Tag: defense

Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2022

Update, December 27, 2021

On this date, U.S. President Joe Biden signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2022. The NDAA became Public Law No: 117-81.


Update, December 15, 2021

On this date, the U.S. Senate agreed to the House amendments in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (S.1605) by a Yea/Nay Vote of 88 – 11.

The NDAA 2022 now goes to the President’s desk to be signed.


Update, December 7, 2021

On this date, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (S.1605) was passed in the House by a Yea/Nay Vote of 363 – 70.

This legislation is substantially based on two bills: (1) H.R. 4350, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, which passed the House on September 23 by a vote of 316-113; and (2) S. 2792, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, which was approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 21 by a vote of 23-3. 
(source)

The December 7 version of the bill included multiple Taiwan provisions:

SEC. 1246. Sense of Congress on Taiwan Defense Relations

It is the sense of Congress that–
(1) the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation for United States-Taiwan relations;

(2) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes, is of grave concern to the United States;

(3) the increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the People’s Republic of China towards Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of a peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan;

(4) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan and the policy of the United States to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self- defense capability should be maintained; and

(5) the United States should continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, including by–
(A) supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales,
direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities that support the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan;
(B) ensuring timely review of and response to requests by Taiwan for defense articles and services;
(C) conducting practical training and military exercises with Taiwan, including, as appropriate, inviting Taiwan to participate in the Rim of the Pacific exercise conducted in 2022, that enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act;
(D) deepening interoperability with Taiwan in defensive capabilities, including maritime and air domain awareness and integrated air and missile defense systems;
(E) encouraging exchanges between defense officials and officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for the purposes of–
(i) enhancing cooperation on defense planning;
(ii) improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan; and
(iii) improving the reserve force of Taiwan;
(F) identifying improvements in Taiwan’s ability to use asymmetric military capabilities to enhance its defensive capabilities, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act; and
(G) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

SEC. 1247. Statement of Policy on Taiwan

a) Statement of Policy — Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et. seq.), it shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist a fait accompli that would jeopardize the security of the people on Taiwan.
(b) Definition — In this section, the term “fait accompli” refers to the resort to force by the People’s Republic of China to invade and seize control of Taiwan before the United States can respond effectively.

SEC. 1248. Annual Report on Taiwan Asymmetric Capabilities and Intelligence Support

(a) In General — The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall each year through fiscal year 2027, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3302(c)), perform an annual assessment of matters related to Taiwan, including intelligence matters, Taiwan’s asymmetric defensive capabilities, and how defensive shortcomings or vulnerabilities of Taiwan could be mitigated through cooperation, modernization, or integration. At a minimum, the assessment shall include the following:
(1) An intelligence assessment regarding–
(A) conventional military threats to Taiwan from China, including exercises intended to intimidate or coerce Taiwan; and
(B) irregular warfare activities, including influence operations, conducted by China to interfere in or undermine the peace and stability of the TaiwanStrait.
(2) The current defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan and the ability of Taiwan to defend itself from external conventional and irregular military threats.
(3) The interoperability of current and future defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan with the military capabilities of the United States and its allies and partners.
(4) The plans, tactics, techniques, and procedures underpinning the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan.
(5) A description of additional personnel, resources, and authorities in Taiwan or in the United States that may be required to meet any shortcomings in the development of Taiwan’s defensive capabilities identified pursuant to this section.
(6) The applicability of Department of Defense authorities for improving the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.
(7) The feasibility and advisability of assisting Taiwan in the domestic production of defensive asymmetric capabilities, including through the transfer of intellectual property, co- development, or co-production arrangements.
(8) An assessment of ways in which the United States could enhance cooperation with on intelligence matters with Taiwan.
(9) A description of any non-Department of Defense efforts by the United States Government to build the capacity of Taiwan to disrupt external efforts that degrade its free and democratic society.
(10) A description of any significant efforts by the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and other elements of the intelligence community to coordinate technical and material support for Taiwan to identify, disrupt, and combat influence operations referred to in this subsection.
(11) Any other matter the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

(b) Plan — The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall develop a
plan for assisting Taiwan in improving its defensive asymmetric capabilities and addressing vulnerabilities identified pursuant to subsection (a) that includes-
(1) recommendations for new Department of Defense authorities, or modifications to existing Department authorities, necessary to improve the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.);
(2) an identification of opportunities for key leader and subject matter expert engagement between Department personnel and military and civilian counterparts in Taiwan; and
(3) an identification of challenges and opportunities for leveraging non-Department authorities, resources, and capabilities to improve the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.

(c) Report — Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually through fiscal year 2027, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress-
(1) a report on the results of the assessment required by subsection (a); and
(2) the plan required by subsection (b).

(d) Form –The report required by subsection (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(e) Definitions — In this section:
(1) The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means–
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) The term “defensive asymmetric capabilities” means the capabilities necessary to defend Taiwan against conventional external threats, including coastal defense missiles, naval mines, anti-aircraft capabilities, cyber defenses, and special operations forces.

SEC. 1249. Feasibility Briefing on Cooperation Between the National Guard and Taiwan

(a) In General — Not later than February 15, 2022, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on the feasibility and advisability of enhanced cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan.

(b) Elements — The briefing required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A description of the cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan during the preceding calendar year, including mutual visits, exercises, training, and equipment opportunities.
(2) An evaluation of the feasibility of enhancing cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan on a range of activities, including –
(A) disaster and emergency response;
(B) cyber defense and communications security;
(C) military medical cooperation;
(D) Mandarin-language education and cultural exchange; and
(E) programs for National Guard advisors to assist in training the reserve components of the military forces of Taiwan.
(3) Recommendations to enhance such cooperation and improve interoperability, including through familiarization visits, cooperative training and exercises, and co-deployments.
(4) Any other matter the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate


Update, September 23, 2021

On this date, the U.S. House of Representatives passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (H.R.4350) by a Yea/Nay Vote of 316-113.

The passed text included 3 additional Taiwan-related amendments:

Floor 53, Rule 628
Directs the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a report on influence operations conducted by China to interfere in or undermine peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific Region and efforts by the U.S. to work with Taiwan to disrupt such operations.

Floor 59, Rule 616
Supports Taiwan’s investment in an asymmetric defense strategy by requiring a report with programmatic and policy options to support Taiwan’s defense budgeting and procurement process in a manner that facilitates sustained investment in capabilities aligned with Taiwan’s asymmetric defense strategy.

Floor 84, Rule 795
Requires the Secretary of Homeland Security and Secretary of Commerce to submit a report that includes an assessment of establishing a preclearance facility in Taiwan.


Update, September 17, 2021

On this date, the House Committee on Armed Services filed a supplemental report on the NDAA. The text of the supplemental report mentioned Taiwan in regards to Chinese Mine Warfare and on PLA Civilian Strategic Mobility Capacity. It also included two additional Taiwan-related items:

TITLE XII–MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS

Items of Special Interest

Report on Anti-Ship Systems for Defense of Taiwan

The committee supports the strategic partnership between the United States and Taiwan, and notes the importance of anti-ship systems in defending the territorial integrity of the Government of Taiwan. The committee further notes the urgent need for ground-based anti-ship cruise missiles, ground-based cruise missiles, and anti-ship mines to defend United States and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific against growing threats and deter conflict in the region.

The committee strongly supports an effort to expand defense industrial cooperation with the Government of Taiwan. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees a report by January 31, 2022, on what anti-ship systems and capabilities in the extant U.S. military hardware inventory might be used to enhance the defense of Taiwan, and plans on how these systems and capabilities could be incorporated into the current military of the Government of Taiwan to enhance their self-defense capabilities.

Report on Engaging Taiwan in Indo-Pacific Regional Dialogues or Forums

The committee recognizes the value of Taiwan-U.S. relations, and the importance Taiwan plays in the Indo-Pacific region. As such, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the House Committee on Armed Services by March 1, 2022, on the Department of Defense’s plan to meaningfully engage Taiwan in regional security dialogues or forums that shall include the following:

    (1) An assessment of list of security regional dialogues or forums that would fit for Taiwan’s participation.

    (2) A discussion of current and future plans to achieve engaging Taiwan in regional security dialogues or forums.

    (3) An evaluation of the feasibility of cooperating on a range of activities with the aforementioned security dialogues or forums, including: (a) humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief; (b) supply chain security; (c) cyber security; (d) coast guard; and (e) any other matters the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate.


Update, September 10, 2021

On this date, the NDAA, as H.R.4350, was reported (amended) in the House by the House Committee on Armed Services.

The text included three provisions for enhancing the defense and security cooperation between the United States and Taiwan:

SEC. 1243. Report on Cooperation Between the National Guard and Taiwan

(a) Report – Not later than February 15, 2022, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to appropriate congressional committees a report on the feasibility and advisability of enhanced cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan. Such report shall include the following:

(1) A description of the cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan during the 10 preceding calendar years,
including mutual visits, exercises, training, and equipment opportunities.

(2) An evaluation of the feasibility and advisability of enhancing cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan on a range of activities, including-
(A) disaster and emergency response;
(B) cyber defense and communications security;
(C) military medical cooperation;
(D) cultural exchange and education of members of the National Guard in Mandarin Chinese; and
(E) programs for National Guard advisors to assist in training the reserve components of the military forces of Taiwan.

(3) Recommendations to enhance such cooperation and improve interoperability, including through familiarization visits, cooperative training and exercises, and co-deployments.

(4) Any other matter the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate.

(b) Appropriate Congressional Committees.–In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means-
(1) the congressional defense committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

SEC. 1247. Sense of Congress on Taiwan Defense Relations

It is the sense of Congress that
(1) the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C.3301 et seq.) and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation for United States-Taiwan relations;

(2) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes, is of grave concern to the United States;

(3) the increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the People’s Republic of China toward Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of the peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan;

(4) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan should be maintained;

(5) the United States should continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, including by–
(A) supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities that support the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan, including anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and resilient command and control capabilities;
(B) ensuring timely review of and response to requests of Taiwan for defense articles and services;
(C) conducting practical training and military exercises with Taiwan that enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self- defense capability, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act;
(D) exchanges between defense officials and officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for the purposes of–
(i) enhancing cooperation on defense planning;
(ii) improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan; and
(iii) improving the reserve force of Taiwan;
(E) identifying improvements in Taiwan’s ability to use asymmetric military capabilities to enhance its defensive capabilities, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act; and
(F) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and

(6) the United States should be committed to the defense of a free and open society in the face of aggressive efforts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to curtail or influence the free exercise of rights and democratic franchise.

SEC. 1248. Sense of Congress on Inviting Taiwan to the Rim of the Pacific Exercise.

It is the sense of Congress that the naval forces of Taiwan should be invited to participate in the Rim of the Pacific exercise conducted in 2022.


July 21, 2021

On this date, the NDAA 2022, as S. 2792, was approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee by a vote of 23-3. 

The text included three Taiwan provisions:

SEC. 1245. Assessment of and Plan for Improving the Defensive Asymmetric Capabilities of Taiwan

(a) Assessment – The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall conduct an assessment of –
(1) the current defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan and the ability of Taiwan to defend itself from external conventional military threats;
(2) the applicability of Department of Defense authorities for improving the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.);
(3) the feasibility and advisability of assisting Taiwan in the domestic production of defensive asymmetric capabilities, including through the transfer of intellectual property, co-development, or co-production arrangements;
(4) the plans, tactics, techniques, and procedures underpinning the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan;
(5) the interoperability of current and future defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan with the military capabilities of the United States and its allies and partners; and
(6) any other matter the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

(b) Plan – The Secretary of Defense shall develop a plan for assisting Taiwan in improving its defensive asymmetric capabilities that includes –
(1) recommendations for new Department of Defense authorities, or modifications to existing Department authorities, necessary to improve the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.);
(2) an identification of opportunities for key leader and subject matter expert engagement between Department personnel and military and civilian counterparts in Taiwan; and
(3) an identification of challenges and opportunities for leveraging non-Department authorities, resources, and capabilities to improve the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.).

(c) Report – Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress-(1) a report on the results of the assessment required by subsection (a); and
(2) the plan required by subsection (b).

(d) Definitions – In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress – The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means –
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) Defensive asymmetric capabilities.–The term “defensive asymmetric capabilities” means the capabilities necessary to defend Taiwan against conventional external threats, including coastal defense missiles, naval mines, anti-aircraft capabilities, cyber defenses, and special operations forces.

SEC. 1246. Annual Feasibility Briefing on Cooperation Between the National Guard and Taiwan

(a) Sense of Congress — It is the sense of Congress that the United States should —
(1) continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability by increasing exchanges between senior defense officials and general officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and
functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for the purposes of –
(A) improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan;
(B) improving the reserve forces of Taiwan; and
(C) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief;
(2) expand and strengthen Taiwan’s capability to conduct security activities, including traditional activities of the combatant commands, cooperation with the National Guard, and through multilateral activities; and
(3) using appropriate authorities and consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), seek to develop a partnership between the National Guard and Taiwan as a means of maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability.

(b) Briefing —
(1) In general — Not later than February 15, 2022, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on the feasibility and advisability of enhanced cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan.
(2) Elements — Each briefing required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) A description of the cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan during the preceding calendar year, including mutual visits, exercises, training, and equipment opportunities.
(B) An evaluation of the feasibility of enhancing cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan on a range of activities, including–
(i) disaster and emergency response;
(ii) cyber defense and communications security;
(iii) military medical cooperation;
(iv) Mandarin-language education and cultural exchange; and
(v) programs for National Guard advisors to assist in training the reserve components of the military forces of Taiwan.
(C) Recommendations to enhance such cooperation and improve interoperability, including through familiarization visits, cooperative training and exercises, and co-deployments.
(D) Any other matter the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

SEC. 1247. Defense of Taiwan

(a) Definitions — In this section:
(1) Deny — The term “deny” means to use combined joint operations to delay, degrade, and ultimately defeat an attempt by the People’s Republic of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan, resulting in–
(A) the termination of hostilities or at least the attempted fait accompli; or
(B) the neutralization of the ability of the People’s Republic of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan.
(2) Fait accompli — The term “fait accompli” refers to the strategy of the People’s Republic of China for invading and seizing control of Taiwan before the United States Armed Forces can respond effectively, while simultaneously deterring an effective combined joint response by the United States Armed Forces by convincing the United States that mounting such a response would be prohibitively difficult or costly.

(b) Statement of Policy — It shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli against Taiwan in order to deter the People’s Republic of China from using military force to unilaterally change the status quo with Taiwan.


July 2, 2021

The NDAA 2022, as H.R.4350, was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on July 2, 2021.


Previous Posts

Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2021

Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2020

Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2019

Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2018

Taiwan Initiative in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2017

Proposed Taiwan Initiatives in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2016

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/taiwan-in-the-national-defense-authorization-act-ndaa-2022/

October 10-12, 2021 – US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2021

Event: US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2021
October 10-12, 2021
Leesburg, Virginia

www.taiwandefenseconference.com

The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2021 will be held October 10-12, 2021 at the Lansdowne Resort in Leesburg, Virginia. We are currently planning to host this event in person. This will be the 20th annual event in a series of ongoing conferences addressing the future of U.S. defense cooperation with Taiwan, the defense procurement process, and Taiwan’s defense and national security needs.

This year, the conference will open with a discussion on the evolving threat in the Taiwan Strait. The opening session will examine how the threat picture for Taiwan is changing, given that the PRC is intensifying its threat posture towards Taiwan and intensifying its incursions into the Taiwan Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). We will also discuss how Taiwan, the U.S., and their regional allies could potentially respond.

The second session will examine the big picture of Taiwan’s overarching defense strategy. As the overarching approach drives both policy and acquisitions, this session will discuss current strategic thinking in Taiwan. We will also consider the U.S. view of that approach, and how reconciling differences could provide insights into areas ripe for further development and cooperation. The third session will discuss national security as a whole-of-society approach, including ways to enhance supply chain security, how to leverage public/private partnerships to support defensive priorities, and how civic defense and civic mobilization could help Taiwan enhance deterrence and improve resilience.

The fourth session will consider how the two sides are continuing to explore ways to deepen business relationships in the defense sector. Building on the discussion at the June 2021 Taiwan-U.S. Defense Business Forum, this session will focus on new approaches to bind the defense industries on both sides closer together, as well as to support future defense and security cooperation efforts.

The fifth and final session will discuss how the Taiwan defense industrial base has continued to develop, and will examine some past and current programs where the U.S. and Taiwan have cooperated to support indigenous production of key systems for the Taiwan military. The panel will discuss how to build on what has worked in the past, and how to surface ideas and opportunities for potential future collaboration.

The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference website is at www.taiwandefenseconference.com

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/october-10-12-2021-us-taiwan-defense-industry-conference-2021/

June 7, 2021 – Virtual Taiwan-US Defense Business Forum

The US-Taiwan Business Council and the Taiwan Defense Industry Development Association (TW-DIDA) will co-host the virtual 2021 Taiwan-US Defense Business Forum (台美國防產業論壇) on June 7, 2021 to discuss granular issues of bilateral cooperation in the defense industry supply chain.

This year, we will discuss ways to expand U.S.-Taiwan co-development and co-production in the defense sector beyond a strict seller/buyer relationship, as well as potential new ways for U.S. companies to interact with the Taiwan-based defense community. We will also talk about U.S.-Taiwan cybersecurity cooperation.

Please see the event information page on www.us-taiwan.org to learn more and to apply to attend.

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/2021-virtual-taiwan-us-defense-business-forum/

Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2021

Update, January 1, 2021

On this date, the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act 2021 became Public Law No: 116-283.

On this date, the NDAA 2021 passed in the Senate, overriding the veto by a Yea-Nay vote of 81-13 (the required 2/3 affirmation).

Update, December 28, 2020

On this date, the NDAA 2021 passed in the House, overriding the veto by a Yea-Nay vote of 322-87 (the required 2/3 affirmation).

Update, December 23, 2020

On this date, the Enrolled Bill was vetoed by the President. The bill is now passed to the House and Senate for a vote.

Update, December 11, 2020

On this date, the conference report was agreed to in the Senate by a Yea/Nay Vote of 84-13.

On this date, Congress also submitted the 2021 NDAA to the President for signature. The following Taiwan-related language was included in the enrolled version of the bill:

SEC. 1260. Statement of Policy and Sense of Congress on the Taiwan Relations Act

(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States—
(1) that the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation for United States-Taiwan relations;

(2) to fully pursue the deepening of the extensive, close, and friendly relations of the United States and Taiwan pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), the intent of which is to facilitate greater cooperation and the broadening and deepening of United States-Taiwan relations;

(3) that the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) shall be implemented and executed, consistent with the Six Assurances, to address evolving political, security, and economic dynamics and circumstances;

(4) that, as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes, is a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;

(5) that the increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the People’s Republic of China towards Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of the peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan; and

(6) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), to maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the United States should continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, including by—
(A) supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities that support the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan, including anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and resilient command and control capabilities;
(B) ensuring timely review of and response to requests of Taiwan for defense articles and services;
(C) conducting practical training and military exercises with Taiwan that enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;
(D) examining the potential for expanding professional military education and technical training opportunities in the United States for military personnel of Taiwan;
(E) increasing exchanges between senior defense officials and general officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for the purposes of—
(i) enhancing cooperation on defense planning;
(ii) improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan; and
(iii) improving the reserve force of Taiwan; and
(F) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief;

(2) the Secretary of State should ensure that any policy guidance related to United States-Taiwan relations is fully consistent with the statement of policy set forth in subsection (a);

(3) the Secretary of Defense should ensure that policy guidance related to United States-Taiwan defense relations is fully consistent with the statement of policy set forth in subsection (a); and

(4) the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other Federal agencies and departments, as appropriate, should issue new guidance as required to carry out such policy.

SEC. 1260A. Annual Briefing on Taiwan Arms Sales

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, or his or her designee, shall brief the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on the United States commitment to supporting Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self defense capability, as required by the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and affirmed in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 3301 note).

(b) ELEMENTS.—Each briefing required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A description of United States efforts to implement section 209(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 3301 note) by conducting regular transfers to Taiwan of defense articles tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats from the People’s Republic of China, including any effort to support Taiwan in the development and integration into its military forces of asymmetric capabilities, as appropriate, including mobile, survivable, and cost-effective capabilities.

(2) A description of the role of such transfers of defense articles and services in supporting Taiwan in maintaining the capabilities, readiness levels, and resourcing necessary to fulfill and implement Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept.

(3) A description of—
(A) United States efforts to conduct a regularized process for consideration of transfers of defense articles and services to Taiwan; and
(B) any barriers to conducting such a process.
(c) SUNSET.—This section shall cease to have effect on December 31, 2026.

SEC. 1260B. Report On United States-Taiwan Medical Security Partnership

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on the feasibility of establishing a medical security partnership with the Ministry of Defense of Taiwan that shall include the following:

(1) The goals and objectives of developing a medical security partnership on issues related to pandemic preparedness and control.

(2) A discussion of current and future plans to cooperate on medical security activities.

(3) An evaluation of the feasibility of cooperating on a range of activities under the partnership, including—
(A) research and production of vaccines and medicines;
(B) joint conferences with scientists and experts;
(C) collaboration relating to and exchanges of medical supplies and equipment; and
(D) the use of hospital ships such as the United States Naval Ship Comfort and United States Naval Ship Mercy.

(4) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate.

SEC. 9724. Fairness for Taiwan Nationals Regarding Employment at International Financial Institutions

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) Taiwan is responsible for remarkable achievements in economic and democratic development, with its per capita gross domestic product rising in purchasing power parity terms from $3,470 in 1980 to more than $55,000 in 2018;
(2) the experience of Taiwan in creating a vibrant and advanced economy under democratic governance and the rule of law can inform the work of the international financial institutions, including through the contributions and insights of Taiwan nationals; and
(3) Taiwan nationals who seek employment at the international financial institutions should not be held at a disadvantage in hiring because the economic success of Taiwan has rendered it ineligible for financial assistance from such institutions.

b) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director at each international financial institution to use the voice and vote of the United States to seek to ensure that Taiwan nationals are not discriminated against in any employment decision by the institution, including employment through consulting or part-time opportunities, on the basis of—
(1) whether they are citizens or nationals of, or holders of a passport issued by, a member country of, or a state or other jurisdiction that receives assistance from, the international financial institution; or
(2) any other consideration that, in the determination of the Secretary, unfairly disadvantages Taiwan nationals with respect to employment at the institution.

(c) WAIVER AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of the Treasury may waive subsection (b) for not more than 1 year at a time after reporting to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that providing the waiver
(1) will substantially promote the objective of equitable treatment for Taiwan nationals at the international financial institutions; or
(2) is in the national interest of the United States, with a detailed explanation of the reasons therefor.

(d) PROGRESS REPORT.—The Chairman of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies shall submit to the committees specified in subsection (c) an annual report, in writing, that describes the progress made toward advancing the policy described in subsection (b), and a summary of employment trends with respect to Taiwan nationals at the international financial institutions.

(e) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘international financial institutions’’ has the meaning given the term in section 1701(c)(2) of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)(2)).

(f) SUNSET.—The preceding provisions of this section shall have no force or effect beginning on the earlier of—
(1) the date that is 7 years after the date of the enactment of this Act; or
(2) the date that the Secretary of the Treasury reports to the committees specified in subsection (c) that each international financial institution has adopted the policy described in subsection (b).

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The US-Taiwan Business Council Welcomes the Sale to Taiwan of Mobile Coastal Defense Systems with RGM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II Missiles

(Arlington, Virginia, October 26, 2020)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Taiwan of up to 100 Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems (HCDS) with up to 400 RGM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II Surface Launched Missiles and related equipment and support. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this proposed arms sale on October 26, 2020.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 20-68) is for a total expected program cost of US$2.37 billion. The proposed sale consists of up to 400 RGM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II Surface Launched Missiles and 4 RTM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II Exercise Missiles. Also included are 411 containers, 100 Harpoon Coastal Defense System Launcher Transporter Units, 25 radar trucks, spare and repair parts, and other elements of personnel, documentation, engineering, technical, and logistics support.

In response to this notification, the fourth involving Taiwan over the last week, US-Taiwan Business Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said, “it is important to look at the totality of Taiwan’s capacity-building efforts to fully grasp the effort to improve Taiwan’s defensive capabilities.

Hammond-Chambers added “These mobile land-based coastal defense batteries, with proven and reliable Harpoon missiles, add to Taiwan’s existing anti-ship defenses and provide significant additional deterrent capabilities. The substantial expansion of Taiwan’s Coastal Defense Cruise Missile stocks, which also include the domestically designed and built Hsiung Feng II/III, is a welcome development.

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

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The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on Three Proposed Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan for US$1.8113 billion

(Arlington, Virginia, October 21, 2020)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of three possible Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan of 135 AGM-84H Standoff Land Attack Missile Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) Missiles, 6 MS-110 Recce Pods, and 11 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) M142 Launchers, along with related equipment and support.

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of these proposed arms sales on October 21, 2020. The published Congressional Notifications (transmittal numbers 20-69, 20-75, and 20-77) are for a total expected program cost of US$1.8113 billion.

  • Notification 70-69 – for an estimated program cost of US$1.008 billion – includes 135 AGM-84H Standoff Land Attack Missile Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) Missiles [a precision-guided, air-launched cruise missile], 4 ATM-84H SLAM-ER Telemetry Missiles, 12 CATM-84H Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM), 151 containers, spare and repair parts, along with related equipment, training, engineering, and other elements of technical and logistics support.
  • Notification 70-75 – for an estimated program cost of US$367.2 million – includes 6 MS-110 Recce Pods [advanced reconnaissance for F-16 fighter jets], 3 Transportable Ground Stations, 1 Fixed Ground station, spare and repair parts, system support and equipment, training, documentation, and other related elements of logistical and program support.
  • Notification 20-77 – for an estimated program cost of US$436.1 million – includes 11 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) M142 Launchers [a truck-mounted light multiple rocket launcher], 64 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) M57 Unitary Missiles. 7 M1152Al High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), 11 M240B Machine Guns (7.62MM), and 17 International Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (IFATDS). Also included are 54 M28A2 Low Cost Reduced Range Practice Rocket Pods (LCRRPR), 11 M2Al machine guns (.50 caliber), radio systems and radio ground stations, 11 M1084A2 cargo Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) Resupply Vehicles (RSV), 2 M1089A2 cargo wrecker FMTV RSV, and 11 M1095 trailer cargo FMTV (5-ton). In addition, the notification includes support, training, testing, and communications equipment, along with related elements of logistical and program support.

The US-Taiwan Business Council supports these Congressional notifications. Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers stated that “The quality of the three programs notified today clearly reflects the urgency of continued Taiwan force modernization to counteract China’s hegemonic behavior. Each program adds an important deterrent capability that should further complicate any consideration by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to threaten or to use force to coerce Taiwan into a political union.

Hammond-Chambers went on to say “The US-Taiwan Business Council believes that Taiwan arms sales notifications should be driven by the regular internal process, and should be free of political delays. Today’s announcements continue the return to regular order for consideration, process, and release of needed capabilities.

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

https://www.us-taiwan.org/resources/the-us-taiwan-business-council-comments-on-three-proposed-foreign-military-sales-to-taiwan/

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October 5-6, 2020 – Virtual US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2020

Virtual US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2020

Event: US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2020
October 5-6, 2020
Virtual Event

The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2020 was held October 5-6, 2020 as a virtual event due to the pandemic. It was the 19th annual event in a series of ongoing conferences addressing the future of U.S. defense cooperation with Taiwan, the defense procurement process, and Taiwan’s defense and national security needs.

The 2020 virtual defense conference opened with a discussion on the evolution of the threat to Taiwan. The opening session examined how a more perilous security environment could drive Taiwan’s deterrence and defense options, and how it determines how to meet its current and future military needs.

The second and third sessions assessed Taiwan’s doctrine, readiness, and civil-military relations, as well as how the indigenous defense industry can play a role in developing Taiwan’s capabilities to meet the evolving threat. We also explored how Taiwan is approaching combat readiness under the Overall Defense Concept (ODC), and how the island can leverage civil-military relations to continue strengthening both its democratic institutions and its defensive capabilities.

Keynote Addresses & Conference Program

Keynote speakers included senior representatives from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and from the U.S. government. For copies of released speeches from this conference, see www.us-taiwan.org.

Conference sessions at the US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference feature a moderator and several speakers on the panel, and some sessions may include additional commentators. Each speaker gives a short presentation on the session topic from his or her own viewpoint and expertise. Those presentations are then followed by a moderator-led discussion among the panelists, as well as a moderator-driven question and answer period with the attendees. This format offers the maximum amount of time for exchanges among the panelists, as well as between the panel and the audience, allowing the sessions to become a forum for substantial and valuable interaction and discussion.

The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference website is at www.taiwandefenseconference.com

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USTBC Comments on the Proposed Sale of Repair & Recertification of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missiles to Taiwan

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale of Repair and Recertification of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missiles to Taiwan. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certification notifying Congress of the proposed arms sale on July 9, 2020.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 20-24) is for a total value of approximately US$620 million. The notification includes recertification of (PAC-3) missiles, Repair and Return of classified and unclassified PAC-3 missile items and Ground Support Equipment, replenishment of missile spares and GSE spares along with a seeker spares pool, air transportation services for missile processing, and other related technical and logistics support. [1]

The US-Taiwan Business Council is encouraged by these Congressional notifications. Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said “The maintenance of Taiwan’s PAC-3 capability is a welcome development. Taiwan is undertaking an important commitment to sustaining the quality of its legacy equipment, in support of deterring the coercive military threat from China. It is an important signal from the governments of Presidents Tsai and Trump that they are committed to peace and security in the Taiwan Strait through strong defensive capabilities.

“Taiwan’s PAC-3 ground-to-air SAM system plays an essential role in protecting Taiwan from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) missile forces that physically and politically threaten and intimidate the country. The U.S. is right to support all of Taiwan’s legitimate defense needs, whether new F-16 fighters or the upgrade of legacy equipment.”

Hammond-Chambers went on to say that “the PLA’s commitment to its own force modernization – and the threat that poses to peace and security in Asia – is a constant reminder that consistent arms sales to Taiwan is in the interests of the United States and of its Asia Pacific allies.”

[1] See the DSCA website at http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales

https://www.us-taiwan.org/resources/ustbc-comments-on-repair-recertification-of-pac-3-missiles-to-taiwan

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Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2020

Update, December 20, 2019

On this date, President Trump signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 into law (Public Law No: 116-92)

Update, December 19, 2019

On this date, Congress submitted the 2020 NDAA to the President for signature. The following Taiwan-related language was included in the final version of the bill:

Sec. 1260b. Report on Cybersecurity Activities with Taiwan

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the following:

(1) The feasibility of establishing a high-level, interagency United States-Taiwan working group for coordinating responses to emerging issues related to cybersecurity.
(2) A discussion of the Department of Defense’s current and future plans to engage with Taiwan in cybersecurity activities.
(3) A discussion of obstacles encountered in forming, executing, or implementing agreements with Taiwan for cybersecurity activities.
(4) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense determines should be included.

Sec. 1260c. Review and Report Related to the Taiwan Relations Act.

(a) REVIEW.—The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall conduct a review of—

(1) whether, and the means by which, as applicable, the Government of the People’s Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party are affecting, including through military, economic, information, digital, diplomatic, or any other form of coercion—
(A) the security, or the social and economic system, of the people of Taiwan;
(B) the military balance of power between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan; or
(C) the expectation that the future of Taiwan will continue to be determined by peaceful means; and
(2) the role of United States policy toward Taiwan with respect to the implementation of the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy.

(b) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the review under subsection (a).
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED. The report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) The assessments resulting from the review.
(B) Recommendations on legislative changes or Department of Defense or Department of State policy changes necessary to ensure that the United States continues to meets its obligations to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) S. 1790—484
(C) Guidelines for—
(i) new defense requirements, including requirements relating to information and digital space;
(ii) exchanges between senior-level civilian and military officials of the United States and Taiwan; and
(iii) the regular transfer of defense articles, especially defense articles that are mobile, survivable, and cost effective, to most effectively deter attacks and support the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan.

(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means— (1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 1260D. Sense of Congress on Enhancement of the United States-Taiwan Defense Relationship.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) Taiwan is a vital partner of the United States and is critical to a free and open Indo-Pacific region;
(2) the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the “Six Assurances” are both cornerstones of United States relations with Taiwan;
(3) the United States should continue to strengthen defense and security cooperation with Taiwan to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;
(4) consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), the United States should strongly support the acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, defensive naval mining, and resilient command and control capabilities that support the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan;
(5) the President and Congress should determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, as required by the Taiwan Relations Act and in accordance with procedures established by law;
(6) the United States should continue efforts to improve the predictability of United States arms sales to Taiwan by ensuring timely review of and response to requests of Taiwan for defense articles and services;
(7) the Secretary of Defense should promote policies concerning exchanges that enhance the security of Taiwan, including—

(A) opportunities with Taiwan for practical training and military exercises that—
(i) enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self defense capability, as described in section 3(a) of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3302(a)); and
(ii) emphasize capabilities consistent with the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan; S. 1790—485
(B) exchanges between senior defense officials and general officers of the United States and Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–135), especially for the purpose of enhancing cooperation on defense planning and improving the interoperability of United States and Taiwan forces; and
(C) opportunities for exchanges between junior officers and senior enlisted personnel of the United States and Taiwan;

(8) the United States and Taiwan should expand cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief;
(9) the Secretary of Defense should consider options, including exercises and ship visits, as appropriate, to expand the scale and scope of humanitarian assistance and disaster response cooperation with Taiwan and other regional partners so as to improve disaster response planning and preparedness; and
(10) the Secretary of Defense should continue regular transits of United States Navy vessels through the Taiwan Strait, commend the armed forces of France for their April 6, 2019, legal transit of the Taiwan Strait, and encourage allies and partners to follow suit in conducting such transits, in order to demonstrate the commitment of the United States and its allies and partners to fly, sail, and operate anywhere international law allows.

SEC. 5513. Report on Efforts by People’s Republic Of China to Influence Election in Taiwan.

(a) REPORT.—

Consistent with section 3(c) of the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3302(c)), and consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, not later than 45 days after the date of the election for the President and Vice President of Taiwan in 2020, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on any—
(1) influence operations conducted by China to interfere in or undermine such election; and
(2) efforts by the United States to disrupt such operations.

(b) ELEMENTS.—

The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A description of any significant efforts by the intelligence community to coordinate technical and material support for Taiwan to identify, disrupt, and combat influence operations specified in subsection (a)(1).
(2) A description of any efforts by the United States Government to build the capacity of Taiwan to disrupt external efforts that degrade a free and fair election process.
(3) An assessment of whether and to what extent China conducted influence operations specified in subsection (a)(1), and, if such operations occurred—
(A) a comprehensive list of specific governmental and nongovernmental entities of China that were involved in supporting such operations and a description of the role of each such entity; and
(B) an identification of any tactics, techniques, and procedures used in such operations.

(c) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Update, December 17, 2019

On this date, the conference report, reconciling the House and Senate versions of the bill, was filed. The conference report was agreed to in the House on December 11, 2019 and in the Senate on December 17, 2019.

The conference report notes:

Report on cybersecurity activities with Taiwan (sec. 1260B)
The House amendment contained a provision (sec. 1250G) that would direct, not later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees a report on cybersecurity activities with Taiwan.

The Senate bill contained no similar provision.

The Senate recedes.

Review and report related to the Taiwan Relations Act (sec. 1260C)
The Senate bill contained a provision (sec. 6211) that would express the sense of the Congress concerning the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8). The provision would also direct the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to conduct a review of coercive behavior by the Government of the People’s Republic of China directed at Taiwan, as well as the role of United States policy toward Taiwan with respect to the implementation of the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy. The provision would direct a report to be delivered to the appropriate committees of Congress on the results of the review.

The House amendment contained no similar provision.

The House recedes with an amendment that would make clarifying changes to the content of the required report.

Sense of Congress on enhancement of the United States-Taiwan defense relationship (sec. 1260D)
The Senate bill contained a provision (sec. 1257) that would express the sense of the Senate concerning the enhancement of the United States-Taiwan defense relationship.

The House amendment contained a similar provision (sec. 1248).

The House recedes with an amendment that would express the sense of the Congress that Taiwan is a vital partner of the United States, and that the United States should continue to strengthen defense and security cooperation in support of Taiwan maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability. In light of the fortieth anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8), the conferees encourage the Department of Defense to focus attention and resources on the future of the United States-Taiwan defense relationship, particularly in relation to implementation of the National Defense Strategy and strategic competition with China.

Implementation of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act with regard to Taiwan arms sales
The Senate bill contained a provision (sec. 6212) that would, among other things, express the sense of the Congress that the United States should fully implement the provisions of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409) with regard to regular defensive arms sales to Taiwan.

The House amendment contained no similar provision.

The Senate recedes.

The conferees note that the matter of arms sales to Taiwan is addressed elsewhere in this report.

Update, July 12, 2019

On this date, the U.S. House of Representatives passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2020 by Yea/Nay Vote of 220-197.  Several Taiwan-related initiatives were included. The bill now awaits reconciliation.

Update, June 27, 2019

On June 27, 2019, the U.S. Senate passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2020 by Yea/Nay Vote of 86-8.

The U.S. Senate adopted multiple provisions for enhancing the defense and security cooperation between the United States and Taiwan.

Update, June 11, 2019

The NDAA, as S.1790, was introduced in the U.S. Senate on June 11, 2019.

Update, May 2, 2019

The NDAA, as H.R.2500, was introduced in the House on May 2, 2019.

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October 6-8, 2019 – US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2019

US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2019
US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2019

Event: US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2019
October 6-8, 2019
Ellicott City, Maryland

The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2019 will be held October 6-8, 2019 in Ellicott City, Maryland. This will be the 18th annual event in a series of ongoing conferences addressing the future of U.S. defense cooperation with Taiwan, the defense procurement process, and Taiwan’s defense and national security needs.

This year, the conference will open with a discussion on the future & evolution of Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept (ODC), looking at what emerging technologies may mean for the concept, and how changes to funding, force structure, and available equipment may affect Taiwan’s ODC plans.

The second, third, and fourth sessions will examine the multi-faceted threat facing Taiwan – starting with lower threat levels during everyday life in Taiwan today, moving to the medium-intensity threat, and then to all-out war. The discussion will look at topic such as political warfare, cybersecurity, subversion and disinformation, potential naval and aerospace blockades, embargoes, government decapitation schemes, and limited ballistic missile strikes. Speakers will also discuss how a sharp conflict may develop and escalate, and will consider the most likely assault vectors – including amphibious, air, missile, cyber, and others. We will also examine potential Taiwan response strategies and tactics, and the role that the U.S. and other Taiwan allies may play.

The last session will consider the needs of Taiwan’s future defense forces. Panelists will discuss how changes to a variety of factors – such as the move towards an all-volunteer force; issues surrounding adequate recruitment, training, and retention; demographic changes; expanded reserves, among other issues – can affect Taiwan’s military readiness, and how to meet those challenges.

Keynote Addresses & Conference Program

Keynote speakers will include senior representatives from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and from the U.S. government.

Conference sessions at the US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference feature a moderator and several speakers on the panel, and some sessions may include additional commentators. Each speaker gives a short presentation on the session topic from his or her own viewpoint and expertise. Those presentations are then followed by a moderator-led discussion among the panelists, as well as a moderator-driven question and answer period with the attendees. This format offers the maximum amount of time for exchanges among the panelists, as well as between the panel and the audience, allowing the sessions to become a forum for substantial and valuable interaction and discussion.

Registration is now open at the 2019 US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference website.

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