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September 29 – October 1, 2013 – US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2013

2013 US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference

Event:
US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2013

September 29-October 1, 2013
Annapolis, Maryland

The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2013 will be held September 29 – October 1, 2013 in Annapolis, Maryland. This will be the twelfth annual event in a series of ongoing conferences addressing the future of U.S. defense cooperation with Taiwan, the defense procurement process, and Taiwan’s defense and national security needs. This year, conference sessions will discuss Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), examine the importance of credibility in sustaining deterrence, and discuss approaches and policies in support of a credible, comprehensive, and strategically relevant deterrence message. We will also examine existing systems and available capabilities that can be leveraged in support of Taiwan defense and national security objectives, as well as assess innovations and future capabilities in support of Taiwan’s national defense and as a component of deterrence.

The first conference in this series was the St. Petersburg, Florida event where former Minister of National Defense Tang Yiau-ming gave the keynote address in March of 2002. The second conference in the series was held in February 2003 in San Antonio, Texas, the third in October 2004 in Phoenix, Arizona, the fourth in September 2005 in San Diego, California, the fifth in September 2006 in Denver, Colorado, and the sixth in September 2007 in Annapolis, Maryland. Taiwan’s Minister of National Defense Chen Chao-min gave the keynote address at the seventh conference in the series, held in September 2008 on Amelia Island, Florida. The eighth conference was held in September 2009 in Charlottesville, Virginia, the ninth conference was held in October 2010 in Cambridge, Maryland, the tenth conference was held in September 2011 in Richmond, Virginia, and the eleventh conference was held in September 2012 in Hershey, Pennsylvania.

Conference Program
Keynote speakers at the 2013 conference will include senior representatives from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and from the U.S. government. US-Taiwan Business Council Chairman Dr. Paul Wolfowitz will serve as the conference host.

Sessions at the US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference feature a moderator and several speakers on the panel, and some sessions include additional commentators. Each speaker will give a short presentation on the session topic from his or her own viewpoint and expertise. Those presentations will then be followed by a moderator-led discussion among the panelists, as well as a moderator-driven question and answer period with the attendees. This format offers the maximum amount of time for exchanges among the panelists, as well as between the panel and the audience, allowing the sessions to become a forum for substantial and valuable interaction and discussion.

Registration is now open at the 2013 US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference website.

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/september-29-october-1-2013-us-taiwan-defense-industry-conference-2013/

The US-Taiwan Business Council Releases a Report on the Looming Taiwan Fighter Gap

Report Cover: The Looming Taiwan Fighter Gap

Report Cover: The Looming Taiwan Fighter Gap

Lessons and experiences from previous Taiwan Strait crises have shown that it is imperative for Taiwan to maintain a measure of qualitative superiority over China – not only to attempt to prevail in conflict, but also to reinforce deterrence, to allow Taiwan to negotiate from a position of strength, and to prevent war. However, a careful and objective analysis of the current balance of air power in the Taiwan Strait reveals that Taiwan’s current air defense forces are only marginally capable of meeting the island’s air defense needs, and that it faces real and significant future challenges in maintaining its current capabilities.

The U.S. decision in 2011 to assist Taiwan with the mid-life upgrade (MLU) of its existing fleet of F-16A/B fighters will significantly improve Taiwan’s air defense capabilities. Nevertheless, the upgrade program still does not adequately address all of Taiwan’s legitimate air defense requirements. Without additional procurement programs, a tangible and substantial front-line fighter gap will develop in Taiwan within the next five to ten years, as a significant portion of the Taiwan Air Force (TAF) aircraft inventory reaches the end of its useful service life.

The Looming Taiwan Fighter Gap

Figure 1: Estimated Fighter Numbers Through 2023

Taiwan’s fleet of Mirage 2000s and the F-CK-1A/B Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) both contend with serious availability issues, and may be facing retirement after 2018. The shortfall in front-line fighters will be further exacerbated by the rapidly approaching obsolescence of Taiwan’s fleet of F-5 Lead-In Fighter Training (LIFT) aircraft. Together, this will reduce the Taiwan air defense force structure to rely primarily on a small fleet of 145 F-16A/Bs whose operational rate takes the number of available planes to approximately 107. During the scheduled upgrade program for these fighters, however, as many as a squadron (24) at a time of F-16A/Bs will be unavailable for service, further reducing Taiwan’s air defense forces.

By 2023, at the expected end of the upgrade program, Taiwan’s operationally-available fighter strength will have declined to a point where the TAF will no longer possess the minimum requisite number of combat aircraft necessary to defend its air space from Chinese aggression or military coercion. Moreover, the quantitative shortfall is certain to also erode the quality of Taiwan’s air force, manifesting in decreased aircraft performance, reduced pilot training opportunities, and lack of pilot experience.

This significant air power shortfall will emerge in Taiwan while China continues to aggressively modernize and expand its missile strike capabilities, and while the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is simultaneously and rapidly introducing modern combat aircraft into service in large numbers.

The United States has both a clear legal and moral obligation to respond to the ongoing Chinese intimidation tactics and attempts at coercion of Taiwan. Under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), Washington must ready itself and Taiwan to resist that coercion. The germane parts of the TRA make it the policy of the United States:

  • to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;
  • to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and
  •  to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.[1]

Arguably the mere existence of China’s current large arsenal of ballistic missiles, land attack cruise missiles (LACMs), and fighter aircraft opposite Taiwan is “a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific,” as it is undermining the long-standing, stability-enhancing military balance in the region. Clearly targeted at Taiwan, China’s standing arsenal is certainly a means of coercion even if the missiles and aircraft are never used.

The United States and Taiwan need to craft and implement counter-coercive strategies that undercut the utility of Chinese aerospace power, while demonstrating Taiwan’s ability to defend its airspace in peacetime and wartime.

 

Report: “The Looming Taiwan Fighter Gap” (PDF, 2.42MB)
Graphic: Report Cover
Graphic: The Looming Taiwan Fighter Gap
[1] Public Law 96-8, “Taiwan Relations Act” Washington, D.C., 96th Congress, January 1, 1979.

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/report-on-the-looming-taiwan-fighter-gap/

September 30 – October 2, 2012 – US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2012

  • Filed under Past Events

  • August 15, 2012

  • August 15, 2012

Event:
US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2012

September 30-October 2, 2012
Hershey, Pennsylvania

2012 US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference

The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2012 was held September 30 – October 2, 2012 in Hershey, Pennsylvania. This was the eleventh annual event in a series of ongoing conferences addressing the future of U.S. defense cooperation with Taiwan, the defense procurement process, and Taiwan’s defense and national security needs. This year, conference sessions discussed innovative military tactics and capabilities, and examined how Taiwan can implement such innovation. We also addressed Taiwan defense policy in President Ma’s second term, held a discussion on challenges in the U.S./China/Taiwan trilateral political environment, and reviewed opportunities for collaboration between the U.S. and Taiwan in meeting the cyber threat.

The first conference in this series was the St. Petersburg, Florida event where former Minister of National Defense Tang Yiau-ming gave the keynote address in March of 2002. The second conference in the series was held in February 2003 in San Antonio, Texas, the third in October 2004 in Phoenix, Arizona, the fourth in September 2005 in San Diego, California, the fifth in September 2006 in Denver, Colorado, and the sixth in September 2007 in Annapolis, Maryland. Taiwan’s Minister of National Defense Chen Chao-min gave the keynote address at the seventh conference in the series, held in September 2008 on Amelia Island, Florida. The eighth conference was held in September 2009 in Charlottesville, Virginia, the ninth conference was held in October 2010 in Cambridge, Maryland, and the tenth conference was held in September 2011 in Richmond, Virginia.

Keynote Addresses
Keynote speakers at the 2012 conference included senior representatives from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense. US-Taiwan Business Council Chairman Dr. Paul Wolfowitz was the conference host.
Keynote Speech by Andrew Yang, Taiwan’s Vice Minister of National Defense (Policy) (PDF)

Conference Program
Sessions at the US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference featured a moderator and several speakers on the panel, and some sessions included additional commentators. Each speaker gave a short presentation on the session topic from his or her own viewpoint and expertise. Those presentations were then followed by a moderator-led discussion among the panelists, as well as a moderator-driven question and answer period with the attendees.

This format offers the maximum amount of time for exchanges among the panelists, as well as between the panel and the audience, allowing the sessions to become a forum for substantial and valuable interaction and discussion.

Website for the 2012 US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/september-30-october-2-2012-us-taiwan-defense-industry-conference-2012/

The US-Taiwan Business Council and the Project 2049 Institute Jointly Release a Report Examining Chinese Reactions to Taiwan Arms Sales

Report Cover: Chinese Reactions to Taiwan Arms Sales

Report Cover: Chinese Reactions to Taiwan Arms Sales


Taiwan’s national security is fundamentally in the national interest of the United States, and the U.S. seeks to create an atmosphere conducive to a peaceful and non-coercive resolution of political differences on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

U.S. arms sales are intended to provide Taiwan’s government and leadership with the confidence needed to engage with their counterparts in Beijing from a position of strength. Guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, and consistent with understandings outlined in Joint Communiqués with China, America providing to Taiwan the arms necessary to ensure its own self-defense has enabled democracy to flourish on the island. Substantial support for Taiwan has also served as a visible reminder of U.S. commitments to peace and security in the Asia Pacific.

The process by which U.S. policymakers have addressed Taiwan’s defense requirements has evolved over time. When the Mutual Defense Treaty guided the relationship, between 1955 and 1979, Taiwan was treated as an ally. After the shift in diplomatic relations in 1979, Taiwan was treated as a special case. Concerned over possible Chinese intervention, Taiwan defense officials traveled to Washington to present senior U.S. policy officials with Taiwan’s bundled list of requirements in annual face-to-face meetings. Formal Congressional notifications of approved items were forwarded both relatively frequently and as needed throughout the course of a given year.

In 2001, the annual Taiwan arms sales talks process was discontinued, with the intention of allowing Taiwan’s defense requirements to be addressed at any time during the year, similar to the process for a normal security assistance partner. Since 2008, however, Congressional notifications of approved items have consistently been bundled into large multi-billion dollar packages, rather than being processed when ready. A return to the annual arms sales talks process may warrant consideration.

Figure 2: Value of Arms Sales Notifications, 1990-2011

Figure 2: Value of Arms Sales Notifications, 1990-2011

China has a well-established track record of responding negatively and stridently to public announcements of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Congressional notifications will likely remain the primary trigger for Chinese responses, rather than earlier decision-points in the process such as providing Price and Availability (P&A) data in response to a Letter of Request (LOR) from Taiwan.

Future Chinese actions taken in response to Taiwan arms sales may include sanctions against the U.S. companies that are supporting Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs or undertaking Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) programs with Taiwan. However, the effectiveness of such sanctions is open to question, as major U.S. defense industrial firms conduct only minor business in China. Beijing is also unlikely to sanction smaller sub-system suppliers due to their peripheral involvement as sub-contractors and their marginal value as symbolic targets. In addition, if a U.S. company were to face discrimination as a result of Chinese sanctions due to Taiwan arms sales, a case could be introduced to the World Trade Organization (WTO) for adjudication.

Beijing authorities could suspend People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military exchanges with the U.S. Department of Defense in response to Taiwan arms sales – an often-used tactic. While such exchanges have value, critical issues in the bilateral security relationship would be addressed through other channels if necessary. In addition, the PLA most likely would resume exchanges again, following an appropriate interval, as they have in the past.

In retaliation for Taiwan arms sales, PRC leaders could also consider releasing sensitive nuclear or missile-related technologies to Iran or other countries of concern, or they could withhold support for non-proliferation-related actions within the United Nations or other international organizations. However, reprisals from the U.S. or from other concerned countries could be expected in return, and Beijing likely would also be subject to criticism from other players in Europe and elsewhere who have significant interests in preventing Iran from gaining weapons of mass destruction.

Political or military leaders in Beijing may attempt to retaliate by liquidating U.S. Treasury holdings. As satisfying an emotional outburst as this course of action might be on an individual basis, the PLA has limited authority over national Chinese economic and financial policy. A sudden sell-off of U.S. Treasury holdings would be a significant horizontal and vertical escalation of the relatively minor, albeit emotionally charged, issue of Taiwan arms sales. In addition, the effects of such an action are unclear and could actually have a greater negative effect on China’s economic interests than on the interests of the U.S.

Past behavior indicates that China is unlikely to challenge any fundamental U.S. interests in response to any future releases of significant military articles or services to Taiwan. The U.S. therefore retains considerable freedom of action in abiding by the Taiwan Relations Act. Barring a substantive reduction in the Chinese military posture opposite Taiwan, the U.S. will likely continue to provide Taiwan with weapons of a defensive character for the foreseeable future.

Nevertheless, key unresolved issues include Taiwan’s unheeded request for additional F-16 fighters, and the fact that the Bush administration’s 2001 commitment to assist Taiwan in its acquisition of diesel-electric submarines remains unfulfilled. Taiwan’s request for additional F-16s is both reasonable and urgent, and should be honored. In addition, if Congressional notification for a submarine design program is not forthcoming, Taiwan’s LOR should be withdrawn and export licenses through direct commercial sales channels should be given positive treatment.

The Barack Obama administration has demonstrated unnecessary restraint in its Taiwan arms sales decisions to date, despite having ample justification for positive considerations. Excessive caution on new arms sales to Taiwan risks legitimizing PRC use of military coercion to resolve political differences with its neighbors and sends a signal to others in the region of a diminished U.S. commitment in Asia.

This major report examining Chinese reactions and retaliatory responses to Taiwan arms sales by the U.S. is available on the US-Taiwan Business Council website:

Report: “Chinese Reactions to Taiwan Arms Sales” (PDF, 2.18MB)
Graphic: Report Cover
Graphic: Value of Arms Sales Notifications, 1990-2011

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/council-and-project-2049-jointly-release-a-report-examining-chinese-reactions-to-taiwan-arms-sales/

US-Taiwan Business Council Releases Major Report Examining the Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait

Report Cover: The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait

Report Cover: The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait

Executive Summary

Taiwan’s relationship with China continues to improve and expand. Yet the eroding cross-Strait military balance must be redressed so that Taiwan can approach the political dialogue from a position of confidence and strength.

Effective air defense is a crucial component if Taiwan is to mount a viable defense of the island. Taiwan’s current air defenses comprise 18 fighter squadrons with a nominal strength of 387 combat aircraft of U.S., French, and indigenous origins: 145 F-16A/Bs, 126 F-CK-1A/Bs, 56 Mirage 2000-5s, and 60 F-5E/Fs. All of these are reasonably modern “Fourth Generation” fighters with BVR AAM capability, with the F-5s – which are mainly used for operational conversion training with only a secondary combat role – as the exception.

The Taiwan Air Force (TAF) also controls ground-based air defense forces in the form of over 25 medium/long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, using a mix of U.S. and indigenous missile systems (I-HAWK, Patriot, and Tien Kung-I/II). TAF has three existing PAC-2+ batteries (currently being upgraded) and is in the process of procuring 6 additional operational Patriot systems, for a total of 9 active PAC-3 batteries. There are also a number of short-range air defense SAM and gun systems, as well as field air defense assets operated by Taiwan’s ground forces.

In addition, Taiwan has a sophisticated integrated air defense command & control (C2) system, together with a modern network of ground-based surveillance radars and E-2 AEW&C aircraft. The air defense C2 infrastructure is currently being hardened, further modernized, and integrated with new capabilities such as the Link 16 datalink and the Surveillance Radar Program (SRP).

Taiwan’s air defense forces confront a unique threat environment involving long-range SAMs and over 1,300 tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), which could – in concert with manned strike aircraft, UAV, information warfare/electronic warfare and Special Operations Forces (SOF) attacks – threaten their bases and C2 installations. To defend against an integrated Chinese air campaign, Taiwan is investing heavily in active missile defense, BMC3I, and early-warning capabilities. But the runways at TAF air bases are vulnerable, and damaged runways could disable defensive air operations.

Block obsolescence is also a clear and present challenge to the TAF. Its F-5 fleet is nearing the end of its useful structurally-permitted service life, and is slated to retire by 2014. In addition, the actual number of airworthy twin-seat F-5Fs was reduced to just four aircraft in 2009. This shortfall is impacting lead-in fighter training (LIFT) for new pilots, and could erode pilot quality and operational readiness over time. Similarly, Taiwan will also need to address block obsolescence and reliability issues of its I-HAWK SAM systems.

Taiwan does not currently have a cost-effective means to address TAF’s fighter capability shortfall caused by F-5 obsolescence. Taiwan’s Mirage 2000 fleet suffers from very high Operations & Maintenance (O&M) costs and chronically low availability rates. The TAF poured substantial funding into addressing the Mirage issues over the past two years, leading to recent improvements in material readiness. But a tight O&M budget situation will almost certainly ensure a relapse into low Mirage material readiness over the next few years. Taiwan may resort to mothballing part of the fleet to conserve resources, and the combination of F-5 obsolescence and strained Mirage supportability will create a substantial shortfall of fighter aircraft for the TAF.

Meanwhile, China continues to aggressively introduce large numbers of modern combat aircraft into service. China currently deploys more than 700 combat aircraft within operational range of Taiwan, with hundreds more in ready reserve. These include over 500 very modern aircraft (Su-27, Su-30, J-10, JH-7), which are roughly comparable to TAF’s “Fourth Generation” aircraft types (F-16A/Bs, Mirage 2000-5s, F-CK-1A/Bs).

Conversely, TAF fighter strength is projected to decline to only around 300 aircraft by 2014-2015, and thus China will easily be able to array a better than 2:1 numerical superiority. Taiwan will then no longer have the number of combat aircraft necessary to meet the requirements for defending its air space from Chinese military threat.

The significant quantitative decline in air defense capability that Taiwan is expected to experience over the next several years could also have a profound and enduring impact by eroding the already marginal qualitative edge still held by Taiwan. Lessons from past Taiwan Strait crises have demonstrated the importance of Taiwan maintaining a qualitative edge against China, not only to prevail in conflict but also to strengthen deterrence.

The inability to provide timely replacements of obsolete equipment and/or prevent further deterioration in material readiness could result in Taiwan permanently losing its traditional edge in training and experience. Thus the current situation is both widening the quantitative gap in the cross-Strait power balance, and narrowing TAF’s qualitative edge in aircraft performance and pilot training/experience.

The principal mission requirements for the TAF are Combat Air Patrol (CAP), Defensive Counter-Air (DCA), Maritime Strike/Anti-Invasion, and Missile Defense (TBM/LACM). To carry out these missions, TAF will need a modern fighter aircraft with sufficient aerodynamic performance, BVR missile capability, and payload/range performance to effectively counter the expected Chinese aerial threats. Taiwan will also need upgraded SAM systems to engage TBMs and LACMs.

A review of the operational scenarios indicates that Taiwan’s current air defense forces are only marginally capable of meeting the island’s air defense needs. With effective fighter strength weakened by a combination of obsolescence of the F-5E/F fleet, low material availability of the Mirage 2000-5 aircraft, and obsolescence/declining reliability of I-HAWK SAM systems, Taiwan’s ability to defend its air space against likely threat scenarios can be expected to significantly deteriorate over the next few years.

TAF urgently needs to procure new combat aircraft to compensate for the significant loss in operational fighter strength projected over the next 5 years. The fighter gap, if not bridged in a timely manner, could solidify cross-Strait military imbalance in favor of China. That would both undermine deterrence and expose Taiwan to Chinese political extortion as the two sides move towards political dialogue.

A suitable candidate aircraft has to possess sufficiently high performance, BVR capability, and payload/range characteristics to conduct the CAP/DCA and maritime-strike/anti-invasion missions. Such aircraft also need to be supportable beyond 2025 and be export-releasable to Taiwan.

Given these criteria, the aircraft best suited to Taiwan’s current needs is the F-16C/D. Taiwan has been seeking U.S. approval for the sale of 66 new F-16C/D Block 50/52 fighters since 2006, but has been repeatedly discouraged by the U.S. Government to formally submit the associated Letter of Request (LOR). With the last F-16s under contract slated to be delivered at the end of 2013 – and given the 36-month manufacturing lead time – the production could be forced to close before a decision is made. Thus the window for Taiwan to purchase new-built F-16s is closing rapidly.

Another measure that could help address Taiwan’s predicament could include adopting a more rigorous, disciplined, life-cycle cost-based approach to force modernization planning and force management. Taiwan needs to implement a robust mid-life retrofit/modernization (MLU) program for its existing fleet of F-16A/B and F-CK-1A/B fighters, to address DMS/obsolescence issues, improve reliability/maintainability, improve survivability, and update aircraft capabilities.

Taiwan should exercise farsighted MLU investment choices in such systems as radar, electronic warfare systems, power plants, mission avionics, and air-launched weapons. Examples of such capabilities could include an active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar and an upgraded engine, which could provide force-multiplying capabilities by significantly enhancing engagement capability per platform.

Taiwan should also consider further improving its ground-based air defense capability, through a combination of acquiring additional PAC-3 and other mobile SAM systems, upgrading existing I-HAWK batteries, and introducing mobile, low-altitude air defense systems. Other major force-multipliers for Taiwan would be a modern, integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability, and additional investment in electronic warfare and information warfare (EW/IW) capabilities.

In addition to (and in combination with) maintaining a critical mass of air defense fighter capability and ground-based air defenses, Taiwan can also consider more asymmetrical approaches to the problem of integrated air defense, including passive defense measures (e.g. redundancy, dispersal, camouflage/deception, hardening, and rapid repair capabilities) and counter-strike capability (LACM, ARM, standoff-attack weapons).

In summary, Taiwan is facing a pressing fighter requirement that can best be met through acquisition of F-16C/D Block 50/52 aircraft from the United States. Taiwan can further strengthen its air defenses by investing intelligently in MLU programs for its F-16A/B and F-CK-1A/B fighters; by deploying more mobile SAM systems, upgrading existing I-HAWK batteries, and pushing ahead with its new low-altitude air defense system program; by developing advanced, integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities; and by adopting a number of asymmetrical measures.

A modernized and capable Taiwan air force could play an important and constructive role supporting U.S. forces in the event of a confrontation with China over Taiwan. In contrast, an absence of credible Taiwan airpower could accentuate U.S. vulnerabilities and negatively influence U.S. power-projection in the Pacific.

In addition, a stronger and more secure Taiwan can be expected to be more confident in its political dialogue with China, which could ultimately lead to a peaceful resolution of the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Such an outcome would certainly serve the national interest of the United States.

The U.S. can and should assist Taiwan in implementing these measures, to help strengthen deterrence and to support peace and stability in the region. Improving Taiwan’s defense capability will also help reinforce the positive steps that Taipei has taken in lowering cross-Strait tensions and expanding ties with Beijing.

This major report examining the cross-Strait balance of air power and Taiwan’s major air defense requirements is available on the US-Taiwan Business Council website:

“The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait” (PDF)
Key Report Graphic: Available Airframes Through 2025

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/council-releases-major-report-examining-the-balance-of-air-power-in-the-taiwan-strait/

US-Taiwan Business Council Releases Report Analyzing the US-Taiwan Defense Relationship In 2003

The US-Taiwan Business Council today announced the availability of Defense Report – Annual Review 2003, the latest in a series of reports analyzing issues affecting the defense relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan.  This report is part of a suite of products and services available to Council members in the defense community, including weekly news eBulletins, quarterly and annual analysis reports, strategic consulting, relationship building, and an ongoing series of defense industry conferences.

The Annual Review of 2003 highlights positive developments in the US-Taiwan military relationship during the past year, and Taiwan’s successful implementation of a plan for procurement.  It also provides a status report on the special arms budget and on the progress of Taiwan’s major arms programs, including the diesel-electric submarine, anti-missile system, and C4ISR programs.

In addition, the report discusses the prospects for 2004, including reviewing some of what is known of the 2004 national defense budget, the potential implications of Taiwan’s March 2004 presidential election – including implications on LY passage of the special arms budget, and the outlook for the US-Taiwan defense relationship.

The report indicates that “barring unforeseen disruptions, the Taiwan military is poised to move forward on addressing its defense modernization objectives” and that “how the budget is handled after the election will be a strong indicator of the pace, direction, and commitment to military modernization,” regardless of who wins.

 

The US-Taiwan Business Council Releases Report Analyzing the US-Taiwan Defense Relationship In 2003 (PDF file)

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/us-taiwan-business-council-releases-report-analyzing-the-us-taiwan-defense-relationship-in-2003/