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Category: Analysis & Commentary

The US-Taiwan Business Council occasionally publishes analysis and commentary on Taiwan defense and national security issues. These include occasional papers, special commentaries, editorials, and other related statements. This section also includes links to and posts about outside commentaries and analysis.

Special Commentary: The Obama Administration Notifies Taiwan’s F-16A/B Upgrade Program To Congress. Where Are The F-16C/Ds?

The US-Taiwan Business Council welcomes the news that the Obama Administration will proceed with a commitment to upgrade Taiwan’s present inventory of F-16 A/Bs at a possible cost of US$5.3 billion, the continuation of the Luke Air Force Base training program at a potential cost of US$500 million, and a requisition for up to US$52 million in parts for Taiwan’s F-16 A/Bs, F-5s, C-130s and IDFs. The congressional notifications are attached.

The Council welcomes the Obama Administration’s partial commitment to supporting Taiwan’s efforts to upgrade and modernize its air power capabilities. As we noted in our 2010 report “The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait”, Taiwan certainly needs to implement a robust mid-life retrofit/modernization program for its existing fleet of F-16 A/Bs. The FMS programs notified to Congress today will help Taiwan address diminishing manufacturing sources and obsolescence issues, improve reliability and maintainability, improve survivability, and update aircraft capabilities to remain abreast of current mission requirements.

Upgraded F-16 A/Bs Are Not Enough to Face the Threat from China

A recent U.S. Department of Defense report states that “China has continued to develop a wide range of weapons and capabilities designed to provide credible military options in a Taiwan contingency.” The report goes on to note that the military threat posed by China to Taiwan continues to grow rapidly.

The Taiwan Air Force is therefore in dire need of a robust and modern fighter fleet in order to prepare for all possible contingencies. The upgrade of Taiwan’s F-16 A/Bs will go some way towards moving the Taiwan Air Force in the right direction, if the upgraded fighters are equipped with modern systems and munitions.

However, with the Taiwan Air Force retiring its obsolete F-5s and prohibitively expensive Mirage 2000-5s, Taiwan will still fall perilously short of the airframes it requires to maintain an adequate air defense force, even with the scheduled upgrade. This shortfall is inherently destabilizing, and if not addressed it will threaten the military balance in the Taiwan Strait and encourage Chinese adventurism in the coming years.

Unnamed Obama Administration officials have been stating – as they did in the Wall Street Journal yesterday – “Taiwan gets them quicker and they are cheaper than C/Ds”.

This is a false statement. The upgrade program is comprehensive, but spans almost 10 years with the first upgraded A/B coming as late as the 6th year of the program. If the Obama Administration were to accept a Letter of Request for 66 F-16 C/Ds now, the entire tranche of new fighters could be delivered before Taiwan receives any of its upgraded F-16 A/Bs.

Secondly, the Obama Administration is suggesting that the choice was between either the F-16 A/B upgrade or the F-16 C/Ds. Again, this is a false choice. It is not either but both programs that are required. The correct approach would have both programs running sequentially, so that as new F-16 C/Ds are delivered to Taiwan – before Taiwan starts pulling front line F-16 A/Bs out of operations – there will be no degradation of Taiwan’s fighter strength. As presently structured, Taiwan will actually see a reduction in the number of operational F-16s over the next 10 years.

The solution to this shortfall is the sale of 66 F-16 C/D fighters to Taiwan, as a follow up and in addition to the announced upgrade of Taiwan’s existing fleet of A/Bs. Together, these two programs would help Taiwan adequately fill the fighter gap, and would ensure that Taiwan has an air force capable of deterring China from provoking or attacking it. A fighter force able to handle all of Taiwan’s many contingencies.

The Council comments on Congressional Notifications for Taiwan Arms Sales:

Special Commentary: The Obama Administration Notifies Taiwan’s F-16 A/B Upgrade Program To Congress. Where Are The F-16 C/Ds?

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/council-commentary-obama-administration-notifies-taiwans-f-16ab-upgrade-program-to-congress-where-are-the-f-16cds/

Special Commentary: The American Defense Commitment to Taiwan Continues to Deteriorate

America’s security relationship with Taiwan is both multi-tiered and comprehensive, and reaches far beyond arms sales to include myriad defense services and exchanges. Such military-to-military networking is vital to Taiwan’s ability to keep pace with modern defense training and with current tactical and strategic thinking. Nevertheless, such behind-the-scenes exchanges are merely one component of the security relationship. It is disingenuous to suggest, as some do, that because these exchanges are taking place, the U.S. security commitment is healthy. If other components – such as providing Taiwan with much needed new and modern equipment – are missing, the U.S. commitment remains incomplete.

2010 started off strong on Taiwan defense issues, with the January 29 Congressional notification of 5 separate arms sales programs. While the dollar value for these notifications was high – a combined US$6.4 billion – the programs themselves were not intrinsically controversial, as the bulk of the money went to Black Hawk utility helicopters and PAC-III missile defense batteries. These notifications represented the final significant parts of President George W. Bush’s April 2001 arms package – with the exception of diesel-electric submarines. In August of 2010, a second and much smaller package – less than US$250 million – of Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) programs were notified to Congress. Once again, these programs were not controversial, and pertained to upgrading the radars on Taiwan’s indigenous defense fighters.

Now, for the first time in 10 years, the Obama Administration has the opportunity to move forward and to ask new and important questions about Taiwan’s defensive needs and about the future of U.S. security support for Taiwan. To aid with this task, in May 2010 the US-Taiwan Business Council released a report entitled “The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait.” The Council’s report makes numerous significant recommendations to those concerned with Taiwan security policy – including to our own political and military leadership – on how to address the growing military imbalance in the Taiwan Strait.

Throughout 2010, numerous other analysts and observers also expressed their opinions on the direction that Taiwan should take on defense going forward. The overall consensus was that Taiwan isn’t spending enough on national security. The Council forecasts that Taiwan’s direct defense expenditures will reach only 2.16% of GDP in 2011, a figure that rises to 2.73% if you include non-direct defense expenditures. This percentage could even fall below 2% if Taiwan’s economic expansion continues to gather steam, falling far short of President Ma Ying-jeou’s campaign commitment to spend a minimum of 3% of GDP on Taiwan’s defense.

Moreover, the consensus was also that the United States needs to accelerate and de-politicize the political process for evaluating required capabilities for Taiwan, and for notifying to Congress the programs addressing those needs. In November 2010, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) released a statement noting that since 2007 they have had to return over US$1.4 billion to Taiwan’s treasury as a consequence of U.S. indecision on arms sales. America’s recent inability to offer timely notifications of programs is therefore having a material impact on Taiwan’s ability to fund its self defense.

The US-Taiwan Business Council comments on the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan:

Special Commentary: The American Defense Commitment to Taiwan Continues to Deteriorate (PDF)

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/council-commentary-the-american-defense-commitment-to-taiwan-continues-to-deteriorate/

Wall Street Journal Editorial on Chinese Opposition to Taiwan Arms Sales

America’s defense relationship with Taiwan is again causing friction in Washington’s dealings with Beijing. Earlier this month China rejected a request from U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates to visit the mainland, citing recent U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. He rightly noted the sales issue is “far from new in this relationship.” But the fact is that the U.S.-Taiwan security relationship has never been more vulnerable, and the Chinese know it—and are taking advantage of the situation.

The key U.S.-Taiwan problem is that Washington has made changes in its process for selling arms to Taiwan that increase incentives for Beijing to raise a fuss. Traditionally, the U.S. had announced Taiwan weapons sales as the deals were completed, regardless of the condition of broader U.S.-China ties at that moment. Yet starting under the Bush administration in 2008, the State Department was allowed to sit on deals before announcing them to the Congress. State would wait for the “least worst time” to release the details; the yardstick for measuring “least worst time” would be the state of relations with China.

This change was part of an attempt to reduce Chinese objections to arms sales by announcing them only during periods of less intense bilateral U.S.-China activity—the idea being to avoid rocking the boat ahead of summits or amid negotiations where the U.S. hoped to cooperate on other, generally unrelated, issues with China. However, institutionalizing such concern over China’s reaction to Taiwan arms sales has had the effect of giving the Chinese greater leverage over how the U.S. implements its security commitment to Taiwan. Meanwhile, as high-level bilateral exchanges continue to multiply the windows available for vital arms sales narrow. Arms sales effectively froze during part of 2008 and again in 2009.

Not surprisingly, Beijing is trying to take advantage of this new opportunity to shape events. The mere rumor of an impending package in early January of this year led to increasingly shrill rhetoric from China. When the package was finally released later in the month, China threatened unspecified penalties for U.S. companies involved in the sales, as well as damage to bilateral initiatives such as cooperation on Iran and climate change. Beijing has not backed up any of these threats with action, at least not yet. But the fact that threats were made at all shows that far from smoothing the water, Washington’s new strategy creates incentives for Beijing to act out.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers comments on Chinese opposition to Taiwan arms sales in an editorial in The Wall Street Journal.

Editorial: “Take China Out of the Driver’s Seat on Taiwan” (PDF)

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/council-wall-street-journal-editorial-on-chinese-opposition-to-taiwan-arms-sales/

US-Taiwan Business Council Releases Major Report Examining the Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait

Report Cover: The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait

Report Cover: The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait

Executive Summary

Taiwan’s relationship with China continues to improve and expand. Yet the eroding cross-Strait military balance must be redressed so that Taiwan can approach the political dialogue from a position of confidence and strength.

Effective air defense is a crucial component if Taiwan is to mount a viable defense of the island. Taiwan’s current air defenses comprise 18 fighter squadrons with a nominal strength of 387 combat aircraft of U.S., French, and indigenous origins: 145 F-16A/Bs, 126 F-CK-1A/Bs, 56 Mirage 2000-5s, and 60 F-5E/Fs. All of these are reasonably modern “Fourth Generation” fighters with BVR AAM capability, with the F-5s – which are mainly used for operational conversion training with only a secondary combat role – as the exception.

The Taiwan Air Force (TAF) also controls ground-based air defense forces in the form of over 25 medium/long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, using a mix of U.S. and indigenous missile systems (I-HAWK, Patriot, and Tien Kung-I/II). TAF has three existing PAC-2+ batteries (currently being upgraded) and is in the process of procuring 6 additional operational Patriot systems, for a total of 9 active PAC-3 batteries. There are also a number of short-range air defense SAM and gun systems, as well as field air defense assets operated by Taiwan’s ground forces.

In addition, Taiwan has a sophisticated integrated air defense command & control (C2) system, together with a modern network of ground-based surveillance radars and E-2 AEW&C aircraft. The air defense C2 infrastructure is currently being hardened, further modernized, and integrated with new capabilities such as the Link 16 datalink and the Surveillance Radar Program (SRP).

Taiwan’s air defense forces confront a unique threat environment involving long-range SAMs and over 1,300 tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), which could – in concert with manned strike aircraft, UAV, information warfare/electronic warfare and Special Operations Forces (SOF) attacks – threaten their bases and C2 installations. To defend against an integrated Chinese air campaign, Taiwan is investing heavily in active missile defense, BMC3I, and early-warning capabilities. But the runways at TAF air bases are vulnerable, and damaged runways could disable defensive air operations.

Block obsolescence is also a clear and present challenge to the TAF. Its F-5 fleet is nearing the end of its useful structurally-permitted service life, and is slated to retire by 2014. In addition, the actual number of airworthy twin-seat F-5Fs was reduced to just four aircraft in 2009. This shortfall is impacting lead-in fighter training (LIFT) for new pilots, and could erode pilot quality and operational readiness over time. Similarly, Taiwan will also need to address block obsolescence and reliability issues of its I-HAWK SAM systems.

Taiwan does not currently have a cost-effective means to address TAF’s fighter capability shortfall caused by F-5 obsolescence. Taiwan’s Mirage 2000 fleet suffers from very high Operations & Maintenance (O&M) costs and chronically low availability rates. The TAF poured substantial funding into addressing the Mirage issues over the past two years, leading to recent improvements in material readiness. But a tight O&M budget situation will almost certainly ensure a relapse into low Mirage material readiness over the next few years. Taiwan may resort to mothballing part of the fleet to conserve resources, and the combination of F-5 obsolescence and strained Mirage supportability will create a substantial shortfall of fighter aircraft for the TAF.

Meanwhile, China continues to aggressively introduce large numbers of modern combat aircraft into service. China currently deploys more than 700 combat aircraft within operational range of Taiwan, with hundreds more in ready reserve. These include over 500 very modern aircraft (Su-27, Su-30, J-10, JH-7), which are roughly comparable to TAF’s “Fourth Generation” aircraft types (F-16A/Bs, Mirage 2000-5s, F-CK-1A/Bs).

Conversely, TAF fighter strength is projected to decline to only around 300 aircraft by 2014-2015, and thus China will easily be able to array a better than 2:1 numerical superiority. Taiwan will then no longer have the number of combat aircraft necessary to meet the requirements for defending its air space from Chinese military threat.

The significant quantitative decline in air defense capability that Taiwan is expected to experience over the next several years could also have a profound and enduring impact by eroding the already marginal qualitative edge still held by Taiwan. Lessons from past Taiwan Strait crises have demonstrated the importance of Taiwan maintaining a qualitative edge against China, not only to prevail in conflict but also to strengthen deterrence.

The inability to provide timely replacements of obsolete equipment and/or prevent further deterioration in material readiness could result in Taiwan permanently losing its traditional edge in training and experience. Thus the current situation is both widening the quantitative gap in the cross-Strait power balance, and narrowing TAF’s qualitative edge in aircraft performance and pilot training/experience.

The principal mission requirements for the TAF are Combat Air Patrol (CAP), Defensive Counter-Air (DCA), Maritime Strike/Anti-Invasion, and Missile Defense (TBM/LACM). To carry out these missions, TAF will need a modern fighter aircraft with sufficient aerodynamic performance, BVR missile capability, and payload/range performance to effectively counter the expected Chinese aerial threats. Taiwan will also need upgraded SAM systems to engage TBMs and LACMs.

A review of the operational scenarios indicates that Taiwan’s current air defense forces are only marginally capable of meeting the island’s air defense needs. With effective fighter strength weakened by a combination of obsolescence of the F-5E/F fleet, low material availability of the Mirage 2000-5 aircraft, and obsolescence/declining reliability of I-HAWK SAM systems, Taiwan’s ability to defend its air space against likely threat scenarios can be expected to significantly deteriorate over the next few years.

TAF urgently needs to procure new combat aircraft to compensate for the significant loss in operational fighter strength projected over the next 5 years. The fighter gap, if not bridged in a timely manner, could solidify cross-Strait military imbalance in favor of China. That would both undermine deterrence and expose Taiwan to Chinese political extortion as the two sides move towards political dialogue.

A suitable candidate aircraft has to possess sufficiently high performance, BVR capability, and payload/range characteristics to conduct the CAP/DCA and maritime-strike/anti-invasion missions. Such aircraft also need to be supportable beyond 2025 and be export-releasable to Taiwan.

Given these criteria, the aircraft best suited to Taiwan’s current needs is the F-16C/D. Taiwan has been seeking U.S. approval for the sale of 66 new F-16C/D Block 50/52 fighters since 2006, but has been repeatedly discouraged by the U.S. Government to formally submit the associated Letter of Request (LOR). With the last F-16s under contract slated to be delivered at the end of 2013 – and given the 36-month manufacturing lead time – the production could be forced to close before a decision is made. Thus the window for Taiwan to purchase new-built F-16s is closing rapidly.

Another measure that could help address Taiwan’s predicament could include adopting a more rigorous, disciplined, life-cycle cost-based approach to force modernization planning and force management. Taiwan needs to implement a robust mid-life retrofit/modernization (MLU) program for its existing fleet of F-16A/B and F-CK-1A/B fighters, to address DMS/obsolescence issues, improve reliability/maintainability, improve survivability, and update aircraft capabilities.

Taiwan should exercise farsighted MLU investment choices in such systems as radar, electronic warfare systems, power plants, mission avionics, and air-launched weapons. Examples of such capabilities could include an active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar and an upgraded engine, which could provide force-multiplying capabilities by significantly enhancing engagement capability per platform.

Taiwan should also consider further improving its ground-based air defense capability, through a combination of acquiring additional PAC-3 and other mobile SAM systems, upgrading existing I-HAWK batteries, and introducing mobile, low-altitude air defense systems. Other major force-multipliers for Taiwan would be a modern, integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability, and additional investment in electronic warfare and information warfare (EW/IW) capabilities.

In addition to (and in combination with) maintaining a critical mass of air defense fighter capability and ground-based air defenses, Taiwan can also consider more asymmetrical approaches to the problem of integrated air defense, including passive defense measures (e.g. redundancy, dispersal, camouflage/deception, hardening, and rapid repair capabilities) and counter-strike capability (LACM, ARM, standoff-attack weapons).

In summary, Taiwan is facing a pressing fighter requirement that can best be met through acquisition of F-16C/D Block 50/52 aircraft from the United States. Taiwan can further strengthen its air defenses by investing intelligently in MLU programs for its F-16A/B and F-CK-1A/B fighters; by deploying more mobile SAM systems, upgrading existing I-HAWK batteries, and pushing ahead with its new low-altitude air defense system program; by developing advanced, integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities; and by adopting a number of asymmetrical measures.

A modernized and capable Taiwan air force could play an important and constructive role supporting U.S. forces in the event of a confrontation with China over Taiwan. In contrast, an absence of credible Taiwan airpower could accentuate U.S. vulnerabilities and negatively influence U.S. power-projection in the Pacific.

In addition, a stronger and more secure Taiwan can be expected to be more confident in its political dialogue with China, which could ultimately lead to a peaceful resolution of the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Such an outcome would certainly serve the national interest of the United States.

The U.S. can and should assist Taiwan in implementing these measures, to help strengthen deterrence and to support peace and stability in the region. Improving Taiwan’s defense capability will also help reinforce the positive steps that Taipei has taken in lowering cross-Strait tensions and expanding ties with Beijing.

This major report examining the cross-Strait balance of air power and Taiwan’s major air defense requirements is available on the US-Taiwan Business Council website:

“The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait” (PDF)
Key Report Graphic: Available Airframes Through 2025

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/council-releases-major-report-examining-the-balance-of-air-power-in-the-taiwan-strait/

Special Commentary: US-Taiwan Business Council Welcomes Congressional Notification of Sales to Taiwan of PAC-3 Missile Units, BLACK HAWK Helicopters, OSPREY Ships, HARPOON Missiles and MIDS/LVT-1 Terminals

The US-Taiwan Business Council welcomes Congressional Notification of Arms Sales to Taiwan

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the Obama Administration’s decision to notify Congress of the following arms sales programs for Taiwan, with a total value of US$6.392 billion:

  • 114 PATRIOT Advanced Capability (PAC-3) Missiles, 3 AN/MPQ-65 Radar Sets and Other Related Equipment & Services [US$2.81 billion]
  • 60 UH-60M BLACK HAWK Helicopters, With Technical & Logistics Support [US$3.1 billion]
  • 2 OSPREY Class Mine Hunting Ships, Including Refurbishment & Upgrade [US$105 million]
  • 10 RTM-84L HARPOON Block II Telemetry Missiles, 2 ATM-84L HARPOON Block II Telemetry Missiles, and Other Related Equipment & Services [US$37 million]
  • 35 Multifunctional Information Distribution Systems Low Volume Terminals (MIDS/LVT-1), with 25 MIDS On Ships Terminals and Other Related Equipment & Support [US$340 million]

The submarine “design phase” notification was not included and remains in limbo. Details on these arms sales programs are available via the DSCA website.

The United States provides Taiwan with these modern defensive weapons not as a goal in and of itself. It is China’s actions – its massive military expansion and modernization, and the commensurate imbalance it creates in the Taiwan Strait – that prompt this U.S. response.

Releasing these programs represents a step forward in the ongoing process of providing Taiwan with weapons systems for its own self defense. The Black Hawk program is particularly welcome, as Taiwan’s need for replacement helicopters is acute both for military and disaster relief operations. Given the aftermath of Typhoon Morakot this past August, it is evident that Black Hawks will offer a significant upgrade to the Taiwan military’s ability to assist citizens in times of national emergency.

While we welcome these notifications, the Council nevertheless remains concerned about the continued stacking of multiple congressional notifications into groups, as well as the increased stretches of time between such notification packages.

Special Commentary: US-Taiwan Business Council Welcomes Congressional Notification of Sales to Taiwan of PAC-3 Missile Units, BLACK HAWK Helicopters, OSPREY Ships, HARPOON Missiles and MIDS/LVT-1 Terminals (PDF)

Related DSCA Notices

 

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/council-welcomes-congressional-notification-of-arms-sales-to-taiwan/

Defense News Editorial on Cross-Strait Detente

Early last month, several of Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense officials met with the Legislative Yuan’s Foreign and National Defense Committee. During his testimony, Chang Liang-jen, vice minister of national defense, noted that Taiwan’s defense procurement budget will be reduced as a result of the planned move to an all-volunteer force. He did not state whether that reduction is simply through the transition period or a long-term adjustment.

The move to an all-volunteer force is not the only pressure on Taiwan’s defense budget. Taiwan’s economy is expected to contract by 6 percent to 7 percent in 2009, and it is likely that defense spending will come under extensive budgetary pressures as the government of President Ma Ying-jeou seeks to allocate greater resources to social welfare and industrial development.

The contraction will allow Ma to claim that he is maintaining his commitment to spending 3 percent of GDP on defense. But as a practical matter, we would likely see a significant and real drop in defense spending.

Such a reduction in resources, and the slowing in Taiwan force modernization that comes with it, could seriously jeopardize the ability of the Ma government to place Taiwan’s relations with China on firm and sustainable footing.

Ma enjoys high support for his country’s policies toward China not as a goal unto itself, but as part of a broader strategy to improve Taiwan’s international profile and operating space.

Yet China continues to hedge on its Taiwan policy. China is continuing its force modernization efforts, and the People’s Liberation Army remains focused on ensuring its ability to coerce Taiwan while deterring U.S. intervention. The Chinese feel a need for options, including military ones.

Ma is therefore wholly beholden to the willingness of the Chinese to continue to provide Taiwan with greater international breathing room. If the Chinese balk or fail to make material concessions, domestic support for Ma’s policies will erode. The prospect of a chastened Ma government and a China frustrated over another failed strategy is deeply troubling. This is a contingency that should not be overlooked.

Conversely, Taiwan’s negotiating position is strengthened immeasurably by a robust U.S. security commitment; it underpins Ma’s outreach and ensures a degree of Chinese respect for Taiwan’s options. This is an essential component if Taiwan-China detente is to have legs and if Ma is to build enough momentum to ride out the rougher patches that are sure to come.

Editorial in Defense News – “Detente Needs Muscle: Taiwan Modernization Underpins Chinese Dealings”

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/council-defense-news-editorial-on-cross-strait-detente/

Defense News Editorial on Taiwan Arms Sales

When the U.S. State Department notified Congress Oct. 3 of a proposed $6.4 billion arms package offering a range of defensive weaponry to Taiwan, the sheer scope and cost of the package caught everyone’s attention.

Yet the package has a history dating back to 2001, and these notifications were both incomplete and well past due. The U.S. administration has drifted away from long-established policy in dealing with Taiwan during this time, and it only undercuts American interests in Asia.

U.S. President George W. Bush released a number of items for sale to Taiwan in April 2001 that were seen as crucial to Taiwan’s military modernization, thus fulfilling an important role in U.S. obligations to provide for Taiwan’s self-defense under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). That decision was based on counsel from all parties in the U.S. interagency process, as well as on Taiwan’s own assessment of its defense needs.

Taiwan bears equal responsibility for the seven-year impasse over arms sales, given its domestic political wrangling over the arms budget. Nevertheless, the budgets for these systems were passed in Taiwan in 2007, with eight pending congressional notifications starting to roll into the State Department from the Defense Department in early 2008.

While the notification package sent to Capitol Hill was welcome as a positive step in an otherwise troubled relationship, it omitted Black Hawk utility helicopters for logistics and humanitarian support, well as some of the requested Patriot anti-missile systems and a submarine design program.

It also took more than seven months for the notifications to accumulate – an unprecedented action irrespective of Bush administration claims that this was part of “a normal interagency process.” There is simply no existing example of notifications being stacked at the State Department in such a manner.

Editorial in Defense News – “Taiwan Arms: 2 Steps Back, 1 Step Forward” (PDF)

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/council-defense-news-editorial-on-taiwan-arms-sales/

Special Commentary: Taiwan Congressional Notifications Released

The US-Taiwan Business Council comments on Congressional Notifications for Taiwan Arms Sales

While there has been a delay of over 7 months for 8 separate Congressional Notifications (CNs) for arms sales to Taiwan, on October 3 the U.S. Department of State released six items for notification: Javelin, Harpoon, spare aircraft parts, PAC-III, E-2T retrofit, and Apache. The total DSCA estimated cost is US$6.463 billion.

Two of the programs in the original request were omitted – the submarine Phase I design program and the Black Hawk program – while the PAC-III program was reduced. [The original request included the Harpoon anti-ship missiles; Apache helicopters (x30 units); PAC-III (x7 units, 6 operational batteries + 1 training battery); diesel-electric submarine design – Phase I; airplane spare parts (mostly for fighters); E-2T retrofit; UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopters (x60 units); and Javelin anti-vehicle missiles.]

It seems as if the Bush Administration’s intention today was to create an overall package based on a dollar figure. They viewed the Black Hawks as a large but not controversial program, and therefore it was one they could punt into 2009 with a degree of confidence that the incoming U.S. administration would not view it as controversial and would likely send it to the Hill. Omitting the submarines was not controversial within decision-making circles, and in the case of PAC-III it pared back the buy to reduce its overall cost.

The impasse over arms sales has done immeasurable damage to the U.S.-Taiwan relationship over the past several years, and these Congressional Notifications – while very late and incomplete – are an important and positive step forward in US-Taiwan relations. However, it has taken over 10 months for the notifications to accumulate – an unprecedented action irrespective of Bush Administration claims that this was part of a normal inter-agency process. There is simply no existing example of notifications being stacked in such a manner.

 

Special Commentary: Taiwan Congressional Notifications Released (PDF)
Related DSCA Notices (PDF)

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/council-comments-on-congressional-notifications-for-taiwan-arms-sales/

Special Commentary: Inconsistent U.S. Defense Priorities Undermine Taiwan Force Modernization

The US-Taiwan Business Council issues a statement commenting on Taiwan’s Counter-strike Missile Program and U.S. policy towards Taiwan Force Modernization

In the early part of 2007, the Bush Administration tacked a new course on Taiwan’s counter-strike missile program. The new heading was triggered by Ministry of National Defense testimony in the Legislative Yuan (LY) on the fiscal demands for further research, development, and limited deployment of the indigenous HF-2E counter-strike missile – over US$1 billion between 2008 and 2012.

The Bush Administration’s new direction vis-à-vis Taiwan’s counter-strike effort is driven by their increasingly negative view of Taiwan and of its role as a reliable partner in Asia. Rather than consider the tactical and strategic nature of such a capability, the Bush Administration has chosen to focus on the behavior of outgoing Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian as the principal driver for its cross-Strait threat assessment. It has become about politics, not about the balance of power across the Strait. Regrettably, this short term view is impacting programs that should play a critical role in Taiwan’s ability to counter a PRC attack well after President Chen has retired. The denial of a second batch of F-16s to replace aging Vietnam era platforms, and the turnaround on support for Taiwan’s counter-strike missile programs are at the forefront.

Editorial in Defense News (PDF)
Special Commentary: Inconsistent U.S. Defense Priorities Undermine Taiwan Force Modernization (PDF)

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/council-statement-on-taiwan-counter-strike-missiles-and-us-policy/

Statement in Support of House Resolution 676 (110th Congress)

The US-Taiwan Business Council states its position in support of House Resolution 676 (H.Res.676, 110th Congress, 2007-2008) on Taiwan Arms Sales and U.S. support for Taiwan’s legitimate national defense needs.

[The Council] supports the passage of H.Res.676 on the matter of U.S. support for Taiwan’s legitimate national defense needs, and specifically supports immediately allowing Taiwan to submit a Letter of Request (LOR) to the U.S. Department of Defense for Price and Availability (P&A) data for F-16C/D fighters.

Council Statement in Support of House Resolution 676 (PDF)

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