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2022 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on China’s military power. This post contains selected Taiwan-related language in the 2022 report.

The Taiwan language in the previous year’s report (2021) is available here: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/2021-military-and-security-developments-involving-the-peoples-republic-of-china/

Selected Taiwan Language

Eastern Theater Command

The Eastern Theater Command has responsibility for the East China Sea and likely executes operational control over military matters related to Taiwan and Japan, including contingencies in and around the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands. PLA units located within the Eastern Theater Command include 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Armies; the Eastern Theater Navy and its naval aviation division and two marine brigades; two Air Force divisions, two operational PLAAF bases, and one PLARF base. The Eastern Theater Command also likely commands all China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia ships while they are conducting operations related to the ongoing dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands. During a contingency, the Eastern Theater Command likely also exercises command over some Strategic Support Force (SSF) units in theater and receives strategic intelligence support from the SSF to improve battlefield awareness and facilitate joint operations within the theater.

In 2021, the Eastern Theater Command focused on training and exercises to improve joint operations and combat readiness with long-distance maneuvers and mobilization, aerial combat, live-fire training, and the use of modified civilian ferries to augment transportation.

Developments in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait

Throughout 2021, island-seizure exercises became more frequent and realistic. The PLA conducted more than 20 naval exercises with an island-capture element, greatly exceeding the 13 observed in 2020. Many of these exercises focused on combat realism and featured night missions, training in adverse weather conditions, and simultaneous multi-domain operations.The PLA is preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force if perceived as necessary by Beijing, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any intervention by a third-party, such as the United States and/or other like-minded partners, on Taiwan’s behalf. As part of a comprehensive campaign to pressure Taiwan and the Tsai administration, and signal its displeasure at deepening Washington-Taipei ties, China has persistently conducted military operations near Taiwan and military training for a Taiwan contingency. Throughout 2021, the PLA increased provocative actions in and around the Taiwan Strait, to include repeated flights into Taiwan’s self-declared Air Defense Identification Zone and numerous island seizure exercises.

East China Sea

The PRC claims sovereignty over the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS), which Taiwan also claims. Beijing continues to uphold the importance of the four-point consensus signed in 2014, which states Japan and the PRC will acknowledge divergent positions over the ECS but will prevent escalation through dialogue, consultation, and crisis management mechanisms. The United States does not take a position on sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands but recognizes Japan’s administration of the islands and continues to reaffirm that the islands fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. In addition, the United States opposes any unilateral actions that seek to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands.

The PRC uses maritime law enforcement vessels and aircraft to patrol near the islands, not only to demonstrate its sovereignty claims, but also to improve readiness and responsiveness to potential contingencies. In 2021, the PRC continued to conduct regular patrols into the contiguous zone territorial seas of the Senkaku Islands and stepped up efforts to challenge Japan’s control over the islands by increasing the duration and assertiveness of its patrols. In one instance, China Coast Guard (CCG) ships entered Japanese-claimed waters for more than 100 consecutive days. Japan’s government protested in January 2021, calling on China to ensure that new PRC legislation allowing its coast guard to use weapons in its waters complies with international law. In August 2021, seven CCG vessels—including four equipped with deck guns—sailed into disputed waters around the Japan-administered Senkaku islands in the East China Sea. According to the Japanese coast guard, the PRC vessels attempted to approach Japanese fishing vessels, but were prevented from doing so by Japan Coast Guard Vessels. Increased PRC assertiveness caused Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi to express “extremely serious concerns” in December 2021 and led to the Japanese and PRC defense ministries to begin operating a new hotline between the two countries to manage the risk of escalation.

Southern Theater Command

The Southern Theater Command covers mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, including the South China Sea (SCS). This geographic area implies that the Southern Theater Command is responsible for securing the SCS, supporting the Eastern Theater Command in any operation against Taiwan, and assuring the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) vital to China’s global ambitions. PLA units located within the Southern Theater Command include 74th and 75th Group Armies, the Southern Theater Navy, three marine brigades, two PLA Air Force bases, and two PLA Rocket Force bases. The Southern Theater Command is responsible for responding to U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the SCS and can assume command as needed over all CCG and PAFMM vessels conducting operations within the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.”

The PRC’s Strategy & Capabilities Development in the Taiwan Strait

Tensions between the PRC and Taiwan heightened in 2021, as the PRC intensified political and military pressure aimed at Taiwan. The PRC continues its suspension of formal communication with Taiwan, which it did in 2016, and remains adamant that Taiwan must accept Beijing’s view of the “1992 Consensus” to restart formal engagement. China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to Beijing’s “One China principle” which was reaffirmed by General Secretary Xi Jinping in a January 2019 address to “compatriots” in Taiwan.

In October 2021, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-Wen called for a building of consensus around four commitments: 1) to a free and democratic constitutional system; 2) that Taiwan and China should not be subordinate to each other; 3) to resist annexation or encroachment upon the island’s sovereignty, and 4) that Taiwan’s future be decided in accordance with the will of its people. Xi replied in a 2021 New Year’s Eve speech, stating the complete unification of “the motherland” was an aspiration shared by people on both sides of the Strait − referring to Taiwan, which Xi described as “sacred” territory. This speech came a week after Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office warned that China would take “drastic measures” if Taiwan makes moves towards formal independence.

The PRC appears willing to defer the use of military force as long as it considers that unification with Taiwan could be negotiated over the long-term and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. The PRC argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintaining the conditions for political progress on its terms and preventing Taiwan from making moves toward independence. In January 2019, General Secretary Xi Jinping publicly reiterated the PRC’s long-standing refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue and its position on peaceful unification under the model of “one country, two systems.” In his July 2021 speech, Xi put more emphasis on opposing Taiwan independence than on pressing unification during his tenure. In addition, Xi omitted China’s offer of “one country, two systems” including the “protection” of Taiwan’s social system, way of life, private property, religious beliefs, and “lawful rights and interests,” provided the PRC’s “sovereignty, security, and development interests,” are ensured. However, the PRC’s 2022 Taiwan White Paper published by the Taiwan Affairs Office restated the PRC’s preference for peaceful reunification under the “one country, two systems” framework, while maintaining a refusal to renounce the use of force to compel unification, if needed.

Based on changing public sentiment in Taiwan from polling data over recent years, PRC leaders may perceive a closing window of opportunity to subjugate Taiwan under Beijing’s “one country, two systems” framework. The PRC in 2021 continued an aggressive pressure campaign against Taiwan and the Tsai administration to curtail Washington-Taipei ties and deter “Taiwan independence.” The PRC conducting persistent military operations near Taiwan—and training for a Taiwan contingency—likely signals a greater urgency for the PLA to improve its planning and capabilities should PRC leaders look to a military option to achieve their objectives.

The circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider the use force have evolved over time. These circumstances have included:
– Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;
– Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;
– Internal unrest in Taiwan;
– Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;
– Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification;
– Foreign military intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs.

Article 8 of the PRC’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that the PRC may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The PRC’s use of such non- specific conditions increases their policy flexibility through deliberate strategic ambiguity.

PRC Military Courses of Action Against Taiwan

The PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. The PRC could pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification, or attempt to compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table under Beijing’s terms. Notably, the PRC would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign— capabilities relevant to deterring or countering potential U.S. intervention were among those that the PRC highlighted during its October 2019 military parade celebrating its 70th anniversary. Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in a limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could offer the following military options against Taiwan, listed below individually or in combination, with varying degrees of feasibilities and risk associated.

Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which the PRC would employ blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade Campaign in an attempt to compel Taiwan’s surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. The PRC likely will complement its air and maritime blockades with concurrent electronic warfare (EW), network attacks, and information operations (IO) to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace and to control the international narrative of the conflict.

Limited Force or Coercive Options. The PRC could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by a variety of information operations to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA special operations forces (SOF) could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign. The PRC could use precision missile and air strikes against key government and military targets, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or undermine the public’s resolve to resist.

Invasion of Taiwan. PRC writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for EW, logistics, air, and naval support. The objectives are to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish a beachhead, build up combat power along Taiwan’s western coastline, and seize key targets or the entire island. The PRC continues to build and exercise capabilities that would likely contribute to a full- scale invasion. In 2021, the PLA conducted joint amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan and completed construction of its third LHA. In addition to this capability, the PLA likely will augment their capabilities with civilian “roll on/roll off” ships, under the legal basis of the 2016 National Defense Transportation Law. The PLA experimented with launching amphibious assault vehicles from these civilian ships in July 2020 and summer 2021, allowing them to flow amphibious forces directly to the beach rather than disembarking at port facilities.

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. Combined with inevitable force attrition, complexity of urban warfare, and potential insurgency, these factors make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party, even assuming a successful landing and breakout.

The PLA is capable of various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, the PRC could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Kinmen is within the PLA’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. This kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate powerful international opposition.

The PLA’s Current Posture for a Taiwan Conflict

PLA Army (PLAA). The PLAA continues to enhance its readiness to prevent Taiwan independence and execute an invasion. Significant reorganizations and amphibious assault training in recent years likely indicate that the Taiwan contingency is a high priority for the Army. Major PLAA contributions to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive amphibious, army aviation, and air assault operations.

The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades—four in the Eastern Theater Command (nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. PLAA units continued amphibious assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts in 2021. Training events refined the tactics of rapid loading, long-distance transport and beach assault under complicated sea situations, and logistic support capabilities. Press reports also claimed extensive use of sea, air, and ground unscrewed systems in support of the amphibious assault operation. PLAA amphibious brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale amphibious operations that are almost certainly aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion scenario.

Amphibious trainings were frequent in 2021—in one 3-month period the PLA held more than 120 maritime trainings. They also tested new platforms that would play a key role in an amphibious seizure. In 2021, the PLA debuted the YUSHEN class amphibious assault ship (Type 075) Hainan LHA, designed to improve forces’ operational capabilities and vessel maneuver. Additional YUSHEN class hulls are currently under construction. It appears that the PLA is also planning to build a new class of amphibious assault ship—the Type 076. The new Type 076 reportedly will be equipped with electromagnetic catapults, which would enhance its ability to support fixed-wing aircraft and make it somewhat more like an aircraft carrier. 2021 also saw the PLA’s most advanced amphibious armored equipment, the Type 05 amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), used in large numbers for the first time. These AAVs represent an upgrade in armor, survivability, and speed from the last-generation Type 63A, and provide the PLA with a more capable amphibious assault platform.

PLA Navy (PLAN). The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, further developing an at-sea nuclear deterrence, and introducing new multi-mission platforms capable of conducting diverse missions during peace and war. New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth- generation naval aircraft are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the First Island Chain to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

The PRC’s amphibious fleet has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of ocean-going amphibious transport docks (LPDs) and amphibious assault ships (LHAs) ships. There is no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its tank landing ships (LSTs) and medium sized landing craft at this time. Although the PLAN has not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that outsiders believe the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assesses it has sufficient amphibious capacity and has mitigated shortfalls through investment in other operational capabilities— such as civilian lift vessels and rotary-wing assets— to address this gap. The PLA may also have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.

PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The PLAAF has maintained a ready force posture for a variety of capabilities necessary in a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to conduct air and ground-attack operations. A number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense against attacks on key military installations or population centers on China’s mainland. The PRC’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations. Additionally, the PLAAF has improved refueling capabilities, expanding its ability to operate further from China and increasing its ability to threaten third party intervention.

PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. 2021 saw an acceleration of the positioning of conventional missiles. PLARF nuclear units will likely be postured to conduct deterrence operations.

Strategic Support Force (SSF). PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and cyberspace domains in joint operations. The PRC’s 2019 Defense White Paper stated that its armed forces are accelerating the build-up of its cyberspace capabilities, specifically its cyber defenses and its ability to detect and counter network intrusions. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible for EW and cyberspace operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions of the force is to seize and maintain information dominance. The SSF 311 Base would be responsible for political and psychological warfare, such as disseminating propaganda against Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a strategic information and communications support role, centralizing technical intelligence collection and management and providing strategic intelligence support to theater commands involved in a Taiwan contingency.

Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics support to the PLA’s strategic and campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, by conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support mechanisms.

Taiwan’s Ability to Deter Force

Taiwan has positioned itself as “a beacon of democracy” to garner international support and expand regional security ties. Taiwan is taking steps to compensate for the growing disparity with the PLA, including building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and noncommissioned officer corps. Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review 2021 reflects adjustments to the military’s strategy for defending the island, placing emphasis on protecting its littorals and near-shore coastal areas in a multi-layered defense-in-depth. The modified strategy stresses enhanced asymmetric and joint capabilities, as well as suggesting greater reliance on Taiwan’s Air Force and Navy through multi-domain deterrence measures. However, these improvements only partially address Taiwan’s defense challenges.

Taiwan’s armed forces are authorized to fill approximately 215,000 billets, including 188,000 active duty billets. As of 2021, the Ministry of National Defense accomplished the goal to fill 90 percent of the active duty billets (169,000) with volunteers. As Taiwan transitioned to an all-volunteer force, the cost savings from manpower reductions provided some margin to improve individual pay and benefits, housing, and incentive pay; however, these savings have been insufficient to cover the full increase in manpower-related costs needed to attract and retain personnel under the new system. Taiwan also faces considerable equipment and readiness challenges. Reservists and civil defense volunteers support the active duty forces. Taiwan’s reserves number approximately 2.3 million, roughly 750,000 of which participate in refresher training. In 2021, Taiwan passed legislation to establish an organization within its national security structure to improve whole of society mobilization to support defense.

Taiwan continues to increase its defense budget in order to support defense acquisitions and bolster its forces against PRC pressure. In 2020, the Tsai administration announced defense spending to be the highest level since 1990. Taiwan announced a further 10 percent increase from the previous year, bringing the 2021 defense budget to NT$453 billion ($15.4 billion), and representing more than 2% of Taiwan’s GDP. Meanwhile, China’s official defense budget continues to grow and is about 17 times larger than Taiwan’s defense budget, with much of it focused on developing the capability to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force. Recognizing the growing disparity between their respective defense expenditures, Taiwan has stated that it is working to develop new cost effective concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. Some specific areas of emphasis include offensive and defensive information and electronic warfare, high-speed stealth vessels, shore-based mobile missiles, rapid mining and minesweeping, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection. Taiwan has also dedicated significant defense spending toward its domestic submarine program, upgrading its existing F-16 fighters, as well as producing four transport docks and four minelaying ships to supplement its navy.

Consistent with the TRA, the United States contributes to peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan Strait by providing defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. From fiscal year 2019 to 2021, the United States has notified approximately $17 billion in potential arms sales to Taiwan, including 66 F-16 Block 70 fighter jets, 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks, four MQ-9 Reaper surveillance drones, Patriot missile system components, 250 Stinger missiles, 18 Mk-48 Mod 6 heavyweight torpedoes, artillery rocket systems, Paladin howitzers, 100 Harpoon coastal defense cruise missile systems, and AGM-84 SLAM-ER missiles.

Key Takeaways

  • The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea. The Eastern Theater Command likely would be in charge of executing a Taiwan invasion.
  • The PRC intensified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan in 2021. Throughout 2021, the PLA increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and around the Taiwan Strait, to include repeated flights into Taiwan’s self-declared Air Defense Identification Zone and conducting island-seizure exercises.
  • The PRC continues to use maritime law enforcement vessels and aircraft to patrol near the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands.
  • In 2021, the PRC passed new legislation regarding the rules of engagement for their Coast Guard vessels, creating a legal justification for more aggressive patrols.
  • The Southern Theater Command is oriented toward the South China Sea, Southeast Asia border security, and territorial and maritime disputes.
  • The PRC’s Spratly outposts are capable of supporting military operations, include advanced weapon systems, and have supported non-combat aircraft; however, no large-scale presence of combat aircraft has been yet observed there.
  • In 2021, the PRC continued to deploy PLAN, CCG, and civilian vessels in response to Vietnamese and Malaysian drilling operations within the PRC’s claimed “nine- dash-line” and Philippines’ construction at Thitu Island.
  • Although the PRC publicly advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, the PRC has never renounced the use of military force; the circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider using force remain ambiguous and have evolved over time.
  • The PRC could conduct a range of options for military campaigns against Taiwan, from an air and/or maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some of its offshore islands or all of Taiwan, with varying degrees of feasibility and risks associated.
  • The PRC’s multi-decade military modernization effort continues to widen the capability gap compared to Taiwan’s military.
  • To counter the PRC’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/2022-military-and-security-developments-involving-the-peoples-republic-of-china/

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Additional Missiles and Radar Sustainment to Taiwan

Press Release:
The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the Proposed Foreign Military Sale of Additional Harpoon and Sidewinder Missiles and Radar Sustainment to Taiwan

(Arlington, Virginia, September 2, 2022)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of three possible Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan of AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder Missiles, AGM-84L-1 Harpoon Block II Missiles, as well as Contract Logistics Support for the Surveillance Radar Program (SRP) and related equipment, at an estimated total cost of US$1.106 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on September 2, 2022.

The published Congressional Notifications (transmittal numbers 22-44, 22-45, and 22-46) is for 100 AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder tactical missiles and 4 AIM-9X Block II tactical Guidance Units – along with containers, spare & repair parts, support & test equipment, documentation, training, and other support. It is also for 60 AGM-84L-1 Harpoon Block II missiles and 4 ATM-84L-1 Harpoon Block II exercise missiles. Also included are Harpoon Guidance Control Units (GCUs), Radar Seekers and Altimeters, Captive Air Test Missiles (CATMs) as well as containers, spare & repair parts, support & test equipment, documentation, training, and other assistance and support. Finally, today’s notifications included follow-on Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) for the Surveillance Radar Program (SRP). That includes program management, minor modifications and upgrades, spares and repair/return parts, documentation, as well as related elements of engineering, technical, logistical, and other program support.

These are not new capabilities. Taiwan already has AIM-9 and Harpoon missiles in its existing inventory, and the Taiwan Surveillance Radar Program (SRP) has now been up and running for near a decade. The US-Taiwan Business Council welcomes continued security assistance support for Taiwan. We expect the Biden Administration to continue to focus its efforts on munitions and sustainment, which fits with their “asymmetric” approach to Taiwan. This views arms sales to Taiwan only through the narrow prism of a D-Day style attack, rather than as an all-phases assessment of the Chinese threat.

The Council opposes this limited approach. As the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) recently demonstrated in its mock blockade, the island faces a range of threats that require a range of capabilities. To deny the island the ability to mount a full defense will, over-time, create new gaps in Taiwan’s defenses that the PLA can exploit. America’s current policy of strategic ambiguity does not allow for the U.S. to clarify that it would fill those gaps as they emerge.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers commented on today’s sale, “The Council has long opposed the ‘packaging’ of programs into a single batch of Congressional Notifications. It is an irregular use of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, where programs should be notified to Congress when they are ready, rather than bundled together. It raises the likelihood of politicized timing, and places stress on Taiwan’s budget process as its government has to manage the ebbs and flows of erratic sales.”

Hammond-Chambers added, “Notifying a bundle of programs in excess of US$1 billion tends to magnify the political impact of an arms sales announcement. In conjunction with the passage of the USS Antietam and USS Chancellorsville through the Taiwan Strait in the past week, we should consider today’s sale a part of the hard-power response to the PRC’s threats and irresponsible behavior after Speaker Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan.

However, if the intention is to both boost Taiwan’s national security and make a political point to China, notifying this sale at 5:00 pm on a holiday weekend is a failing grade. Attempts to bury so-called ‘sensitive’ arms sales announcements late in the day or before a 3-day weekend have happened in the past as well. It appears that one faction within the Biden Administration wants to make a solid point to the PRC about material support for Taiwan in the face of PLA pressure, while another seems to want to minimize that point by announcing it the evening before a long weekend.”

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Additional Missiles and Radar Sustainment to Taiwan

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/ustbc-comments-on-the-proposed-fms-of-additional-missiles-and-radar-sustainment-to-taiwan/

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Contractor Technical Assistance Support to Taiwan

Press Release:
The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the Proposed Foreign Military Sale of Contractor Technical Assistance Support to Taiwan

(Arlington, Virginia, July 15, 2022)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Taiwan of Blanket Order Contractor Technical Assistance Support, at an estimated cost of US$108 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on July 15, 2022.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 22-31) is for contractor technical assistance support consisting of unclassified spare and repair parts and assembly for tanks and combat vehicles. It also covers technical assistance, technical and logistical support, and other related elements.

The US-Taiwan Business Council acknowledges the need for sustainment of Taiwan’s military. This sale will help Taiwan maintain its vehicles, small arms, combat weapon systems, and logistical support items.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said, “As the US-Taiwan Business Council has previously noted, the Biden Administration’s security assistance policy through 2025 will focus on sustainment and munitions. Force modernization of Taiwan’s armed forces is no longer a priority. We expect to soon learn more about the new limits of U.S. security assistance to Taiwan after the June Monterey Talks and Special Channel talks in Washington, D.C. and Annapolis, Maryland.”

Hammond-Chambers added, “More information will allow us to better predict where U.S. policy will start to open up critical gaps in Taiwan’s all-phases approach to the defense of the island. The PLA will naturally focus on these emerging vulnerabilities, as they adapt to the shortcomings of U.S. policy. The US-Taiwan Business Council again calls on the Biden Administration to provide strategic clarity on where U.S. forces will fill gaps in Taiwan’s defense brought on by these changes to U.S. policy.”

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Contractor Technical Assistance Support to Taiwan

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/ustbc-comments-on-the-proposed-fms-of-contractor-technical-assistance-support-to-taiwan/

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Naval Spare and Repair Parts to Taiwan

Press Release:
The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the Proposed Foreign Military Sale of Naval Spare and Repair Parts to Taiwan

(Arlington, Virginia, June 9, 2022)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Taiwan of naval spare and repair parts, at an estimated cost of US$120 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on June 8, 2022.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 22-22) is for spare and repair parts for ships and ship systems, technical assistance, technical and logistical support, and other related elements of logistics support. The notification indicated that the equipment will be sourced from approved U.S. Navy vendors and/or U.S. Navy stock.

The US-Taiwan Business Council acknowledges the need for sustainment of Taiwan’s military. The upkeep of the Taiwan armed forces is an essential aspect of Taiwan’s overall force posture, and supports its efforts to ensure that its military operational rates are high.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said, “As the Biden Administration undertakes the most significant narrowing of U.S.-Taiwan security assistance since 1979, these types of notifications covering sustainment efforts are the most likely over the next 18-24 months. There appears to now be little to no U.S. support for substantial Taiwan force modernization efforts, so we should expect to see mostly sustainment and munitions programs through the remainder of President Biden’s term (or terms) in office.”

Hammond-Chambers added, “One significant impact this approach will have is to constrain force modernization for entire areas of Taiwan’s military capability. We are likely to see the loss of infrastructure, hollowing out of operational experience, and the loss of decades of expertise. Once lost, that expertise will not return to the Taiwan military. This creates new vulnerabilities for the Chinese military to exploit. Far from improving Taiwan security, as time progresses this new directed approach will supply the PLA with emerging areas of military weakness, heightening – not lessening – the likelihood of attack.”

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Naval Spare and Repair Parts to Taiwan

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/ustbc-comments-on-the-proposed-fms-of-naval-spare-and-repair-parts-to-taiwan/

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Contractor Technical Assistance for Taiwan’s Patriot Air Defense System

Press Release:
The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the Proposed Foreign Military Sale of Contractor Technical Assistance for Taiwan’s Patriot Air Defense System

(Arlington, Virginia, April 6, 2022)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Taiwan of Contractor Technical Assistance and related maintenance and sustainment articles and services for the Patriot Air Defense System, at an estimated cost of US$95 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on April 5, 2022.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 22-16) is for support of the Patriot Air Defense System in Taiwan, and helps underpin Taiwan’s efforts to modernize its armed forces and to maintain a credible defensive capability. It includes Contractor Technical Assistance support consisting of training, planning, fielding, deployment, operation, maintenance, and sustainment of the Patriot Air Defense System, associated equipment, and logistics support elements. It also includes Patriot Ground Support Equipment, spare parts, and consumables.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said: “The sustainment of Taiwan’s existing weapons systems is an essential commitment by its armed forces to maintain high operational rates for its legacy gear.” “The normalized and regularized process of assessing all requested weapons systems for Taiwan’s use must remain a top priority for the Biden Administration. That should entail the acceptance from Taiwan of Letters of Request (LoRs), so that a full inter-agency assessment – that includes the uniformed services – can ascertain the utility of the request.”

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Contractor Technical Assistance for Taiwan’s Patriot Air Defense System

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/ustbc-comments-on-the-proposed-fms-of-contractor-technical-assistance-for-taiwans-patriot-air-defense-system/

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS in Support of Taiwan Participation in Patriot IESP & FSP

Press Release:
The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the Proposed Foreign Military Sale to Taiwan of Equipment and Services to Support Participation in Patriot IESP and FSP

(Arlington, Virginia, February 7, 2022)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale of equipment and services to support Taiwan’s participation in the Patriot International Engineering Services Program (IESP) and Field Surveillance Program (FSP) for five years, at an estimated cost of US$100 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on February 7, 2022.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 21-66) is for engineering services support designed to sustain, maintain, and improve the Patriot Air Defense System in Taiwan. It includes missile field surveillance support for legacy (Guidance Enhanced Missile (GEM)) and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles, to ensure the reliability and performance of the Patriot missile through storage and aging programs, surveillance firing programs, and configuration management. It is also for legacy and PAC-3 missile stockpile reliability testing, to provide quantitative reliability assessments of the deployed missile round. The potential sale also includes engineering, technical, and logistics support, as well as other related elements of program support. Participation in the shared IESP and FSP for the life of the Patriot system is a requirement of the U.S. government.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said: “The Biden Administration’s commitment to ensure that Taiwan’s military equipment is well supported and maintained is welcome. While ongoing force modernization is essential to combat the growing threat from China, maintenance of Taiwan’s existing equipment is similarly crucial. Taiwan and the U.S. should also seek to integrate Taiwan’s missile defense capabilities into America’s regional architecture, including cooperation with allies such as Japan and Australia.”

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS in Support of Taiwan Participation in Patriot IESP & FSP

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/ustbc-comments-on-the-proposed-fms-in-support-of-taiwan-participation-in-patriot-iesp-fsp/

Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2022

Update, December 27, 2021

On this date, U.S. President Joe Biden signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2022. The NDAA became Public Law No: 117-81.

Update, December 15, 2021

On this date, the U.S. Senate agreed to the House amendments in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (S.1605) by a Yea/Nay Vote of 88 – 11.

The NDAA 2022 now goes to the President’s desk to be signed.

Update, December 7, 2021

On this date, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (S.1605) was passed in the House by a Yea/Nay Vote of 363 – 70.

This legislation is substantially based on two bills: (1) H.R. 4350, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, which passed the House on September 23 by a vote of 316-113; and (2) S. 2792, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, which was approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 21 by a vote of 23-3. 
(source)

The December 7 version of the bill included multiple Taiwan provisions:

SEC. 1246. Sense of Congress on Taiwan Defense Relations

It is the sense of Congress that–
(1) the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation for United States-Taiwan relations;

(2) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes, is of grave concern to the United States;

(3) the increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the People’s Republic of China towards Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of a peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan;

(4) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan and the policy of the United States to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self- defense capability should be maintained; and

(5) the United States should continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, including by–
(A) supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales,
direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities that support the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan;
(B) ensuring timely review of and response to requests by Taiwan for defense articles and services;
(C) conducting practical training and military exercises with Taiwan, including, as appropriate, inviting Taiwan to participate in the Rim of the Pacific exercise conducted in 2022, that enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act;
(D) deepening interoperability with Taiwan in defensive capabilities, including maritime and air domain awareness and integrated air and missile defense systems;
(E) encouraging exchanges between defense officials and officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for the purposes of–
(i) enhancing cooperation on defense planning;
(ii) improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan; and
(iii) improving the reserve force of Taiwan;
(F) identifying improvements in Taiwan’s ability to use asymmetric military capabilities to enhance its defensive capabilities, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act; and
(G) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

SEC. 1247. Statement of Policy on Taiwan

a) Statement of Policy — Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et. seq.), it shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist a fait accompli that would jeopardize the security of the people on Taiwan.
(b) Definition — In this section, the term “fait accompli” refers to the resort to force by the People’s Republic of China to invade and seize control of Taiwan before the United States can respond effectively.

SEC. 1248. Annual Report on Taiwan Asymmetric Capabilities and Intelligence Support

(a) In General — The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall each year through fiscal year 2027, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3302(c)), perform an annual assessment of matters related to Taiwan, including intelligence matters, Taiwan’s asymmetric defensive capabilities, and how defensive shortcomings or vulnerabilities of Taiwan could be mitigated through cooperation, modernization, or integration. At a minimum, the assessment shall include the following:
(1) An intelligence assessment regarding–
(A) conventional military threats to Taiwan from China, including exercises intended to intimidate or coerce Taiwan; and
(B) irregular warfare activities, including influence operations, conducted by China to interfere in or undermine the peace and stability of the TaiwanStrait.
(2) The current defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan and the ability of Taiwan to defend itself from external conventional and irregular military threats.
(3) The interoperability of current and future defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan with the military capabilities of the United States and its allies and partners.
(4) The plans, tactics, techniques, and procedures underpinning the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan.
(5) A description of additional personnel, resources, and authorities in Taiwan or in the United States that may be required to meet any shortcomings in the development of Taiwan’s defensive capabilities identified pursuant to this section.
(6) The applicability of Department of Defense authorities for improving the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.
(7) The feasibility and advisability of assisting Taiwan in the domestic production of defensive asymmetric capabilities, including through the transfer of intellectual property, co- development, or co-production arrangements.
(8) An assessment of ways in which the United States could enhance cooperation with on intelligence matters with Taiwan.
(9) A description of any non-Department of Defense efforts by the United States Government to build the capacity of Taiwan to disrupt external efforts that degrade its free and democratic society.
(10) A description of any significant efforts by the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and other elements of the intelligence community to coordinate technical and material support for Taiwan to identify, disrupt, and combat influence operations referred to in this subsection.
(11) Any other matter the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

(b) Plan — The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall develop a
plan for assisting Taiwan in improving its defensive asymmetric capabilities and addressing vulnerabilities identified pursuant to subsection (a) that includes-
(1) recommendations for new Department of Defense authorities, or modifications to existing Department authorities, necessary to improve the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.);
(2) an identification of opportunities for key leader and subject matter expert engagement between Department personnel and military and civilian counterparts in Taiwan; and
(3) an identification of challenges and opportunities for leveraging non-Department authorities, resources, and capabilities to improve the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.

(c) Report — Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually through fiscal year 2027, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress-
(1) a report on the results of the assessment required by subsection (a); and
(2) the plan required by subsection (b).

(d) Form –The report required by subsection (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(e) Definitions — In this section:
(1) The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means–
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) The term “defensive asymmetric capabilities” means the capabilities necessary to defend Taiwan against conventional external threats, including coastal defense missiles, naval mines, anti-aircraft capabilities, cyber defenses, and special operations forces.

SEC. 1249. Feasibility Briefing on Cooperation Between the National Guard and Taiwan

(a) In General — Not later than February 15, 2022, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on the feasibility and advisability of enhanced cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan.

(b) Elements — The briefing required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A description of the cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan during the preceding calendar year, including mutual visits, exercises, training, and equipment opportunities.
(2) An evaluation of the feasibility of enhancing cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan on a range of activities, including –
(A) disaster and emergency response;
(B) cyber defense and communications security;
(C) military medical cooperation;
(D) Mandarin-language education and cultural exchange; and
(E) programs for National Guard advisors to assist in training the reserve components of the military forces of Taiwan.
(3) Recommendations to enhance such cooperation and improve interoperability, including through familiarization visits, cooperative training and exercises, and co-deployments.
(4) Any other matter the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate

Update, September 23, 2021

On this date, the U.S. House of Representatives passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (H.R.4350) by a Yea/Nay Vote of 316-113.

The passed text included 3 additional Taiwan-related amendments:

Floor 53, Rule 628
Directs the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a report on influence operations conducted by China to interfere in or undermine peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific Region and efforts by the U.S. to work with Taiwan to disrupt such operations.

Floor 59, Rule 616
Supports Taiwan’s investment in an asymmetric defense strategy by requiring a report with programmatic and policy options to support Taiwan’s defense budgeting and procurement process in a manner that facilitates sustained investment in capabilities aligned with Taiwan’s asymmetric defense strategy.

Floor 84, Rule 795
Requires the Secretary of Homeland Security and Secretary of Commerce to submit a report that includes an assessment of establishing a preclearance facility in Taiwan.

Update, September 17, 2021

On this date, the House Committee on Armed Services filed a supplemental report on the NDAA. The text of the supplemental report mentioned Taiwan in regards to Chinese Mine Warfare and on PLA Civilian Strategic Mobility Capacity. It also included two additional Taiwan-related items:

TITLE XII–MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS

Items of Special Interest

Report on Anti-Ship Systems for Defense of Taiwan

The committee supports the strategic partnership between the United States and Taiwan, and notes the importance of anti-ship systems in defending the territorial integrity of the Government of Taiwan. The committee further notes the urgent need for ground-based anti-ship cruise missiles, ground-based cruise missiles, and anti-ship mines to defend United States and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific against growing threats and deter conflict in the region.

The committee strongly supports an effort to expand defense industrial cooperation with the Government of Taiwan. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees a report by January 31, 2022, on what anti-ship systems and capabilities in the extant U.S. military hardware inventory might be used to enhance the defense of Taiwan, and plans on how these systems and capabilities could be incorporated into the current military of the Government of Taiwan to enhance their self-defense capabilities.

Report on Engaging Taiwan in Indo-Pacific Regional Dialogues or Forums

The committee recognizes the value of Taiwan-U.S. relations, and the importance Taiwan plays in the Indo-Pacific region. As such, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the House Committee on Armed Services by March 1, 2022, on the Department of Defense’s plan to meaningfully engage Taiwan in regional security dialogues or forums that shall include the following:

    (1) An assessment of list of security regional dialogues or forums that would fit for Taiwan’s participation.

    (2) A discussion of current and future plans to achieve engaging Taiwan in regional security dialogues or forums.

    (3) An evaluation of the feasibility of cooperating on a range of activities with the aforementioned security dialogues or forums, including: (a) humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief; (b) supply chain security; (c) cyber security; (d) coast guard; and (e) any other matters the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate.

Update, September 10, 2021

On this date, the NDAA, as H.R.4350, was reported (amended) in the House by the House Committee on Armed Services.

The text included three provisions for enhancing the defense and security cooperation between the United States and Taiwan:

SEC. 1243. Report on Cooperation Between the National Guard and Taiwan

(a) Report – Not later than February 15, 2022, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to appropriate congressional committees a report on the feasibility and advisability of enhanced cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan. Such report shall include the following:

(1) A description of the cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan during the 10 preceding calendar years,
including mutual visits, exercises, training, and equipment opportunities.

(2) An evaluation of the feasibility and advisability of enhancing cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan on a range of activities, including-
(A) disaster and emergency response;
(B) cyber defense and communications security;
(C) military medical cooperation;
(D) cultural exchange and education of members of the National Guard in Mandarin Chinese; and
(E) programs for National Guard advisors to assist in training the reserve components of the military forces of Taiwan.

(3) Recommendations to enhance such cooperation and improve interoperability, including through familiarization visits, cooperative training and exercises, and co-deployments.

(4) Any other matter the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate.

(b) Appropriate Congressional Committees.–In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means-
(1) the congressional defense committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

SEC. 1247. Sense of Congress on Taiwan Defense Relations

It is the sense of Congress that –
(1) the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C.3301 et seq.) and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation for United States-Taiwan relations;

(2) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes, is of grave concern to the United States;

(3) the increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the People’s Republic of China toward Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of the peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan;

(4) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan should be maintained;

(5) the United States should continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, including by–
(A) supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities that support the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan, including anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and resilient command and control capabilities;
(B) ensuring timely review of and response to requests of Taiwan for defense articles and services;
(C) conducting practical training and military exercises with Taiwan that enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self- defense capability, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act;
(D) exchanges between defense officials and officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for the purposes of–
(i) enhancing cooperation on defense planning;
(ii) improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan; and
(iii) improving the reserve force of Taiwan;
(E) identifying improvements in Taiwan’s ability to use asymmetric military capabilities to enhance its defensive capabilities, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act; and
(F) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and

(6) the United States should be committed to the defense of a free and open society in the face of aggressive efforts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to curtail or influence the free exercise of rights and democratic franchise.

SEC. 1248. Sense of Congress on Inviting Taiwan to the Rim of the Pacific Exercise.

It is the sense of Congress that the naval forces of Taiwan should be invited to participate in the Rim of the Pacific exercise conducted in 2022.

July 21, 2021

On this date, the NDAA 2022, as S. 2792, was approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee by a vote of 23-3. 

The text included three Taiwan provisions:

SEC. 1245. Assessment of and Plan for Improving the Defensive Asymmetric Capabilities of Taiwan

(a) Assessment – The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall conduct an assessment of –
(1) the current defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan and the ability of Taiwan to defend itself from external conventional military threats;
(2) the applicability of Department of Defense authorities for improving the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.);
(3) the feasibility and advisability of assisting Taiwan in the domestic production of defensive asymmetric capabilities, including through the transfer of intellectual property, co-development, or co-production arrangements;
(4) the plans, tactics, techniques, and procedures underpinning the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan;
(5) the interoperability of current and future defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan with the military capabilities of the United States and its allies and partners; and
(6) any other matter the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

(b) Plan – The Secretary of Defense shall develop a plan for assisting Taiwan in improving its defensive asymmetric capabilities that includes –
(1) recommendations for new Department of Defense authorities, or modifications to existing Department authorities, necessary to improve the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.);
(2) an identification of opportunities for key leader and subject matter expert engagement between Department personnel and military and civilian counterparts in Taiwan; and
(3) an identification of challenges and opportunities for leveraging non-Department authorities, resources, and capabilities to improve the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.).

(c) Report – Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress-(1) a report on the results of the assessment required by subsection (a); and
(2) the plan required by subsection (b).

(d) Definitions – In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress – The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means –
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) Defensive asymmetric capabilities.–The term “defensive asymmetric capabilities” means the capabilities necessary to defend Taiwan against conventional external threats, including coastal defense missiles, naval mines, anti-aircraft capabilities, cyber defenses, and special operations forces.

SEC. 1246. Annual Feasibility Briefing on Cooperation Between the National Guard and Taiwan

(a) Sense of Congress — It is the sense of Congress that the United States should —
(1) continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability by increasing exchanges between senior defense officials and general officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and
functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for the purposes of –
(A) improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan;
(B) improving the reserve forces of Taiwan; and
(C) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief;
(2) expand and strengthen Taiwan’s capability to conduct security activities, including traditional activities of the combatant commands, cooperation with the National Guard, and through multilateral activities; and
(3) using appropriate authorities and consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), seek to develop a partnership between the National Guard and Taiwan as a means of maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability.

(b) Briefing —
(1) In general — Not later than February 15, 2022, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on the feasibility and advisability of enhanced cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan.
(2) Elements — Each briefing required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) A description of the cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan during the preceding calendar year, including mutual visits, exercises, training, and equipment opportunities.
(B) An evaluation of the feasibility of enhancing cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan on a range of activities, including–
(i) disaster and emergency response;
(ii) cyber defense and communications security;
(iii) military medical cooperation;
(iv) Mandarin-language education and cultural exchange; and
(v) programs for National Guard advisors to assist in training the reserve components of the military forces of Taiwan.
(C) Recommendations to enhance such cooperation and improve interoperability, including through familiarization visits, cooperative training and exercises, and co-deployments.
(D) Any other matter the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

SEC. 1247. Defense of Taiwan

(a) Definitions — In this section:
(1) Deny — The term “deny” means to use combined joint operations to delay, degrade, and ultimately defeat an attempt by the People’s Republic of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan, resulting in–
(A) the termination of hostilities or at least the attempted fait accompli; or
(B) the neutralization of the ability of the People’s Republic of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan.
(2) Fait accompli — The term “fait accompli” refers to the strategy of the People’s Republic of China for invading and seizing control of Taiwan before the United States Armed Forces can respond effectively, while simultaneously deterring an effective combined joint response by the United States Armed Forces by convincing the United States that mounting such a response would be prohibitively difficult or costly.

(b) Statement of Policy — It shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli against Taiwan in order to deter the People’s Republic of China from using military force to unilaterally change the status quo with Taiwan.

July 2, 2021

The NDAA 2022, as H.R.4350, was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on July 2, 2021.

Previous Posts

Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2021

Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2020

Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2019

Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2018

Taiwan Initiative in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2017

Proposed Taiwan Initiatives in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2016

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/taiwan-in-the-national-defense-authorization-act-ndaa-2022/

2021 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on the military power of China. This post contains selected Taiwan-related language in the 2021 report.

Taiwan language in the 2020 report: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/2020-military-and-security-developments-involving-the-peoples-republic-of-china/

Selected Taiwan Language

Eastern Theater Command

The Eastern Theater Command has responsibility for the East China Sea and likely executes operational control over national defense matters related to Taiwan and Japan, including contingencies in and around the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands. In 2020, the Eastern Theater Command focused on a series of training and exercises to improve joint operations and combat readiness, organizing exercises and drills consisting of long-distance training and mobilization, aerial combat, and live-fire training. PLA units located within the Eastern Theater Command include three group armies, a naval fleet, a naval aviation division, two marine brigades, two Air Force divisions, two operational Air Force bases, and one Rocket Force base. The Eastern Theater Command also likely commands all China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia ships while they are conducting Senkakus-related operations. During a contingency, the Eastern Theater Command likely also exercises command over some Strategic Support Force (SSF) units in theater and receives strategic intelligence support from the SSF to improve battlefield awareness and facilitate joint operations within the theater.

In August and September 2020, the Eastern Theater Command conducted a series of military exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan that featured large-scale naval and air maneuvers, amphibious operations, and multiple instances of PLA aircraft crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait. An Eastern Theater Command spokesperson stated that these drills were meant to further test and improve multi-service joint operations capabilities, as well as to deter “Taiwan independence” forces and foreign actors from threatening the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait region.

Developments in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait

Tensions between the PRC and Taiwan heightened in 2020, as the PRC intensified political and military pressure aimed at Taiwan. In January 2020, despite the PRC’s election interference, President Tsai Ing-wen won reelection for a second term. The PRC continues its suspension of formal communication with Taiwan, which it did in 2016, and remains steadfast that Taiwan must accept Beijing’s view of the “1992 Consensus” to restart formal engagement. China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to Beijing’s “one China Principle” which was reaffirmed by General Secretary Xi in a January 2019 address to “compatriots” in Taiwan. President Tsai has continually pledged to maintain the status quo in cross-Strait relations and called for the PRC to respect Taiwan’s democracy and agree to negotiations without preconditions. In her May 2020 inauguration speech, Tsai reiterated that her China policy would be based on the Republic of China’s constitution and the law governing cross-Strait relations, with a willingness to engage in dialogue on the principles of “peace, parity, democracy, and dialogue” to the PRC’s displeasure.

The PRC also maintained its diplomatic pressure on Taiwan, thwarting Taiwan’s efforts to participate in international organizations such as the World Health Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, and the International Criminal Policy Organization (INTERPOL). Despite the stalled consultations with the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to engage with Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT) party, and the PRC continues to hold lower-level cross-Strait exchanges such as the municipal Shanghai-Taipei Twin City Forum, held virtually in August 2020, due to the pandemic.

The PLA continues to prepare for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait to deter, and if necessary, compel Taiwan to abandon moves toward independence. The PLA also is likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party intervention, such as the United States and/or other like- minded partners, on Taiwan’s behalf. As part of a comprehensive campaign to pressure Taiwan and the Tsai administration, and signal its displeasure at warming Washington-Taipei ties, China has persistently conducted military operations near Taiwan and military training for a Taiwan contingency. Throughout 2020, China’s military increased provocative actions in and around the Taiwan Strait, to include repeated flights into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone and conducting combat drills such as island seizure operations. In 2020, Beijing also publicly refuted the existence of the Taiwan Strait ‘median line,’ a decades-long tacit agreement between the two sides intended to reduce miscalculation and avoid sparking accidental crises.

East China Sea

The PRC claims sovereignty over the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, which Taiwan also claims. It also continues to uphold the importance of abiding by the four-point consensus signed in 2014, which states Japan and the PRC will acknowledge divergent positions over the East China Sea but will prevent escalation through dialogue, consultation, and crisis management mechanisms. The United States does not take a position on sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands but recognizes Japan’s administration of the islands and continues to reaffirm that the islands fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. In addition, the United States opposes any unilateral actions that seek to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands.

The PRC uses maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft to patrol near the islands, not only as a visible representation of the PRC’s sovereignty claims, but also in an effort to improve readiness and respond quickly to potential contingencies. During 2020, the PRC continued to conduct regular patrols into the contiguous and territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands, and stepped up efforts to challenge Japan’s control over the islands by increasing the duration and assertiveness of its patrols. In July, two PRC coast guard vessels conducted a record-setting patrol within the 12nm territorial waters that lasted 39 hours and 23 minutes, following a similar patrol just two days prior. These two patrols represented the longest time PRC vessels have ever spent continuously operating inside the Senkakus’ territorial waters since 2012. By the end of the year, PRC vessels had been observed in the contiguous waters of the islands for 333 days, breaking 2019’s record of 282 days.

PRC coast guard vessels also acted more assertively during their patrols in 2020, shadowing Japanese fishing vessels operating within the Senkakus’ territorial waters and ordering them to leave on multiple occasions. Japan’s government protested in late November 2020 when PRC ships entered Japan’s contiguous zone for the 306th time this year, further straining the relations between the PRC and Japan in relation to the Senkakus and complicating plans to reschedule a planned visit to Japan by President Xi Jinping.

The PRC’s Strategy & Capabilities Development in the Taiwan Strait

The PRC appears willing to defer the use of military force as long as it considers that unification with Taiwan could be negotiated over the long-term and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. The PRC argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintaining the conditions for political progress on its terms and preventing Taiwan from making moves toward independence. In January 2019, General Secretary Xi Jinping publicly reiterated the PRC’s long-standing refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue, and staked the PRC’s position for peaceful unification under the model of “one country, two systems.” Based on the 2019 speech, “once country, two systems” entails the “protection” of Taiwan’s social system, way of life, private property, religious beliefs, and “lawful rights and interests,” provided the PRC’s “sovereignty, security, and development interests,” are ensured. In 2020, senior PRC leaders and government spokespersons continued to call for cross-Strait discussions on the foundation of adhering to Beijing’s interpretation of the “1992 Consensus” and opposing Taiwan independence, and reiterated contents of Xi’s 2019 speech.

Based on changing public sentiment in Taiwan, according to recent polling data, PRC leaders may perceive a closing window of opportunity to subjugate Taiwan under the pretenses of Beijing’s “one country, two systems” framework. The PRC has increasingly resorted to an aggressive pressure campaign against Taiwan and the Tsai administration to curtail Washington-Taipei ties and deter “Taiwan independence.” The PRC conducting persistent military operations near Taiwan—and training for a Taiwan contingency—likely signals a greater urgency for the PLA to continue to develop and perfect its strategy and capabilities should PRC leaders look to a military option to achieve their objectives.

The circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider the use force have evolved over time. These circumstances have included:
‒ Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;
‒ Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;
‒ Internal unrest in Taiwan;
‒ Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;
‒ Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification; and
‒ Foreign military intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs.

Article 8 of the PRC’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that the PRC may use “non- peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The PRC’s use of such non-specific conditions increases their policy flexibility through deliberate strategic ambiguity.

PRC Courses of Action Against Taiwan

The PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. The PRC could pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification, or compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table under Beijing’s terms. Notably, the PRC would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign – capabilities relevant to deterring or countering potential U.S. intervention were among those that the PRC highlighted during its October 2019 military parade celebrating its 70th anniversary. Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in an asymmetric, limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could initiate the military options listed below individually or in combination.

Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which the PRC would employ kinetic blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade in an attempt to achieve a rapid Taiwan surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. The PRC will also likely complement its air and maritime blockade operations with concurrent electronic warfare (EW), network attacks, and information operations (IO) to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace and to control the international narrative of the conflict.

Limited Force or Coercive Options. The PRC could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by a variety of IO to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA special operations forces (SOF) could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign. The PRC could use missile attacks and precision air strikes against air defense systems, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the Taiwan people’s resolve.

Invasion of Taiwan. Publicly available PRC writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for logistics, air, and naval support, and EW. The objective would be to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish and build a beachhead, transport personnel and materiel to designated landing sites in the north or south of Taiwan’s western coastline, and launch attacks to seize and occupy key targets or the entire island. In 2020, the PLA conducted joint amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan. Furthermore, the PRC continues to build capabilities that would contribute to a full-scale invasion; in 2019, the PLA completed construction of its first helicopter dock amphibious assault ship (LHA).

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with the PRCs combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency, even assuming a successful landing and breakout, make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party.

The PLA is capable of attempting various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, the PRC could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Jinmen is within the PLA’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. However, this kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate powerful international opposition.

The PLA’s Current Posture for a Taiwan Conflict

PLA Army (PLAA)
The PLAA continues to enhance its readiness to prevent Taiwan independence and execute an invasion. Significant reorganizations and cross-sea amphibious assault training in recent years likely indicate supporting a Taiwan operation is a high priority for the Army. Major PLAA contributions to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive amphibious, army aviation, and air assault operations.

The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades—four in the Eastern Theater Command (nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. Despite COVID-19 mitigation efforts, extensive flooding in southern China, and conflict on the Indian border, PLAA units continued amphibious assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts in 2020. Training events included nighttime loading, concealed landing, simulated sea crossing operations, and joint landing operations integrating PLAA aviation, Special Forces, EW, armor, and mechanized infantry. Press reports also claim extensive use of sea, air, and ground UAS in support of the amphibious assault operation. PLAA amphibious brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale amphibious operations that are almost certainly aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion scenario.

In addition to amphibious assault, PLAA aviation and air assault brigades will likely play a role in a large-scale amphibious assault. PLAA aviation and air assault brigades conducted significant training throughout 2020—some directly supporting a Taiwan scenario and others that improve skill sets necessary for a cross-sea invasion. Exercises included single-service operations and joint operations with the PLAN and PLAAF. In August 2020, PLAA helicopters left their land base, landed on PLAN ships, and then conducted an air assault mission. PLAA aviation units also completed “cross-sea [aerial] assault drills,” using UAVs to target opposing forces for air strikes in support of ground forces. PLAA aviation assets also conducted an exercise attacking air and maritime assets in an open-sea environment. Army aviation and air assault units extensively trained on scenarios in a maritime environment that support joint force operations similar to those necessary for a Taiwan invasion.

PLA Navy (PLAN)
The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, developing an at-sea nuclear deterrent, and introducing new multi- mission platforms capable of striking Taiwan’s naval forces in a cross-Strait conflict as well as conducting diverse missions in other contingency operations. New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the First Island Chain as well as to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

The PRC’s amphibious ship fleet, however, has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of ocean-going amphibious platform docks (LPDs) and flat deck landing helicopter assault (LHAs) ships, indicating a near term focus on regional and eventually global expeditionary missions rather than the large number of landing ship transports and medium landing craft that would be necessary for a large-scale direct beach assault. There is also no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its force of tank landing ships (LSTs) and medium sized landing craft at this time—suggesting a traditional large-scale direct beach— assault operation requiring extensive lift remains aspirational. Although the PLAN has not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that outsiders believe the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assess it has sufficient amphibious capacity and mitigated shortfalls through investments in other operational modalities able to bring forces onto Taiwan such as the PLA’s rapidly expanding fleet of rotary-wing assets. The PLA may also have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.

PLA Air Force (PLAAF)
The PLAAF has maintained a force posture that provides a variety of capabilities for a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to conduct air and ground-attack operations. A number of long- range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense against attacks on key military installations or population centers on China’s mainland. In addition, the PRC’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations in a contingency.

PLA Rocket Force (PLARF)
The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, in an attempt to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. PLARF nuclear units will likely be postured to conduct deterrence operations and in heightened readiness in preparation for rapid nuclear counterstrikes if called on.

Strategic Support Force (SSF)
PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and cyberspace domains in joint operations. The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper states that its armed forces are accelerating the build-up of its cyberspace capabilities, specifically its cyber defenses and its ability to detect and counter network intrusions. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible for the use of EW and cyber operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions of the force is to seize and maintain battlefield information control in contemporary informatized warfare. The SSF 311 Base would also be responsible for political and psychological warfare, such as disseminating propaganda against Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a strategic information and communications support role, centralizing technical intelligence collection and management and providing strategic intelligence support to theater commands involved in a Taiwan contingency.

Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF)
The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics support to the PLA’s strategic and
campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, by conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support mechanisms.

Taiwan’s Defense Capabilities

Taiwan is taking important steps to compensate for the growing disparities it has compared to the PLA, including building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and noncommissioned officer corps. However, these improvements only partially address Taiwan’s defense challenges. Taiwan’s 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review reaffirms recent adjustments to the military’s strategy for defending the island, placing emphasis on protecting its littorals and near-shore coastal areas in a multi-layered defense in depth. The modified strategy stresses enhanced asymmetric and joint capabilities, as well as suggesting greater reliance on Taiwan’s Air Force and Navy through multi-domain deterrence measures.

Taiwan’s armed forces are authorized to fill approximately 215,000 billets, including 188,000 active duty billets. Reservists and civil defense volunteers support the active duty forces. As of the end of 2020, the Ministry of National Defense accomplished its goal of filling 90 percent of the active duty billets, totaling approximately 169,000 personnel, with volunteers. Taiwan’s military modernization program envisions a continued decrease in Taiwan’s active duty force to approximately 175,000 personnel as part of a transition to an all-volunteer force. This transition has slowed due to severe difficulties recruiting volunteers. The cost savings from manpower reductions provides some margin to improve individual pay and benefits, housing, and incentive pay; however, these savings have been insufficient to cover the full increase in manpower-related costs needed to attract and retain personnel under the new system. The unanticipated magnitude of transition costs has led Taiwan to divert funds from foreign and indigenous defense acquisition programs, as well as near-term training and readiness. Taiwan also faces considerable equipment and readiness challenges.

Taiwan continues to increase its defense budget in order to support defense acquisition and reforms. In August 2019, Taiwan said it would increase the island’s defense budget by 5.2 percent to NT $358 billion ($11.6 billion). In August 2020, the Tsai administration announced an additional 10% increase to the defense budget, increasing overall defense spending to more than 2% of gross domestic product and the highest level since the 1990’s. Meanwhile, the PRC’s official defense budget continues to grow, with much of it focused on developing the military joint operations capability that could be used to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force. Recognizing the growing disparity between their respective defense expenditures, Taiwan has stated that it is working to develop new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. Some specific areas of emphasis include Electronic Warfare, cyber and information operations, fast attack maritime vessels, coastal defense missiles, rapid naval mining, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection.

The United States maintains its one-China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. The United States is committed to deepening ties with Taiwan, which is a leading democracy and a critical economic and security partner. The United States will continue to support a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues, consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people on Taiwan.

Consistent with the TRA, the United States contributes to peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan Strait by providing defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. In October 2019, Taiwan announced the purchase of F-16V fighter aircraft for $8 billion. In 2020, the frequency of arms sales to Taiwan increased with authorizations totaling more than $5 billion. Authorized weapons sales included advanced unmanned aerial systems, long range missiles and artillery, and the Harpoon Coastal Defense System. Since 2010, the United States has announced more than $23 billion in arms sales to Taiwan. In support of these efforts, the U.S. continues to maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.

Key Take Aways

  • The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea.
  • PRC diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan intensified in 2020.
  • Throughout 2020, the PLA increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and around the Taiwan Strait, to include repeated flights into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone and conducting combat drills such as island seizure operations.
  • The PRC continues to use maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft to patrol near the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands. In 2020, the PRC stepped up efforts to challenge Japan’s control over the islands by increasing the duration and assertiveness of its patrols.
  • Although the PRC publicly advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, the PRC has never renounced the use of military force; the circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider using force remain ambiguous and have evolved over time.
  • The PRC has a range of options for military campaigns against Taiwan, from an air and maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some or all of Taiwan or its offshore islands.
  • The PRC’s multi-decade military modernization effort continues to widen the capability gap between the PLA and Taiwan’s military.
  • To counter the PRC’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/2021-military-and-security-developments-involving-the-peoples-republic-of-china/

Taiwan Arms Sales Notified to Congress 1990-2021

Updated Charts: Taiwan Arms Sales 1990-2021

Notified Taiwan Arms Sales 1990-2021 - Amount
Notified Taiwan Arms Sales 1990-2021 - Number of Notifications

Taiwan Arms Sales notified to Congress from 1990 to August 4, 2021. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) only, in US$ billion and by number of notifications.

Sources:

– FMS Data from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency at http://www.dsca.mil

– Kan, Shirley A., “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990” Congressional Research Service Report RL30957, January 5, 2015

Note that the gaps in notifications were as follows:
October 25, 2005 – February 28, 2007
October 3, 2008 – January 29, 2010
September 21, 2011 – December 16, 2015
December 16, 2015 – June 29, 2017

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/taiwan-arms-sales-notified-to-congress-1990-2021/

The US-Taiwan Business Council Welcomes the Sale to Taiwan of 40 150mm M109A6 Paladin Self-Propelled Howitzers for US$750 million

(Arlington, Virginia, August 4, 2021)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale of 40 155mm M109A6 Paladin Medium Self-Propelled Howitzer Systems and related equipment to Taiwan at an estimated cost of US$750 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on August 4, 2021.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 21-44) is for 40 155mm M109A6 Medium Self-Propelled Howitzer Systems; 20 M992A2 Field Artillery Ammunition Support Vehicles (FAASV); 1 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS); 5 M88A2 Hercules vehicles; 5 M2 Chrysler Mount .50 caliber machine guns; and 1,698 multi-option, Precision Guidance Kits (PGK). Also included are M109A6/M992A2 overhaul, conversion and refurbishment services, along with additional equipment, testing, software and technical documentation, technical assistance, engineering, storage, and other related elements of technical, logistics, and program support.

Taiwan already operates older M109A2 and M109A5 variants of the Paladin, and holds M110A2 self-propelled howitzers and towed M114 howitzers in its existing inventory. The M109A6 provides enhanced armor and improved survivability over the older variants, and features a reduction in the time required for set up and fire.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said: “This notification for the M109A6 Paladin program is the first Taiwan arms sale under the Biden Administration. It serves as a timely reminder of the close national security partnership between the United States and Taiwan, particularly as the PRC is now violating the Taiwan AIDZ on a near daily basis. We expect to continue seeing normalized, timely, and regular arms sales from the U.S. that promote Taiwan’s military readiness. We also hope to see additional offers from the Biden Administration of new capabilities for Taiwan, to both help expand its current military posture and to continue improving its multilayered self-defense capacity.”

The US-Taiwan Business Council would also like to recognize the work of our dearly departed friend and former Board Member Greyson T. Bassett on this program.

Press Note: The words “package” and “packaging” often refer to slowing/stacking Taiwan arms sales notifications and sending them to Congress as a group, instead of individually forwarding them to Congress when they are ready. This was a common practice from 2007 to 2017, and resulted in large and irregular arms sales packages. The word “program” is preferred for items released in one Congressional notification.

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

USTBC Comments on the Proposed Taiwan FMS of 40 M109A6 Paladin Self-Propelled Howitzers

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/the-us-taiwan-business-council-welcomes-the-sale-to-taiwan-of-40-150mm-m109a6-paladin-self-propelled-howitzers-for-us750-million/