安全航道的監偵與我水面艦隻護衛外，在北京飛彈突襲下，潛艦具有高存活度，更能針對中國海軍水面艦隻反潛能力不足的弱點，有效與即時地嚇阻解放軍海軍自台灣北方與南方水域突破第一島鏈進入太平洋，而對台灣形成全面包圍，並干擾或遲滯友邦的來援。民進黨在重返執政後將啟動真正的潛艦國造，以 2025 年前完成第 1 艘新構型的潛艦下水為目標，並建立國內船廠完整之潛艦設計、製造、維修能量與提高自製率。

(A) Through dual channels of indigenous production and external procurement, expand current missile defense coverage to all major air and sea bases, buildup the missiles that can resist four waves of all-out assault, and enhance the mobility and independent combat capability of each missile defense unit.

(B) Continue the ongoing construction enhancements at the air and sea bases. Survivable back-up or mobile command and control centers should be established in addition to continuous improvement of rapid airport runway repair skills, and bomb-proof reinforcements of critical political-military command centers.

3. Build up high combat survivability to tackle missile ambushes: Missile defense and combat survivability are Taiwan's critical capabilities to deter Beijing's military aggression. The former is used to mitigate the damages of missiles to our military and civilian facilities; the latter is used to block the enemy's attainment of air and sea supremacy following missile strikes, and thwart the adversary's plan to achieve a quick and decisive victory. However, as the quality and quantity of the Chinese guided missiles grow, China's capability of air-sea power projection also increases tremendously. The previous plan for the Air Force and the Navy to deploy to Hualien's Chia-shan air base and offshore mobile platforms in order to preserve war capabilities will be no longer effective. It would be difficult to bring out combat capabilities after the missile ambushes. In the face of such steep challenges, there needs to be concrete measures to build a high combat survivability after missile ambushes:

(A) The future development of combat platform of the Air Force includes continuing upgrade of current fighter jets. But obtaining those with vertical or short take-off and landing ability through indigenous production or external procurement will be the priority when the DPP returns to power. The V/STOL along with anti-access missiles will share the critical mission of blocking the enemy's attainment of air and sea supremacy after China's missile ambushes, during airport runway repairs, and before the traditional fighter jets scrambling to take off.

(B) Expand the current submarine capabilities: Besides dedication to secure waterways with reconnaissance and protect naval surface vessels, the submarines have high survivability under Beijing's missile ambushes, can target the weakness of the PLAN surface vessels' lack of anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and can effectively and timely deter the PLAN from breaking through the first island chain to the Pacific Ocean, besieging Taiwan, and disrupting or delaying friendly countries from coming to Taiwan's aid. Upon returning to power, the DPP will activate the real indigenous production programs of the submarines, and aim for the first new-type submarine to enter service by 2025. We will also shore up a comprehensive capability for the domestic ship manufacturers from submarine design, manufacture, to maintenance, and increase the rate of indigenous production.

(四) 持續研發不對稱武器：不對稱武器負有打亂敵作戰節奏之任務，以增加解放軍犯台困難度與不確定性，爭取戰力重整以遂行抵抗反擊的時間。而國軍過去業已研製出性能優異、相對價廉的不對稱武器，如對地攻擊巡弋飛彈、攻船飛彈、水雷等，未來除持續維持研製動能外，無人飛行系統將是另一研製要項。

(五) 轉型地面兵力：過去「灘岸決戰」的作戰構想在中國遠距打擊能力提升後已不合時宜，更何況，近年來解放軍立體登陸能力日增，極可能橫跨我海岸線，直取後方要地，並合圍我灘岸部隊。因此，作為國防最後防線之珍貴地面部隊不應虛擲於無險可守的灘岸。近年來，陸軍大幅強化陸航打擊能力，逐漸發展出「濱海阻擊」能力，以不使敵登陸部隊有機會進入泊地為戰術目標。我們認為這是正確的方向，我陸航部隊可隱匿、快速出擊，並具可觀之戰術機動性，對於迫近的敵艦隊可構成相當威脅。不過，在欠缺空優保護下，陸航部隊出擊的風險仍高，我們認為在濱海阻擊的架構下，地面部隊應大幅提昇現有的火炮、火箭打擊的能量，構成阻敵逼近我近海的火力網。

此外解放軍已大幅提昇特種作戰能力，建立可迅速入侵首都與開放機場港口之能力。一旦首都失守，將對民心士氣影響甚鉅，有組織的抵抗將難以持續。而機場或港口一旦為敵特戰部隊所據，若無法及時奪回，其後援兵力將源源不斷湧入台灣。因此，濱海阻擊與城鎮作戰將是國軍地面部隊的主要任務，並必須認知到可能將面對：無海空的有效支援或保護、敵人掌握機先且敵情不明、國內社會陷入混亂等極為不利的戰場環境。很顯然地，目前仍嫌鈍重的地面部隊組織與部署方式，難以因應此種時地因素下的戰鬥。針對建立具濱海阻擊以及防護要地與政軍關鍵基礎設施之地面戰力，我們具體建議：

(A) 現階段，地面部隊應強化遠程火力打擊能力，並與海軍岸置反艦火力密切配合，有效構成濱海阻擊能力。

(B) 現階段，強化首都衛戍，重新釐清首都衛戍範圍與兵力部署。賡續現有國家關鍵基礎設施防護規劃，地面部隊應與海巡兵力、警力等相互搭配，由國軍負有其中最高等級設施之防護責任。

4. Continue the R&D of asymmetrical weapons: Asymmetrical weapons carry the mission of interrupting the adversary's combat operations sequence and increasing the degree of difficulty and uncertainty associated with a PLA invasion of Taiwan, allowing time to regroup and resist.

5. Transformation of ground forces: The previous combat mentality of fighting a decisive battle on the shore has become obsolete as China's long-distance attacking capability rises. Moreover, the PLA's capability of dimensional airborne and seaborne landings has gradually increased in recent years, and they are likely to move across our shorelines, straight through our rear bases, and besiege our troops at the shore. Therefore, as the last line of defense, our precious ground forces should not be wasted on the indefensible shorelines. In recent years, our Army Aviation's combat capability has been strengthened tremendously, and our Army has gradually developed the "offshore barricade" capability – aiming at tactically denying the hostile landing force's opportunity to access our harbors – and we think this is the right way to go. Our Army Aviation units can launch invisible and stealth attacks and have an impressive amount of tactical mobility that can impose significant threat to the enemy's approaching fleets. However, the Army Aviation's strikes will still carry a lot of risk without protection from air supremacy. Under the framework of coastal defense, we think the field artillery ought to leap from its existing cannon and rocket striking capabilities and form a fire network to barricade the adversary from approaching our near seas.

Besides, the PLA has seen staggering improvement of its special forces' combat capabilities, and have established the ability to rapidly invade the capital and open airports and harbors. Once our capital is occupied there will be a huge impact on the public and military morale, and organized resistance will be disrupted. And as soon as our ports are taken by the adversary's special force and cannot be retrieved in time, the enemy's support forces will surge onto Taiwan. Therefore, coastal defense and urban combat will be the main mission of our field artillery, which must also be aware of the potential adversities on the battlefields: lack of effective support or protection from the air and sea forces, unidentified intelligence while the enemy has taken the preemptive opportunities, and the society's falling into chaos. Obviously, the bulky field artillery organization and deployment that we have at this moment cannot effectively engage this type of battle. To build ground forces which can engage in coastal defense and urban combat, and protect the critical infrastructure of political and military facilities, we propose the following concrete measures:

(A) At present, ground forces should strengthen its long-range firepower capability, and work closely with the naval anti-ship missiles installed onshore in order to form an effective offshore barricade capability.

(B) In the current phase, strengthen the defense of the capital, reevaluate and redefine the scale and deployment of the capital defense. Continue the current defense planning of protecting the nation's critical infrastructure. Make the ground force interoperable with coast guard and police force, and task the military to protect the highest level facilities.

(C) 藉由整合地面兵力編制，減少指揮層級，提高個人武器裝備性能，強調城鎮作戰能力，建立高戰備可快速應變之具有能立即打擊解放軍特種作戰的常備地面部隊能量，負有防止解放軍在第一擊前後奪取機場、港口、重要政軍指揮管制中心與首都地區的任務。具有可迅速動員、就位與作戰的後備地面部隊能量，可支援常備部隊共同擔負因應解放軍 2 個加強師（首波登陸最大兵力）之任務。

(六) 維持制空與制海既有戰力：在研製海軍水下戰力與空軍新一代戰機的同時，現有戰力應予維持、升級。這些主戰載台不僅是國軍防衛主力，也可支援海外人道救援與災害防救任務。目前我空軍主戰兵力 F-16 A/B 與 IDF 戰機正進行升級，替代 AT-3 的新款高級教練機亦可能在 2016 年前定案。海軍部分，隨著中大型水面艦齡老化，海軍未來水面艦更新需求龐大，將在預算許可範圍下選擇最關鍵性項目優先推動，並以國艦國造與細水長流的方式執行。

陸、預算支持

民進黨已再三宣示：重返執政之後，將努力恢復國防預算至 GDP 3% 之水準。針對預算議題，國防小組建議：GDP 3% 是個數字，不是目標，目標在提高國軍戰力與整體國防能量。國防預算不足是事實，增加國防預算有其必要，但更重要地，在於增加的預算需要在完整的戰略規劃架構下，經嚴謹的財務紀律，用於正確的方向。特別在國家財政赤字高漲之際，國防預算的增加如果不能發揮有助社會發展的附加效應，將難以獲得民眾的支持。

(C) By integrating the ground force units, reducing the hierarchy of command, elevating the functions of individual weapons, and underscoring the capability of regular ground forces, we can establish a high-readiness standing ground force which is capable of fighting the PLA's special operations, and carries the mission of preventing the PLA from capturing our airports, harbors, critical political-military command centers, and the metropolitan area of the capitol. The Reserve ground force capable of quick mobilization, deployment, and combat can also support the regular forces and share the mission of tackling two of the PLA's reinforced division as the strongest forces in the first wave of landing.

6. Maintain existing capabilities for air and sea control: While in the process of developing and producing the Navy's new generation underwater combat capabilities and the Air Force's next generation fighters, the existing capabilities must be preserved and upgraded. These combat platforms not only make up Taiwan's primary defensive capabilities, but can also be used to support FHA/FDR missions. Presently, our main air combat capabilities are undergoing upgrades to the F-16 A/B and IDF aircraft, while the program of new model AT-3 advanced trainers should be initiated in 2016. As for the Navy, it faces immense needs in the future for updates and upgrades to the current aging fleet of mid- and large-sized surface vessels. Within reason of budgetary constraints, the acquisition of these items should be prioritized, with an emphasis on domestic production over a steady, extended time span.

VI. Budget Support

The DPP has repeatedly reiterated that, upon returning to power, it will work hard to resume bringing the national defense budget to the level of 3% of GDP. Regarding the budget issue, our defense policy committee suggests that the 3% of GDP is a number, not a goal. The goal is to elevate the capabilities of the Armed Forces and total defense. It is an undeniable truth that the defense budget is insufficient, and it is necessary to increase the defense budget. But more importantly, the increased budget must be appropriated under a comprehensive framework of strategic planning, through serious financial scrutiny, and in the right direction. Especially when the country's fiscal deficit is high, the public will be unlikely to support the defense budget increase if there is no spillover effect to help the society grows.

國防小組針對我國、美國、中國、南韓、新加坡、以色列、英國、德國、法國、澳洲與日本等 11 個國家進行國防預算的比較，我國政府財力有限，是造成我國國防預算總額有限的結構原因，如附件 3 所示，以瑞典斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究中心（Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI）之統計，我國國防預算占政府總預算（應指含地方政府）約在 10%至 11%間，略低於南韓（12%至 13%間），但如附件 4，南韓 2014 年的國防預算約在 360 億美元，但我國僅為 100 億美金，相差幾達 3.5 倍。但除了結構性因素外，我國國防預算逐年探底（如附件 1）的主要原因，是政府缺乏決心與規劃來增加國防預算。

政府缺乏決心與規劃來增加國防預算，呈現在附件 6，相形於其他 9 個國家（除日本維持微幅增減的穩定）普遍維持國防預算穩定成長率，台灣的國防預算成長卻嚴重遲滯，在 2001-2008 年民進黨第一次執政期間，尚維持平均 2.7%的成長率，但除法國、德國、日本外，仍低於多數國家。而自 2009-2014 年國民黨執政期間，國防預算平均成長率竟為-1.4%的負成長，居於末位，不禁令人搖頭。不僅低成長率，我國國防預算的編列亦嚴重缺乏穩定性，相對於各國穩定的成長或穩定的不成長（日本是此一特例），台灣的國防預算增減起伏的頻率與幅度均大（如附件 7），此一不穩定性若非因為國防部缺乏嚴謹戰略規劃，也會造成國防部難以進行嚴謹的戰略規劃，但無論是因或果，在預算獲得不確定性高的狀況下，國防預算是否能夠獲得善用實令人存疑。

The defense policy committee compared the defense budgets of 11 countries (including Taiwan, the United States, China, South Korea, Singapore, Israel, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Australia, and Japan) and found that our government's fiscal restraint is the structural factor that limits the total budget of our national defense. As Appendix 3 shows, based on the statistics of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), our defense budget only consists of 10-11% of the government's general budget (possibly including the local governments), which is slightly lower than the South Korea's (between 12-13%). However, as Appendix 4 shows, South Korea's defense budget for FY 2014 is approximately 36 billion US dollars, almost 3.5 times more than ours, which is only 10 billion. Besides structural factors, the reason why our annual defense budget is decreasing year after year (as shown in Appendix 1) is because of the government's lack of resolve and planning to make budget increase.

The government's lack of resolve and planning to make budget increases is illustrated in Appendix 6. In comparison with the other 9 countries' overall steady growth rate (except for Japan's minor but steady increases and decreases), Taiwan's defense budget growth suffers serious delays. During the DPP's first administration in 2001-2008, the growth rate maintained at 2.7%, but it was still behind many countries except for France, Germany and Japan. However, during the KMT administration in 2009-2014, the defense budget's average growth rate was negative 1.4%. One cannot help shaking one's head seeing Taiwan falling to last. Besides the low growth rate, our defense budget drafting also seriously lacks stability. In comparison with each country's stable growth or stable non-growth (as the special case for Japan), there is larger frequency and scale of Taiwan's defense increases and decreases (as shown in Appendix 7) – even if this budget instability is not caused by the lack of serious strategic planning on the MND's end, it will cause the MND trouble with conducting serious strategic planning. Regardless the uncertain causal relationship, it is doubtful if the defense budget can be properly appropriate under its high degree of instability.

政府的國防預算規劃取決於國防與經濟發展的契合度，這是民進黨許諾在重返執政後堅決採取振興本土國防產業的主要原因，因為只有國內經濟成長，特別是自足的本土國防產業，國防預算才有穩定成長的空間，以南韓與澳洲為例，兩國 GDP 的高成長帶動其國防預算的高成長（如附件 4 與 8），2001 年時，我國的國防預算總額約為 79 億美元，而南韓為 129 億，約我國的 1.6 倍，而澳洲僅 70 億，略低於我國。但 2001 至 2013 年期間，我國的 GDP 平均年成長率為 3.6%，但南韓與澳洲分別為 7.1% 與 11.3%。其結果便是：我國在這 13 年期間國防預算的平均年成長率僅 1.2%，而南韓與澳洲則高達 6.8% 與 5.6%。在 2014 年時，當我國的國防預算總額停滯於 105 億美元時，而南韓已達 339 億美元（擴大差距自 1.6 倍到 3.2 倍），而澳洲的國防預算不僅超越我國，更達 248 億（為我國的 2.3 倍）。同時，像美國與英國，武器裝備自足率無虞，儘管經濟成長未必驚人（分別為 3.8% 與 4.6%），國防預算仍可保持穩定的成長幅度（分別為 6.1% 與 3.4%）。

此一結論再度說明：面對當前國防預算不足的窘境，確實有增加國防預算的需要，但若政府無法下定決心、無法縝密規劃、無法與經濟發展契合，國防支出與經濟成長零和的現狀便無法化解，國防預算的增加仍將會有心無力的政治口號。

國防小組再次建議：國防預算應當增加，而且以經濟發展的速度（如 GDP 成長率）等比增加，且視本土國防產業的發展重點擇要增加。建議：新增之預算 70% 集中於國防自主研發為重點的軍事投資項（如前文所列舉）下，因為只有武器裝備真正的提升，才可能在不損及戰力的國家安全前提下，降低所需的專業軍人數目，降低人員維持費用的比例。

The government's defense budget planning is determined by its compatibility with defense and economic development. This is why the DPP is committed to bolstering indigenous defense industries upon returning to power. Because only when the domestic economy grows will the defense budget have steady room to grow, especially when it comes to self-sufficient indigenous defense industries. Take South Korea and Australia for example. Their high GDP growth rate has driven high increase in defense budget (as shown in Appendix 4 and 8). In 2001, our total defense budget was approximately 7.9 billion while South Korea was 12.9 billion, about 1.6 times higher than ours. Australia was only 7 billion, slightly below ours. However, from 2001 to 2013, our average GDP growth rate was only 3.6% while South Korea and Australia was 7.1% and 11.3%, respectively. The result is that our average growth rate for defense budget in the past 13 years was only 1.2% annually, while South Korea and Australia were as high as 6.8% and 5.6% respectively. Coming to 2014, while our total defense budget is stalled at 10.5 billion, South Korea has reached 33.9 billion (and the gap widened from 1.6 times to 3.2 times). Conversely, the Australian defense budget not only surpassed ours, it even reached 24.8 billion (2.3 times higher than ours). In the meantime, for countries like the US and UK which have highly self-sufficient defense articles, even though their economic growth rates are hardly astonishing (3.8% and 4.6% respectively), their defense budget can still maintain a steady growth rate (6.1% and 3.4% respectively).

The conclusion once again explains the need for defense budget increase while facing the conundrum of insufficient defense budget. If the government cannot make up its mind, fails to plan deliberately, and is unable to spend in a manner compatible with economic development, the zero-sum status of current defense spending vs. economic growth cannot be resolved, and the defense budget increase will still be a political slogan without any teeth.

The Defense Policy Advisory Committee once again makes the following suggestions: The defense budget ought to increase, and it must increase geometrically along with the pace of economic development (such as the GDP growth rate), and increase selectively based on the development of indigenous defense industries. We suggest that 70% of the new budget increase budget should go toward military investment items (as previously discussed), focusing on autonomous defense R&D. Only through the genuine improvement of the armament can we reduce the demand for professional soldiers and lower the cost ratio for manpower retention without negatively impacting national security and intact capabilities.

國防小組建議：新增預算用於人員維持費的不宜超過 10%，人員維持費仍應控管在國防年度支出 50% 以下。因此，兵役制度的檢討應強調以提高青年競爭力而非僅以提高薪給來吸引青年從軍。我們認知到：志願役軍士官兵之人事成本高，後續的退輔支出也將會是財政沉重負擔，在人力優質化帶動優質人力之良性循環尚未及見效前，藉軍事訓練役男部隊見習、嚴格認定軍人身份，擴大國防文官數量、擴大非機敏性業務委外規模等措施來降低高成本人力之需求數量，以控制預算負荷。新創「優選」管道在長期效益呈現前，初期所需之成本由國防產業分攤負擔。新增志願後備部隊，為現行規劃所無，且新增預算不低。為求控制人員維持費不致過度增加，新增兩項措施所需之人力數量由預算導向決定。

The Defense Policy Advisory Committee raises the following proposals: the newly increased budget for manpower retention should not exceed 10% and should be under 50% of annual defense spending. Therefore, the review of the military service system should place importance on raising the competitiveness for the youth instead of offering a high salary to attract enlistment. We recognize that the personnel cost for volunteer forces is high, and the following spending on veteran affairs will also impose a heavy fiscal burden. So before the virtuous cycle of manpower qualification takes effect, we should manage the budget load and lower the manpower cost through the following measures: military on-site training for draftees, strictly identifying the role of soldiers, expanding the number of civilian officers, and enlarging the outsourcing scale of non-classified jobs. Likewise, before the newly founded channel of “elite qualification” shows its long-term effect, the first installation cost should be shared by the defense industries. The volunteer Reserve Force will also be costly given it is not in place in the current planning. To prevent the manpower retention fee from overly increase, the two new measures for manpower demand should be decided based on budget considerations.

附件
ADDENDUM

附件 1 我國國防預算總額、佔中央政府總預算比例、佔 GDP 比例

年度	國防預算	中央政府預算	佔總預算比例	佔 GDP 比例
1998	3,222 ^A	13,640 ^A	25.09 ^A	3.43 [#] ; 3.68 ^A
1999	2,953 ^A	12,842 ^A	21.60 ^B ; 22.04 ^A	3.00 [#] ; 3.21 ^A
2000	2,761 ^C	15,859 ^C	17.41 ^C	2.66 [#] ; 3.17 ^B ; 2.78 ^A
2001	2,698 ^C	16,371 ^C	16.48 ^C	2.65 [#] ; 2.91 ^B ; 2.60 ^A
2002	2,604 ^D	15,907 ^D	16.37 ^D	2.43 [#] ; 2.64 ^B ; 2.52 ^A
2003	2,572 ^D	16,588 ^D ; 15,503 ^C	15.52 ^D ; 16.59 ^C	2.34 [#] ; 2.50 ^B
2004	2,641 ^D	15,973 ^D ; 15,916 ^C	16.53 ^D ; 16.59 ^C	2.26 [#] ; 2.51 ^B
2005	2,586 ^D	16,083 ^D	16.08 ^D	2.13 [#] ; 2.34 ^B
2006	2,525 ^D	15,717 ^D	16.06 ^B ; 16.07 ^D	1.99 [#] ; 2.21 ^B
2007	3,049 ^D	16,284 ^D	18.72 ^D ; 19.03 ^B	2.27 [#] ; 2.69 ^B
2008	3,340 ^D	17,117 ^D ; 16,859 ^C	19.51 ^D ; 19.84 ^C ; 21.51 ^B	2.53 [#] ; 3.00 ^B
2009	3,186 ^D	18,097 ^D	17.61 ^D	2.45 [#]
2010	2,974 ^D	17,149 ^D	17.34 ^D	2.10 [#]
2011	2,946 ^D	17,884 ^E ; 17,896 ^D	16.47 ^E ; 16.46 ^D	2.05 [#]
2012	3,173 ^E	19,388 ^E	16.37 ^E	2.16 [#]
2013	3,127 ^E	19,076 ^E	16.39 ^E	2.05 [#]
2014	3,043 ^F	19,162 ^F	15.90 ^F	1.89 [#]
2015	3,059 ^F	19,346 ^F	15.80 ^F	

金額單位：億元台幣

資料來源：

A 國防報告書，2004 年，頁 138-139，數字含特別預算。

B 國防報告書，2008 年，頁 203。數字含特別預算。

C 國防報告書，2009 年，頁 142。

D 國防報告書，2011 年，頁 142。

E 國防報告書，2013 年，頁 135。

F 中央政府總預算決算查詢資料庫。

新境界智庫國防小組統計。

附件 2 國防預算佔 GDP 比例國別比較

年度	台灣		美國	中國	南韓	新加坡	以色列	英國	德國	法國	澳洲
1998	3.68 ^A	3.4	3.0	1.70	2.9	5.4	7.9	2.5	1.5	2.7	1.9
1999	3.21 ^A	3.2	2.9	1.90	2.6	5.3	7.4	2.5	1.5	2.7	1.9
2000	3.17 ^A	2.7	2.9	1.90	2.5	4.6	7.1	2.4	1.5	2.5	1.9
2001	2.91 ^A	2.7	2.9	2.07	2.4	4.9	7.4	2.4	1.5	2.5	1.9
2002	2.64 ^A	2.5	3.2	2.17	2.3	5.0	8.3	2.4	1.5	2.5	1.9
2003	2.50 ^A	2.4	3.6	2.11	2.3	4.9	8.5	2.5	1.4	2.6	1.8
2004	2.51 ^A	2.3	3.8	2.06	2.3	4.5	8.2	2.4	1.4	2.5	1.8
2005	2.34 ^A	2.2	3.8	2.02	2.5	4.4	7.6	2.4	1.4	2.5	1.8
2006	2.21 ^A	2.0	3.8	2.03	2.5	4.0	7.5	2.3	1.3	2.4	1.8
2007	2.69 ^A	2.1	3.8	2.05	2.5	3.7	6.8	2.4	1.3	2.3	1.8
2008	3.00 ^A	2.2	4.2	2.02	2.6	3.9	6.6	2.4	1.3	2.3	1.8
2009	2.33 [#]	2.4	4.6	2.19	2.7	4.0	6.8	2.6	1.4	2.6	1.9
2010	2.39 [#]	2.1	4.7	2.07	2.5	3.5	6.3	2.5	1.4	2.4	1.9
2011	2.12 [#]	2.2	4.6	2.01	2.6	3.3	6.0	2.4	1.3	2.3	1.8
2012	2.19 [#]	2.2	4.2	2.02	2.6	3.2	5.7	2.4	1.4	2.3	1.7
2013	2.17 [#]	2.1	3.8	NA	2.6	3.2	5.8	2.2	1.3	2.3	1.7
2014	1.89 [#]	2.1	3.5	2.06	2.6	3.3	5.2	2.2	1.2	2.2	1.8

日本 1998 年為 0.9%，1999 年後比例維持為 1%

資料來源：

瑞典 SIPRI 統計數字

A 我國官方數字中最高值

新境界智庫國防小組統計

附件 3 國防預算佔政府總預算比例國別比較

年度	台灣	美國	中國	南韓	新加坡	以色列	英國	德國	法國	澳洲	日本
1998	11.6	NA	13.9	16.4	19.6	NA	6.8	3.2	5.1	5.7	2.7
1999	13.9	NA	12.6	14.5	22.1	NA	6.6	3.2	5.0	5.4	2.7
2000	8.3	NA	11.3	14.4	22.9	14.8	7.0	3.3	4.8	5.3	2.7
2001	11.1	8.9	11.8	13.5	22.2	14.5	6.5	3.1	4.7	5.6	2.6
2002	11.2	9.6	11.7	13.7	28.2	16.0	6.6	3.0	4.6	5.4	2.7
2003	10.7	10.5	11.5	12.2	34.9	16.8	6.6	3.0	4.7	5.5	2.8
2004	10.7	11.2	11.5	11.7	33.1	17.2	6.2	3.0	4.8	5.4	2.9
2005	10.3	11.3	11.1	12.6	35.2	16.4	6.0	2.9	4.5	5.4	2.9
2006	10.3	11.2	11.2	12.3	30.0	16.6	5.8	2.9	4.5	5.5	2.8
2007	10.7	11.0	11.1	12.1	30.3	15.6	5.9	2.9	4.4	5.4	2.9
2008	11.0	11.3	8.9	12.5	22.8	15.4	5.9	3.0	4.3	5.4	2.7
2009	10.5	11.1	8.6	12.7	21.0	15.9	5.6	3.0	4.4	5.3	2.6
2010	10.3	11.6	7.9	12.9	23.0	15.0	5.5	2.9	4.1	5.0	2.5
2011	10.4	11.7	7.4	12.9	21.8	14.3	5.5	2.9	4.0	5.0	2.5
2012	10.7	11.2	7.2	12.6	21.8	13.8	5.3	3.0	3.9	4.4	2.5
2013	10.7	10.4	7.0	12.4	19.4	14.4	5.1	2.9	3.9	4.7	2.5
2014	10.6	9.5	7.3	12.1	18.3	13.0	5.1	2.8	3.8	4.8	2.5

資料來源：

瑞典 SIPRI 統計數字（分母應為中央與地方政府總預算加總）

附件 4 國防預算國別比較

年度	台灣	美國	中國	南韓	新加坡	以色列	英國	德國	法國	澳洲	日本
1998	9.2	274.2	18.0	10.4	4.4	9.1	36.8	33.1	40.0	7.1	36.6
1999	9.5	280.9	20.5	12.0	4.4	8.6	36.4	32.6	38.8	7.7	43.1
2000	8.8	301.6	22.1	13.8	4.3	9.3	35.2	28.1	33.8	7.2	45.9
2001	7.9	312.7	27.4	12.9	4.3	9.5	35.3	27.4	33.2	7.0	40.4
2002	7.5	356.7	31.6	14.1	4.5	9.9	39.6	29.3	36.4	7.9	39.1
2003	7.4	415.2	34.7	15.8	4.7	10.6	46.9	35.0	45.9	9.9	42.7
2004	7.8	464.6	40.0	17.8	5.0	10.9	53.9	38.0	53.0	11.9	45.5
2005	8.0	503.3	46.2	22.1	5.4	10.7	55.1	38.0	52.9	13.2	44.6
2006	7.6	527.6	56.6	25.1	5.8	11.4	57.4	38.0	54.5	14.2	42.1
2007	8.1	556.9	71.7	27.7	6.5	11.9	65.9	42.5	60.5	17.1	41.4
2008	8.9	621.1	91.6	26.0	7.4	14.1	65.6	48.0	66.0	18.6	46.7
2009	9.1	668.5	111.7	24.4	7.5	14.0	57.9	47.4	66.8	18.9	51.4
2010	9.0	698.1	123.3	27.5	8.1	14.6	58.0	46.2	61.7	23.2	53.7
2011	9.9	711.3	147.2	30.8	8.9	15.4	60.2	48.1	64.6	26.5	60.4
2012	10.4	684.7	169.6	31.6	9.1	14.7	58.4	46.4	60.0	26.2	60.0
2013	10.5	639.7	191.2	33.9	9.6	16.9	56.8	47.6	62.4	24.8	48.7
2014	10.2	609.9	216.3	36.6	9.8	15.9	60.4	46.4	62.2	25.4	45.7

單位 10 億美元

資料來源：

瑞典 SIPRI 統計數字

附件 5 國防預算人均值國別比較

年度	台灣	美國	中國	南韓	新加坡	以色列	英國	德國	法國	澳洲	日本
1998	421	994	14.6	226	1137	1526	630	404	665	380	290
1999	433	1007	16.4	259	1135	1408	621	397	643	411	341
2000	395	1069	17.6	294	1075	1494	599	342	555	380	362
2001	356	1097	21.6	273	1041	1480	598	333	542	363	318
2002	334	1240	24.7	296	1084	1514	668	356	589	404	307
2003	331	1431	27.0	331	1148	1595	787	425	738	499	335
2004	345	1587	30.9	371	1210	1610	900	461	845	596	357
2005	352	1703	35.5	460	1281	1553	913	461	837	649	353
2006	334	1768	43.2	520	1325	1620	945	462	857	688	330
2007	355	1849	54.4	571	1421	1665	1076	517	947	825	325
2008	389	2043	69.2	533	1540	1933	1062	586	1025	877	366
2009	395	2179	84.0	496	1511	1874	930	580	1034	874	403
2010	393	2257	92.2	558	1597	1921	925	566	950	1054	422
2011	430	2283	110	620	1721	1993	953	589	989	1191	473
2012	450	2182	126	633	1727	1866	918	578	914	1154	470
2013	451	2024	141	676	1778	2105	887	591	945	1073	383
2014	437	1891	155	741	1789	2040	952	562	964	1077	360

單位：1 美元

資料來源：

瑞典 SIPRI 統計數字


附件 6 國防預算年成長率國別比較

年度	台灣	美國	中國	南韓	新加坡	以色列	英國	德國	法國	澳洲	日本
1998											
1999	-8.3	+2.1	+13.3	-2.0	+1.8	+3.1	+1.2	+2.6	+1.3	+6.4	+4.2
2000	-6.5	+7.5	+8.2	+9.0	-1.9	+7.2	+3.4	-0.1	+0.5	+4.1	+0.7
2001	-2.2	+3.6	+23.3	+7.0	+3.4	+4.6	+5.3	+0.3	+1.3	+8.5	-0.8
2002	-3.4	+14.1	+15.4	+5.3	+5.0	+17.6	+7.8	+1.6	+4.0	+7.4	-0.1
2003	-1.2	+16.5	+9.9	+6.8	+1.5	+3.0	+8.6	-0.3	+5.1	+4.6	-0.1
2004	+2.6	+11.8	+14.9	+8.5	+3.5	+1.1	+2.5	-1.4	+4.9	+6.5	-0.4
2005	-2.0	+8.4	+14.5	+10.7	+6.6	+1.1	+2.9	0	-0.3	+6.2	-0.1
2006	-2.3	+4.7	+19.2	+6.1	+1.8	+5.4	+2.9	-0.7	+2.1	+9.0	-0.4
2007	+20.7	+5.5	+20.7	+11.6	+6.0	-3.5	+5.5	+2.3	+1.8	+8.6	-0.4
2008	+9.5	+11.6	+16.6	+6.1	+7.6	+3.2	+8.2	+5.5	+1.7	+8.1	-1.0
2001-2008	+2.7	+9.5	+16.8	+7.7	+4.4	+4.0	+5.4	+0.9	+2.5	+7.3	-0.4
2009	-4.6	+7.5	+19.9	+8.3	+3.9	+8.8	+4.1	+4.1	+6.8	+9.4	-0.3
2010	-6.6	+4.4	+9.2	+2.2	+0.8	-0.7	+1.1	+2.2	-3.1	+4.1	-1.9
2011	-0.9	+1.8	+14.0	+7.5	+1.4	+1.1	0	-0.8	-0.3	+1.8	+2.1
2012	+7.7	-3.7	+12.5	+4.0	+2.1	+2.7	-1.5	+4.4	+0.5	-1.8	-0.7
2013	-1.4	-6.5	+10.6	+4.8	+4.7	+7.6	-1.7	-0.7	+0.6	+1.5	-0.6
2014	-2.6	-4.6	+12.2	+4.2	+3.7	-7.0	+0.9	-2.4	-0.1	+9.6	+2.0
2009-2014	-1.4	-0.1	+13.0	+5.1	+2.7	+2.0	+0.4	+1.1	+0.7	+4.1	+0.1

單位：%

資料來源：採當地幣值，除台灣（採官方數字最高值）外，其餘依瑞典 SIPRI 統計數字，由新境界智庫國防小組統計


附件 7 我國 GDP 與國防預算年成長值關係，2001-2014 年



資料來源：新境界智庫國防小組統計

國防預算年成長率之計算標準採當地幣值計算，除台灣（採官方數字最高值）外，其餘依瑞典 SIPRI 統計數字；GDP 值年成長率之計算基準，除台灣（取自資料行政院主計處）其餘來自 The World Bank。

附件 8 GDP 與國防預算 2001-2013 年間平均成長比例之國別比較



資料來源：新境界智庫國防小組統計

國防預算年成長率之計算標準採當地幣值計算，除台灣（採官方數字最高值）外，其餘依瑞典 SIPRI 統計數字；GDP 值年成長率之計算基準，除台灣（取自資料行政院主計處）其餘來自 The World Bank。

新境界文教基金會

董事長：蔡英文

執行長：林全

副執行長：劉建忻

蕭美琴

New Frontier Foundation

President: Ing-Wen TSAI

CEO: Chuan LIN

Vice CEO: T Chien-Sin LIU

Bi-Khim HSIAO

國防政策諮詢小組

召集人：陳文政

諮詢委員：

李文忠

吳明蔚

吳怡農

柯承亨

胡鎮埔

翁明賢

黃順章

廖祥順

盧天麟

蔡行健

蔡明憲

蘇紫雲

以及不具名的一位退役海軍少將

And an anonymous retired rear admiral

幕僚：黃柏彰

Staff: Paul HUANG

國防小組感謝吳釗燮秘書長的督導協調，彭光理主任、陳怡潔、蕭舜文在翻譯上的協助，以及 5 位學者、專家參與本報告的研擬或提供寶貴意見。

The Committee thanks DPP Secretary General Joseph Wu for his supervision and coordination, Michael Fonte, Janice Chen, and Iris Shaw for their best assistance in translation as well as 5 scholars and experts for their contributions in preparing this report.



國防政策藍皮書 Defense Policy Blue Papers

- | | |
|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 第一號報告
DEF-PUB 01 | 民進黨的國防議題
DPP's National Defense Agenda |
| 第二號報告
DEF-PUB 02 | 中科院轉型與厚實自主國防核心研製能量
Transforming the CSIST: Strengthening Indigenous Defense Research and Development |
| 第三號報告
DEF-PUB 03 | 建立權責相符的國家安全會議
An Accountable National Security Council |
| 第四號報告
DEF-PUB 04 | 開啟臺美國防夥伴關係的新章節
New Chapter for Taiwan-U.S. Defense Partnership |
| 第五號報告
DEF-PUB 05 | 二〇二五年中國對臺軍事威脅評估
China's Military Threats against Taiwan in 2025 |
| 第六號報告
DEF-PUB 06 | 新世代的軍人
New Generation of Soldiers |
| 第七號報告
DEF-PUB 07 | 振興臺灣國防核心產業
Bolstering Taiwan's Core Defense Industries |
| 第八號報告
DEF-PUB08 | 人道救助與災害防救
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief |
| 第九號報告
DEF-PUB09 | 二〇二五年臺灣軍事防衛能量
Taiwan's Military Capacities in 2025 |

地址：台北市 100 北平東路 30 號 8 樓
Address: 8 F., No. 30, Pei-Ping E. Rd., Taipei, 100, Taiwan
TEL: (02) 2356 8028 For more information: <http://www.dppnff.tw>