Report Cover: Chinese Reactions to Taiwan Arms Sales
Taiwan’s national security is fundamentally in the national interest of the United States, and the U.S. seeks to create an atmosphere conducive to a peaceful and non-coercive resolution of political differences on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
U.S. arms sales are intended to provide Taiwan’s government and leadership with the confidence needed to engage with their counterparts in Beijing from a position of strength. Guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, and consistent with understandings outlined in Joint Communiqués with China, America providing to Taiwan the arms necessary to ensure its own self-defense has enabled democracy to flourish on the island. Substantial support for Taiwan has also served as a visible reminder of U.S. commitments to peace and security in the Asia Pacific.
The process by which U.S. policymakers have addressed Taiwan’s defense requirements has evolved over time. When the Mutual Defense Treaty guided the relationship, between 1955 and 1979, Taiwan was treated as an ally. After the shift in diplomatic relations in 1979, Taiwan was treated as a special case. Concerned over possible Chinese intervention, Taiwan defense officials traveled to Washington to present senior U.S. policy officials with Taiwan’s bundled list of requirements in annual face-to-face meetings. Formal Congressional notifications of approved items were forwarded both relatively frequently and as needed throughout the course of a given year.
In 2001, the annual Taiwan arms sales talks process was discontinued, with the intention of allowing Taiwan’s defense requirements to be addressed at any time during the year, similar to the process for a normal security assistance partner. Since 2008, however, Congressional notifications of approved items have consistently been bundled into large multi-billion dollar packages, rather than being processed when ready. A return to the annual arms sales talks process may warrant consideration.
Figure 2: Value of Arms Sales Notifications, 1990-2011
China has a well-established track record of responding negatively and stridently to public announcements of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Congressional notifications will likely remain the primary trigger for Chinese responses, rather than earlier decision-points in the process such as providing Price and Availability (P&A) data in response to a Letter of Request (LOR) from Taiwan.
Future Chinese actions taken in response to Taiwan arms sales may include sanctions against the U.S. companies that are supporting Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs or undertaking Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) programs with Taiwan. However, the effectiveness of such sanctions is open to question, as major U.S. defense industrial firms conduct only minor business in China. Beijing is also unlikely to sanction smaller sub-system suppliers due to their peripheral involvement as sub-contractors and their marginal value as symbolic targets. In addition, if a U.S. company were to face discrimination as a result of Chinese sanctions due to Taiwan arms sales, a case could be introduced to the World Trade Organization (WTO) for adjudication.
Beijing authorities could suspend People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military exchanges with the U.S. Department of Defense in response to Taiwan arms sales – an often-used tactic. While such exchanges have value, critical issues in the bilateral security relationship would be addressed through other channels if necessary. In addition, the PLA most likely would resume exchanges again, following an appropriate interval, as they have in the past.
In retaliation for Taiwan arms sales, PRC leaders could also consider releasing sensitive nuclear or missile-related technologies to Iran or other countries of concern, or they could withhold support for non-proliferation-related actions within the United Nations or other international organizations. However, reprisals from the U.S. or from other concerned countries could be expected in return, and Beijing likely would also be subject to criticism from other players in Europe and elsewhere who have significant interests in preventing Iran from gaining weapons of mass destruction.
Political or military leaders in Beijing may attempt to retaliate by liquidating U.S. Treasury holdings. As satisfying an emotional outburst as this course of action might be on an individual basis, the PLA has limited authority over national Chinese economic and financial policy. A sudden sell-off of U.S. Treasury holdings would be a significant horizontal and vertical escalation of the relatively minor, albeit emotionally charged, issue of Taiwan arms sales. In addition, the effects of such an action are unclear and could actually have a greater negative effect on China’s economic interests than on the interests of the U.S.
Past behavior indicates that China is unlikely to challenge any fundamental U.S. interests in response to any future releases of significant military articles or services to Taiwan. The U.S. therefore retains considerable freedom of action in abiding by the Taiwan Relations Act. Barring a substantive reduction in the Chinese military posture opposite Taiwan, the U.S. will likely continue to provide Taiwan with weapons of a defensive character for the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, key unresolved issues include Taiwan’s unheeded request for additional F-16 fighters, and the fact that the Bush administration’s 2001 commitment to assist Taiwan in its acquisition of diesel-electric submarines remains unfulfilled. Taiwan’s request for additional F-16s is both reasonable and urgent, and should be honored. In addition, if Congressional notification for a submarine design program is not forthcoming, Taiwan’s LOR should be withdrawn and export licenses through direct commercial sales channels should be given positive treatment.
The Barack Obama administration has demonstrated unnecessary restraint in its Taiwan arms sales decisions to date, despite having ample justification for positive considerations. Excessive caution on new arms sales to Taiwan risks legitimizing PRC use of military coercion to resolve political differences with its neighbors and sends a signal to others in the region of a diminished U.S. commitment in Asia.
This major report examining Chinese reactions and retaliatory responses to Taiwan arms sales by the U.S. is available on the US-Taiwan Business Council website:
Report: “Chinese Reactions to Taiwan Arms Sales” (PDF, 2.18MB)
Graphic: Report Cover
Graphic: Value of Arms Sales Notifications, 1990-2011
Wall Street Journal Editorial: Taiwan’s Military Under Siege
August 13, 2013
August 13, 2013
Taiwan’s Military Under Siege:
A hazing scandal could destabilize the island’s relations with Beijing and Washington
August 12, 2013
Editorial by Rupert Hammond-Chambers
After several years of relative calm, Taiwan faces a new political crossroads. The tragic hazing death of army conscript Hung Chung-chiu has thrown the entire island into turmoil, and brought a coalition of civil society groups into collision with the Ministry of National Defense (MND). The way the ruling Kuomintang handles the scandal could destabilize relations with both the U.S. and China.
Corporal Hung, after receiving significant physical hazing, died in disciplinary confinement. His alleged transgression was the taking of a camera phone on to a military base, but many speculate that he was privy to corruption on the base. The video footage of his confinement was erased before it could be handed over to judicial authorities. Taiwan’s citizens view this case through the prism of a MND that acts with impunity, and the possibility of corruption on the base has further aggravated events. Pro-China forces have jumped on the opportunity to further undermine the MND and claim that the military is unworthy of robust support.
Washington has reason to worry about that backlash because the MND is the most important pro-American institution within the government. Some in the KMT want to impose financial restrictions on the MND to “starve the beast” in the aftermath of the hazing scandal. This would further weaken the already underfunded MND at a time when the military requires resources and support to transform itself into a modern, well-equipped, and all-volunteer force. Mr. Ma committed to turning a conscript army into an all-volunteer force, but has so far failed to come up with the budget. That means the military is unable to execute a policy directive from its civilian leadership. The MND is frustrated over what it views as a policy that by design leaves it highly vulnerable to political attack. Recent events have also left a vacuum at the top, with two ministers resigning in rapid succession.
The scandal could also destabilize relations with mainland China. The “deep blue” – i.e. pro-China – members of Mr. Ma’s Kuomintang party want him to open political and military talks with Beijing, which has been frustrated with the lack of movement in this area after it made economic overtures to the island. The deep blue camp wants to restrict funds to the MND, claiming that China’s ongoing military build-up is nothing to worry about and that the money should be spent elsewhere. This is a dangerous road, as there is no consensus in Taiwan on moving forward with cross-Strait talks. More than 90% of Taiwan’s citizens support the status quo of de facto independence, and forcing through such talks would further polarize Taiwan society. But without a credible defense, Taiwan could one day be forced to accept Beijing’s terms on reunification.
Chinese leaders must be watching these developments with positive glee. Taipei is doing more damage to its own ability to deter mainland coercion and military attack than any weapon the People’s Liberation Army could conceive. This damage represents a serious threat to Taiwan’s national security, and by extension to the national security of the U.S. and Japan.
Given the political atmosphere, the KMT’s prospects in next year’s five municipal elections are tenuous at best. If the opposition DPP wins three or more municipalities, they will likely have the momentum to regain the presidency in 2016. And even if the KMT hold on to the presidency, the incoming president will have limited maneuvering room in relations with China. Either way, tensions are set to rise as China sees its present strategy of engagement founder on the realities of Taiwan’s vibrant democracy.
The Obama administration’s decision rhetorically and substantively to omit Taiwan from its pivot to Asia telegraphs to China that Taiwan is no longer central to U.S. policy. By doing so, the U.S. is inviting Chinese adventurism when the present trajectory of Taiwan-China relations changes in the spring of 2016, if not sooner. China is currently playing nice, because it believes that Taiwan is being drawn inexorably into the fold. That explains why cross-Strait relations have been calm since Mr. Ma’s election in 2008. However, if Beijing starts to believe that time is no longer on its side, we can expect behavior more in line with China’s aggressiveness toward its other neighbors.
If the U.S. wants to avoid repeating Dean Acheson’s mistake of encouraging North Korea to invade the South in 1950, it needs to signal resolve to defend Taiwan. Taiwan’s democratic growing pains should not open the door for further Chinese coercion. The U.S. can recalibrate its Taiwan policy by restarting the arms sales to Taiwan that have been stalled for two years. The first step should be new F-16 C/D fighters, followed by assistance with the procurement of submarines. In addition, as Mr. Obama has instructed his cabinet officers to make at least one visit to Asia each year, Taiwan should be a port-of-call for all the economic officers making that trip. More senior uniformed officers need to visit Taiwan, both to improve communication at the highest levels and offer U.S. support for the MND and its reform efforts.
The Obama administration has been happy with the U.S.-Taiwan relationship under President Ma, especially compared to the turbulence under his predecessor Chen Shui-bian. But this is because both sides have been content to allow the relationship to drift. Taiwan asks for little, which the U.S. provides. This complacency will come back to haunt both nations soon.
Rupert Hammond-Chambers is President of the US-Taiwan Business Council
Editorial Published in the Wall Street Journal’s “Opinion Asia” section, August 12, 2013
PDF of Editorial