cross strait

Tag: cross strait

Special Commentary: The American Defense Commitment to Taiwan Continues to Deteriorate

America’s security relationship with Taiwan is both multi-tiered and comprehensive, and reaches far beyond arms sales to include myriad defense services and exchanges. Such military-to-military networking is vital to Taiwan’s ability to keep pace with modern defense training and with current tactical and strategic thinking. Nevertheless, such behind-the-scenes exchanges are merely one component of the security relationship. It is disingenuous to suggest, as some do, that because these exchanges are taking place, the U.S. security commitment is healthy. If other components – such as providing Taiwan with much needed new and modern equipment – are missing, the U.S. commitment remains incomplete.

2010 started off strong on Taiwan defense issues, with the January 29 Congressional notification of 5 separate arms sales programs. While the dollar value for these notifications was high – a combined US$6.4 billion – the programs themselves were not intrinsically controversial, as the bulk of the money went to Black Hawk utility helicopters and PAC-III missile defense batteries. These notifications represented the final significant parts of President George W. Bush’s April 2001 arms package – with the exception of diesel-electric submarines. In August of 2010, a second and much smaller package – less than US$250 million – of Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) programs were notified to Congress. Once again, these programs were not controversial, and pertained to upgrading the radars on Taiwan’s indigenous defense fighters.

Now, for the first time in 10 years, the Obama Administration has the opportunity to move forward and to ask new and important questions about Taiwan’s defensive needs and about the future of U.S. security support for Taiwan. To aid with this task, in May 2010 the US-Taiwan Business Council released a report entitled “The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait.” The Council’s report makes numerous significant recommendations to those concerned with Taiwan security policy – including to our own political and military leadership – on how to address the growing military imbalance in the Taiwan Strait.

Throughout 2010, numerous other analysts and observers also expressed their opinions on the direction that Taiwan should take on defense going forward. The overall consensus was that Taiwan isn’t spending enough on national security. The Council forecasts that Taiwan’s direct defense expenditures will reach only 2.16% of GDP in 2011, a figure that rises to 2.73% if you include non-direct defense expenditures. This percentage could even fall below 2% if Taiwan’s economic expansion continues to gather steam, falling far short of President Ma Ying-jeou’s campaign commitment to spend a minimum of 3% of GDP on Taiwan’s defense.

Moreover, the consensus was also that the United States needs to accelerate and de-politicize the political process for evaluating required capabilities for Taiwan, and for notifying to Congress the programs addressing those needs. In November 2010, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) released a statement noting that since 2007 they have had to return over US$1.4 billion to Taiwan’s treasury as a consequence of U.S. indecision on arms sales. America’s recent inability to offer timely notifications of programs is therefore having a material impact on Taiwan’s ability to fund its self defense.

The US-Taiwan Business Council comments on the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan:

Special Commentary: The American Defense Commitment to Taiwan Continues to Deteriorate (PDF)

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Taiwan Defense & Security Report – Annual Review, 2010

2010 could prove to be a defining year in the history of Taiwan’s relationship with China. The two sides signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), a preferential trade agreement, in June, and have been working to continue to expand bilateral trade and cooperation since. Just like the two sides of the Taiwan Strait look to deepening and further broadening their ties, Washington and Beijing are also seriously pursuing mutually beneficial common grounds in their complex tangle of global strategic interests.

Marking the midway point of President Ma Ying-jeou’s four-year term, events in 2010 also prepared the political landscape for the fierce battles ahead in the lead-up to the next presidential election in March 2012. The economy, jobs, partisan unity, cross-Strait dynamics, and U.S.-Taiwan relations will all figure prominently in the 2012 campaigns.

However, issues concerning Taiwan’s defense and national security have not received as much attention as they probably should have so far under the Ma Administration. With much of his defense agenda facing serious challenges, and civil-military relations still rather frosty, President Ma’s record on defense could prove to be a major potential vulnerability as he heads into the 2012 presidential race.

This report provides a brief overview of significant developments in the past year, and examines some of the factors that influenced the course of events during 2010. It will also provide a brief update on the defense budget, on U.S.-Taiwan defense relations, and on the progress of select Taiwan arms procurement programs.

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/taiwan-defense-security-report-annual-review-2010/

Taiwan Defense & Security Report – Q3, 2010

Having achieved a major milestone in cross-Strait relations over the summer with the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), Taipei has begun to think more seriously about trying to better position itself for the next phase in its dealings with Beijing.

While notable progress continues to be made, China has consistently proven a shrewd and elusive adversary of ambitious (and unwavering) political objectives. Not surprisingly, there are significant uncertainties ahead, not least of which is the political fortune of President Ma Ying-jeou’s ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party in the upcoming municipality mayoral elections and next year’s parliamentary election, as well as for Mr. Ma’s own re-election in 2012. There are also major challenges on the defense and national security front in the foreseeable future, principally due to, and in the form of, budgetary constraints.

This report will review the major political events that transpired during the third quarter of 2010. It will also discuss the significant defense and national security developments over this period, and will provide a brief update on the progress for select Taiwan arms procurement programs.

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/taiwan-defense-security-report-q3-2010/

US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2010 to Discuss the Future Cross-Strait Threat, Disaster Relief, and Asymmetric Options for the Taiwan Military

The US-Taiwan Business Council today announced that it will host the 9th annual US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference from October 3-5, 2010 in Cambridge, Maryland.

Keynote speakers at the conference will include Wallace “Chip” Gregson, Assistant Secretary for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs at the U.S. Department of Defense; Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State; and a senior representative from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense. Council Chairman Dr. Paul Wolfowitz will be the conference host.

This annual conference focuses on US-Taiwan defense and military cooperation and Taiwan’s future defense and national security needs. This year, conference sessions will examine the future cross-Strait threat, the Taiwan military’s new focus on disaster rescue, recovery & relief, and asymmetric options for the Taiwan armed forces. Special breakout sessions will cover each of the services: Army, Navy, and the Air Force.

Rupert Hammond-Chambers, President of the Council, said “We are honored to have General Gregson and Mr. Shapiro as keynote speakers. Their views and insights on the U.S.-Taiwan defense and security relationship, and on current and future challenges for Taiwan, will be both valuable and timely.”

 

“US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2010” to Discuss the Future Cross-Strait Threat, Disaster Relief, and Asymmetric Options for the Taiwan Military (PDF file)

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Taiwan Defense & Security Report – Q2, 2010

Through the second quarter of 2010, the primary focus in Taiwan has been on the trade pact with China. Known as the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), this is widely considered to be the single most important achievement for the Ma Ying-jeou administration during its first term. The ECFA may have broad-ranging implications – political as well as economic – for years to come. In conjunction with an improving economy, this significant milestone has certainly begun to help President Ma regain some of the popularity he lost since he took office in 2008.

The details of Taiwan’s defense and national security agenda for the next two years remains shrouded, although there are indications that the Ma Administration has begun to contemplate new defense procurement plans – possibly as part of an overall plan to ready Taiwan for eventual political dialogue with China.

This quarterly report provides a brief overview of significant developments during the past three months, and examines some of the factors that influenced the course of events during this period. The report will also cover implications for adding disaster relief to the core mission focus for the Ministry of National Defense (MND), along with a brief look at the status of select programs.

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/taiwan-defense-security-report-q2-2010/

US-Taiwan Business Council Releases Major Report Examining the Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait

Report Cover: The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait

Report Cover: The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait

Executive Summary

Taiwan’s relationship with China continues to improve and expand. Yet the eroding cross-Strait military balance must be redressed so that Taiwan can approach the political dialogue from a position of confidence and strength.

Effective air defense is a crucial component if Taiwan is to mount a viable defense of the island. Taiwan’s current air defenses comprise 18 fighter squadrons with a nominal strength of 387 combat aircraft of U.S., French, and indigenous origins: 145 F-16A/Bs, 126 F-CK-1A/Bs, 56 Mirage 2000-5s, and 60 F-5E/Fs. All of these are reasonably modern “Fourth Generation” fighters with BVR AAM capability, with the F-5s – which are mainly used for operational conversion training with only a secondary combat role – as the exception.

The Taiwan Air Force (TAF) also controls ground-based air defense forces in the form of over 25 medium/long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, using a mix of U.S. and indigenous missile systems (I-HAWK, Patriot, and Tien Kung-I/II). TAF has three existing PAC-2+ batteries (currently being upgraded) and is in the process of procuring 6 additional operational Patriot systems, for a total of 9 active PAC-3 batteries. There are also a number of short-range air defense SAM and gun systems, as well as field air defense assets operated by Taiwan’s ground forces.

In addition, Taiwan has a sophisticated integrated air defense command & control (C2) system, together with a modern network of ground-based surveillance radars and E-2 AEW&C aircraft. The air defense C2 infrastructure is currently being hardened, further modernized, and integrated with new capabilities such as the Link 16 datalink and the Surveillance Radar Program (SRP).

Taiwan’s air defense forces confront a unique threat environment involving long-range SAMs and over 1,300 tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), which could – in concert with manned strike aircraft, UAV, information warfare/electronic warfare and Special Operations Forces (SOF) attacks – threaten their bases and C2 installations. To defend against an integrated Chinese air campaign, Taiwan is investing heavily in active missile defense, BMC3I, and early-warning capabilities. But the runways at TAF air bases are vulnerable, and damaged runways could disable defensive air operations.

Block obsolescence is also a clear and present challenge to the TAF. Its F-5 fleet is nearing the end of its useful structurally-permitted service life, and is slated to retire by 2014. In addition, the actual number of airworthy twin-seat F-5Fs was reduced to just four aircraft in 2009. This shortfall is impacting lead-in fighter training (LIFT) for new pilots, and could erode pilot quality and operational readiness over time. Similarly, Taiwan will also need to address block obsolescence and reliability issues of its I-HAWK SAM systems.

Taiwan does not currently have a cost-effective means to address TAF’s fighter capability shortfall caused by F-5 obsolescence. Taiwan’s Mirage 2000 fleet suffers from very high Operations & Maintenance (O&M) costs and chronically low availability rates. The TAF poured substantial funding into addressing the Mirage issues over the past two years, leading to recent improvements in material readiness. But a tight O&M budget situation will almost certainly ensure a relapse into low Mirage material readiness over the next few years. Taiwan may resort to mothballing part of the fleet to conserve resources, and the combination of F-5 obsolescence and strained Mirage supportability will create a substantial shortfall of fighter aircraft for the TAF.

Meanwhile, China continues to aggressively introduce large numbers of modern combat aircraft into service. China currently deploys more than 700 combat aircraft within operational range of Taiwan, with hundreds more in ready reserve. These include over 500 very modern aircraft (Su-27, Su-30, J-10, JH-7), which are roughly comparable to TAF’s “Fourth Generation” aircraft types (F-16A/Bs, Mirage 2000-5s, F-CK-1A/Bs).

Conversely, TAF fighter strength is projected to decline to only around 300 aircraft by 2014-2015, and thus China will easily be able to array a better than 2:1 numerical superiority. Taiwan will then no longer have the number of combat aircraft necessary to meet the requirements for defending its air space from Chinese military threat.

The significant quantitative decline in air defense capability that Taiwan is expected to experience over the next several years could also have a profound and enduring impact by eroding the already marginal qualitative edge still held by Taiwan. Lessons from past Taiwan Strait crises have demonstrated the importance of Taiwan maintaining a qualitative edge against China, not only to prevail in conflict but also to strengthen deterrence.

The inability to provide timely replacements of obsolete equipment and/or prevent further deterioration in material readiness could result in Taiwan permanently losing its traditional edge in training and experience. Thus the current situation is both widening the quantitative gap in the cross-Strait power balance, and narrowing TAF’s qualitative edge in aircraft performance and pilot training/experience.

The principal mission requirements for the TAF are Combat Air Patrol (CAP), Defensive Counter-Air (DCA), Maritime Strike/Anti-Invasion, and Missile Defense (TBM/LACM). To carry out these missions, TAF will need a modern fighter aircraft with sufficient aerodynamic performance, BVR missile capability, and payload/range performance to effectively counter the expected Chinese aerial threats. Taiwan will also need upgraded SAM systems to engage TBMs and LACMs.

A review of the operational scenarios indicates that Taiwan’s current air defense forces are only marginally capable of meeting the island’s air defense needs. With effective fighter strength weakened by a combination of obsolescence of the F-5E/F fleet, low material availability of the Mirage 2000-5 aircraft, and obsolescence/declining reliability of I-HAWK SAM systems, Taiwan’s ability to defend its air space against likely threat scenarios can be expected to significantly deteriorate over the next few years.

TAF urgently needs to procure new combat aircraft to compensate for the significant loss in operational fighter strength projected over the next 5 years. The fighter gap, if not bridged in a timely manner, could solidify cross-Strait military imbalance in favor of China. That would both undermine deterrence and expose Taiwan to Chinese political extortion as the two sides move towards political dialogue.

A suitable candidate aircraft has to possess sufficiently high performance, BVR capability, and payload/range characteristics to conduct the CAP/DCA and maritime-strike/anti-invasion missions. Such aircraft also need to be supportable beyond 2025 and be export-releasable to Taiwan.

Given these criteria, the aircraft best suited to Taiwan’s current needs is the F-16C/D. Taiwan has been seeking U.S. approval for the sale of 66 new F-16C/D Block 50/52 fighters since 2006, but has been repeatedly discouraged by the U.S. Government to formally submit the associated Letter of Request (LOR). With the last F-16s under contract slated to be delivered at the end of 2013 – and given the 36-month manufacturing lead time – the production could be forced to close before a decision is made. Thus the window for Taiwan to purchase new-built F-16s is closing rapidly.

Another measure that could help address Taiwan’s predicament could include adopting a more rigorous, disciplined, life-cycle cost-based approach to force modernization planning and force management. Taiwan needs to implement a robust mid-life retrofit/modernization (MLU) program for its existing fleet of F-16A/B and F-CK-1A/B fighters, to address DMS/obsolescence issues, improve reliability/maintainability, improve survivability, and update aircraft capabilities.

Taiwan should exercise farsighted MLU investment choices in such systems as radar, electronic warfare systems, power plants, mission avionics, and air-launched weapons. Examples of such capabilities could include an active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar and an upgraded engine, which could provide force-multiplying capabilities by significantly enhancing engagement capability per platform.

Taiwan should also consider further improving its ground-based air defense capability, through a combination of acquiring additional PAC-3 and other mobile SAM systems, upgrading existing I-HAWK batteries, and introducing mobile, low-altitude air defense systems. Other major force-multipliers for Taiwan would be a modern, integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability, and additional investment in electronic warfare and information warfare (EW/IW) capabilities.

In addition to (and in combination with) maintaining a critical mass of air defense fighter capability and ground-based air defenses, Taiwan can also consider more asymmetrical approaches to the problem of integrated air defense, including passive defense measures (e.g. redundancy, dispersal, camouflage/deception, hardening, and rapid repair capabilities) and counter-strike capability (LACM, ARM, standoff-attack weapons).

In summary, Taiwan is facing a pressing fighter requirement that can best be met through acquisition of F-16C/D Block 50/52 aircraft from the United States. Taiwan can further strengthen its air defenses by investing intelligently in MLU programs for its F-16A/B and F-CK-1A/B fighters; by deploying more mobile SAM systems, upgrading existing I-HAWK batteries, and pushing ahead with its new low-altitude air defense system program; by developing advanced, integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities; and by adopting a number of asymmetrical measures.

A modernized and capable Taiwan air force could play an important and constructive role supporting U.S. forces in the event of a confrontation with China over Taiwan. In contrast, an absence of credible Taiwan airpower could accentuate U.S. vulnerabilities and negatively influence U.S. power-projection in the Pacific.

In addition, a stronger and more secure Taiwan can be expected to be more confident in its political dialogue with China, which could ultimately lead to a peaceful resolution of the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Such an outcome would certainly serve the national interest of the United States.

The U.S. can and should assist Taiwan in implementing these measures, to help strengthen deterrence and to support peace and stability in the region. Improving Taiwan’s defense capability will also help reinforce the positive steps that Taipei has taken in lowering cross-Strait tensions and expanding ties with Beijing.

This major report examining the cross-Strait balance of air power and Taiwan’s major air defense requirements is available on the US-Taiwan Business Council website:

“The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait” (PDF)
Key Report Graphic: Available Airframes Through 2025

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May 11, 2010 – The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait: Report Release & Panel Discussion

Event:
The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait
Report Release & Panel Discussion

May 11, 2010
10:30am – 12:30pm

Report Cover: The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait

Report Cover: The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait

In a report dated January 21, 2010, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) submitted to Congress an assessment of the current state of Taiwan’s air defense forces, their ability to defend Taiwan’s air space, and possible measures that Taiwan could undertake to strengthen its air defense. The DoD analysis was written under guidelines laid out in the National Defense Authorization Act 2010. However, the bulk of the DoD analysis on this matter is classified.

The US-Taiwan Business Council has produced its own independent analysis report – entitled “The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait” – to examine these questions and to provide a detailed public assessment of the issues. This event and seminar will allow for an open and active discussion of the report and its contents.

Moderator:

Rupert Hammond-Chambers, President, US-Taiwan Business Council

Speakers:

Fu Mei, Director, Taiwan Security Analysis Center
Richard Fisher, Senior Fellow, Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment & Strategy Center

Location:

U.S. Capitol Visitor Center, Room SVC 203/202
Washington, D.C.

Note that the entrance is located on 1st Street NE & East Capitol Street. Please arrive early, allowing for sufficient time to pass through security screening.

Registration:

www.us-taiwan.org
(703) 465-2930

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/may-11-2010-the-balance-of-air-power-in-the-taiwan-strait-report-release-panel-discussion/

Taiwan Defense & Security Report – Q1, 2010

The year 2010 began with encouraging progress for a number of Taiwan’s long-delayed defense programs. But President Ma Ying-jeou may be finding it increasingly difficult to justify his support of continued defense procurements, given his desire to highlight the positive changes in cross-Strait relations as his presidency approaches the mid-term mark. Meanwhile, political battles also loom as the island moves closer to its historic trade pact with China. Reeling from a series of political setbacks in 2009, the Ma Administration has been trying to regain some initiative, with limited success. In addition, fiscal challenges can be expected to continue to hamper Taiwan, despite apparent signs of an economic recovery.

This report provides a brief overview of significant developments during the first three months of 2010, and examines some of the factors that influenced the course of events during this period.

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/taiwan-defense-security-report-q1-2010/

Taiwan Defense & Security Report – Annual Review, 2009

Despite continued improvement in cross-Strait relations, 2009 proved to be rather stormy for President Ma Ying-jeou, whose ability to govern is increasingly being questioned in the wake of a series of political crises. The overwhelming parliamentary majority enjoyed by the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party has also proven to be of little consolation, as Mr. Ma’s style of leadership has not been conducive to coalition-building and has fueled dissent amongst the long-feuding factions within the party. Serious challenges are also looming in the defense arena, with one of President Ma’s key campaign promises on force reorganization now likely to fall through, and civil-military relations at an all-time low.

The dynamic between Taiwan defense/national security and cross-Strait détente is taking on unprecedented complexity, and it will remain a challenge for Taiwan through the foreseeable future. Yet despite these challenges, we have seen some progress through 2009. The Obama Administration has begun the congressional notification process for a substantial arms sale package to Taiwan, a process undertaken just as an official Taiwan delegation headed to Beijing to begin consultations on a major cross-Strait economic cooperation agreement.

This report provides a brief overview of significant developments through 2009, and examines some of the factors that influenced the course of events during 2009 and into early 2010.

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/taiwan-defense-security-report-annual-review-2009/

Taiwan Defense & Security Report – Q3, 2009

The summer of 2009 was stormy for Taiwan, both literally and figuratively. While still struggling with a weak (albeit apparently stabilizing) economy, the island was hit by the most destructive typhoon in 50 years. Typhoon Morakot was a catastrophic event that also had powerful political ramifications. The political aftermath of the typhoon spilled over into the defense arena in the form of leadership changes and new mission priorities at the Ministry of National Defense (MND). In the meantime, the effects of Taiwan’s fiscal realities are beginning to show, with a significant tightening of defense spending in the FY2010 government budget.

This quarterly report will review the major political events that transpired during the third quarter of 2009, along with the significant defense and national security developments over this period. The report will also cover defense spending and budgetary issues, along with the normal look at the status of select programs.

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/taiwan-defense-security-report-q3-2009/