The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on the military power of China. This post contains selected Taiwan-related language in the 2020 report.

• Press Release: DOD Releases 2020 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
• Report: 2020 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PDF)

Selected Taiwan Language

Capabilities for Counter Intervention and Power Projection

The PLA is developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention during a large-scale, theater campaign such as a Taiwan contingency. The PRC also continues to increase its military capabilities to achieve regional and global security objectives beyond a Taiwan contingency

China’s Coercive Approach

China’s leaders use tactics short of armed conflict to pursue China’s objectives. China calibrates its coercive activities to fall below the threshold of provoking armed conflict with the United States, its allies and partners, or others in the Indo-Pacific region. These tactics are particularly evident in China’s pursuit of its territorial and maritime claims in the South and East China Seas as well as along its border with India and Bhutan.1 In recent years, the PLA has also increased patrols around and near Taiwan using bomber, fighter, and surveillance aircraft to signal Taiwan. China also employs non-military tools coercively, including economic tools during periods of political tensions with countries that China accuses of harming its national interests

Eastern Theater Command

The Eastern Theater Command likely executes operational control over national defense matters related to Taiwan and Japan, including contingencies in and around the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands. In 2019, the Eastern Theater Command focused on a series of training and exercises to improve joint operations and combat readiness, organizing exercises and drills consisting of long-distance training and mobilization, aerial combat, and live-fire training. PLA units located within the Eastern Theater Command include three group armies, a naval fleet, two marine brigades, two Air Force bases, and one missile base. The Eastern Theater Command also likely commands all China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia ships while conducting Senkakus-related operations.

In April 2019, the Eastern Theater Command JOCC commanded joint training east of Taiwan, which they asserted was to train for joint fire and maritime strike. The training included bombers, fighters, electronic jamming and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft circumnavigating Taiwan while naval combatants trained for mock strikes and helicopters delivered an amphibious landing force. In March, two J-11 fighters crossed the unofficial median line of the Taiwan Strait, for the first time since 1999. The Eastern Theater Command also likely played a significant role in a nationwide exercise across all five theater commands based on the locations of some of the exercise activity near Taiwan.

As of March 2019, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) assigned its first fifth generation J-20s to an operational unit, a fighter brigade in the Eastern Theater Command, probably to improve its ability to respond to U.S. and allied aircraft in the area. In March 2019, a likely Eastern Theater Y-8Q anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft was also first observed operating in the East China Sea by Japan.

Developments in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait

Relations between the PRC and Taiwan remained at an impasse through 2019. Since the 2016 election of Tsai Ing-wen as Taiwan’s president, China halted formal communication with Taiwan and has repeatedly stressed that Taiwan must accept the “1992 Consensus” to restart formal engagement. Since November 2016, China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to “one China,” which was reaffirmed by President Xi in a January 2019 address to “compatriots” in Taiwan. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen has continually pledged to maintain the status quo in cross-Strait relations and called for China to respect Taiwan’s democracy and agree to negotiations without preconditions.

The PRC also maintained its diplomatic pressure on Taiwan, thwarting Taiwan’s efforts to participate in international organizations such as the World Health Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, and INTERPOL. In 2019, the PRC convinced the Solomon Islands and Kiribati to break diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Despite the stalled consultations with the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to engage with Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT) party, and the PRC continues to hold lower-level cross-Strait exchanges such as the municipal Shanghai-Taipei Twin City Forum.

The PLA continues to prepare for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait to deter, and if necessary, compel Taiwan to abandon moves toward independence. The PLA also is likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the mainland by force, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party intervention on Taiwan’s behalf. As part of a comprehensive campaign to pressure Taiwan and the Tsai Administration, China has increased military exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan, including circumnavigation flights by the PLAAF and naval exercises in the East China Sea.

Taiwan’s national defense report released in 2017 cited concerns that increased PLA military activity near Taiwan poses an “enormous threat to security in the Taiwan Strait,” and that Taiwan requires a “multiple deterrence strategy,” including an emphasis on developing asymmetric warfare to counter PLA advances.

China’s Strategy and Capabilities Development in the Taiwan Strait

The PRC appears willing to defer the use of military force as long as it considers that unification with Taiwan could be negotiated over the long-term and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. China argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintaining the conditions for political progress and preventing Taiwan from making moves toward independence. In January 2019, President Xi Jinping publicly reiterated China’s long-standing refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue. In the same speech, Xi also reaffirmed China’s longstanding position for peaceful unification under the principle of “one country, two systems.”

The circumstances under which the PRC has historically warned it would use force have evolved over time. These circumstances have included:
– Formal declaration of Taiwan independence
– Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence
– Internal unrest in Taiwan
– Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons
– Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification
– Foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs
– Foreign forces stationed on Taiwan

Article 8 of China’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states China may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. China’s use of such non-specific conditions increases their policy flexibility through deliberate strategic ambiguity.

China continues to view the Taiwan issue as the most important and sensitive issue between the United States and China.

China’s Courses of Action Against Taiwan

The PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. China could pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification, or unification dialogue under China’s terms. Notably, China would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign – capabilities that the PRC highlighted during its October 2019 military parade celebrating its 70th anniversary. Failing that, China would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in an asymmetric, limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, China might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could initiate the military options listed below individually or in combination.

Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which China would employ kinetic blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade in an attempt to achieve a rapid Taiwan surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. China will also likely complement its air and maritime blockade operations with concurrent electronic warfare (EW), network attacks, and information operations (IO) to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace and to control the international narrative of the conflict.

Limited Force or Coercive Options. China could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by a variety of IO to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA special operations forces (SOF) could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign. China could use missile attacks and precision air strikes against air defense systems, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the Taiwan people’s resolve.

Invasion of Taiwan. Publicly available Chinese writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for logistics, air, and naval support, and EW. The objective would be to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish and build a beachhead, transport personnel and materiel to designated landing sites in the north or south of Taiwan’s western coastline, and launch attacks to seize and occupy key targets or the entire island. In 2019, the PLA conducted joint amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan. Furthermore, China continues to build capabilities that would contribute to a full-scale invasion; in 2019, the PLA completed construction of its first helicopter dock amphibious assault ship (LHA).

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations. Success depends upon air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain China’s armed forces and invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with China’s combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency, even assuming a successful landing and breakout, make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk.

The PLA is capable of accomplishing various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan as well. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, China could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Jinmen is within China’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. However, this kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate international opposition.

Effect of PLA Reform on a Taiwan Contingency

One of the overarching goals of the structural reforms to reshape the PLA was to construct a military capable of conducting complex joint operations, including those that would be involved in a Taiwan contingency. PLA reforms seek to clarify command authorities, improving joint integration, and facilitating the transition from peace to war. The abolishment of military regions in favor of military theaters – in this case, the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command – has also likely streamlined and improved the PLA’s ability to conduct yearlong planning and preparation for joint military operations across the Taiwan Strait. PLA combat units are likely experiencing temporary decreases in readiness and proficiency to conduct large-scale joint operations as they reorganize units, integrate new capabilities, and adjust to new command structures.

A significant addition to the overall structure of the PLA is the establishment of the Strategic Support Force (SSF) and the Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). During a Taiwan contingency, the JLSF, in conjunction with subordinate joint logistics support centers, would coordinate joint logistics and the delivery of materiel as well as oversee various civil-military support systems to sustain the campaign. The creation of the SSF likely improves the PLA’s ability to execute and coordinate IO (particularly cyber, EW, and counterspace) in a Taiwan contingency. It may also improve the PLA’s ability to manage and provide space-based reconnaissance to the CMC and the Eastern Theater Command, improving PLA command staffs’ situational awareness of Taiwan’s military units and facilities. The PLA is likely still exploring how to reform its joint command processes to integrate IO and ISR capabilities more fully at the theater-level, but structural reforms have removed the biggest barriers to integrating these strategic capabilities at the theater-level.

Structural reforms within the military and paramilitary forces also have implications on resources and operational capabilities available to the PLA for a future Taiwan contingency.

Taiwan’s Defense Capabilities

Taiwan has historically enjoyed military advantages in the context of a cross-Strait conflict, such as technological superiority and the inherent geographic advantages of island defense, but China’s multi-decade military modernization effort has eroded or negated many of these advantages. Although Taiwan is taking important steps to compensate for the growing disparities – building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and noncommissioned officer corps – these improvements only partially address Taiwan’s declining defensive advantages.

Taiwan’s military spending remains at approximately two percent of its gross domestic product. In August 2019, Taiwan said it would increase the island’s defense budget by 5.2 percent to NT $358 billion ($11.6 billion). Meanwhile, China’s official defense budget continues to grow, and for 2019, is roughly 15 times that of Taiwan, with much of it focused on developing the capability to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force. Recognizing the growing disparity between their respective defense expenditures, Taiwan has stated that it is working to develop new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. Some specific areas of emphasis include offensive and defensive information and EW, high-speed stealth vessels, shore-based mobile missiles, rapid mining and minesweeping, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection.

The United States maintains a “one-China” policy that is based on the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the three Joint Communiqués. The United States opposes unilateral actions aimed at altering the status quo. The United States continues to support the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues in a manner, scope, and pace acceptable to both sides.

Consistent with the TRA, the United States contributes to peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan Strait by providing defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. In May 2020, the White House publicly released a report to Congress entitled, United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China. The report states, “Beijing’s failure to honor its commitments under the communiques, as demonstrated by its massive military buildup, compels the United States to continue to assist the Taiwan military in maintaining a credible self-defense, which deters aggression and helps to ensure peace and stability in the region.

In a 1982 memorandum, President Ronald Reagan insisted ‘that the quantity and quality of the arms provided Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC.’” In October 2019, Taiwan announced the purchase of F-16V fighter aircraft for $8 billion. Since 2010, the United States has announced more than $23 billion in arms sales to Taiwan.

Key Takeaways

• The PLA is developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention during a large-scale, theater campaign such as a Taiwan contingency. U.S. defense planners often refer to these collective capabilities as anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities.
• The PRC continues to increase its military capabilities to achieve regional and global security objectives beyond a Taiwan contingency.
• The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea.
• Relations between the PRC and Taiwan remained tense through 2019.
• The PLA continued Taiwan Strait contingency preparations
• Although China advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, China has never renounced the use of military force; the circumstances under which China has historically warned it would use force remain ambiguous and have evolved over time.
• China has a range of options for military campaigns against Taiwan, from an air and maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some or all of Taiwan or its offshore islands.
• China’s multi-decade military modernization effort has eroded or negated many of the military advantages that Taiwan has historically enjoyed the context of a cross-Strait conflict.
• To counter China’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.