2018 archive

The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the September 24, 2018 U.S. Arms Sale to Taiwan

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the decision by the U.S. Department of State to announce its approval of a possible Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) to Taiwan for an estimated value of US$330 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on September 24, 2018.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 18-09) is for an FMSO II that would provide funds for blanket order requisitions – under a Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement – for stock replenishment supply of standard spare parts and repair/replace of spare parts in support of the F-16, C-130, F-5, Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF), all other aircraft systems and subsystems, and other related elements of logistics and program support.

The US-Taiwan Business Council is encouraged by this Congressional notification, which appears to move away from the previous “bundling” method for Taiwan arms sales. Notifying each sale when it is ready is a positive development, and indicates more potential activity at the end of this year and into early 2019. It is the approach the Council has advocated for since the original bundling began in 2008.

Real issues remain, however, with Taiwan’s ability to ask for the defensive systems it wants and needs. Since 2011, U.S. arms sales have focused almost exclusively on sustainment and maintenance of Taiwan’s existing military capabilities. There has seemingly been no willingness by the U.S. to assess new capabilities for Taiwan, with requests for new systems apparently rejected or deterred prior to the initial stages of evaluation.

New arms sales requests by Taiwan should be subject to an interagency assessment that includes the National Security Council, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of State, the Indo-Pacific Command, the American Institute in Taiwan, and other organizations. All such requests should be evaluated on their merits only, with potential Chinese reactions to a sale not a part of the calculus.

“Intelligent” Requests
In speeches and other statements, the State Department has discussed the need for “intelligent” arms sales, which leave unanswered questions both about the criteria for arms sales and the existing process. Is Taiwan free to make any request, or only those deemed “intelligent?” Who makes the determination of what is “intelligent,” and at what stage in the review process does this determination take place?

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers noted that “the Trump Administration’s stated policy is that Taiwan may submit a Letter of Request (LoR) for Pricing & Availability (P&A) data for any platform or system Taiwan feels they need to mount a credible defense, and it is entitled to receive a full assessment and timely response to their request by the full interagency review process.

Hammond-Chambers added, “This gets at the heart of normalizing the arms sales process. Will Taiwan be able to ask for all that it feels it needs, to then have that LoR accepted – not deterred if deemed “unintelligent” – and assessed on its merits? If the U.S. deems that a request is not doable at the moment, will they offer an alternative solution? It is not for any one department to determine what is “intelligent,” but for the full interagency review process to be employed to ensure that Taiwan can mount a credible and full defense as required by the Taiwan Relations Act.

http://www.us-taiwan.org/pressrelease/2018september25congressionalnotificationsarmssalestotaiwan.pdf

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September 24, 2018 – U.S. Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II to Taiwan

On September 24, 2018 the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) made the following statement:

The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II to provide funds for blanket order requisitions to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) for an estimated cost of $330 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today. TECRO has requested a Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II to provide funds for blanket order requisitions, under a Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement for stock replenishment supply of standard spare parts, and repair/replace of spare parts in support of the F-16, C-130, F-5, Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF), all other aircraft systems and subsystems, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated program cost is $330 million.

This proposed sale is consistent with U.S. law and policy as expressed in Public Law 96-8.This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security and defensive capability of the recipient, which has been and continues to be an important force for political stability, military balance, and economic progress in the region. The proposed sale of spare and repair parts is required to maintain the recipient’s defensive and transport aerial fleet. The recipient has been operating these fleets since 1996 and will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and support into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region. There are no principal contractors involved with this potential sale. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the permanent assignment of any U.S. Government or contractor representatives. There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale. This notice of a potential sale is required by law and does not mean the sale has been concluded.

All questions regarding this proposed Foreign Military Sale should be directed to the State Department’s Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Congressional and Public Affairs, pm-cpa@state.gov.

The original news release is available on the DSCA website:
http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-office-united-states-tecro-foreign

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2018 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on the military power of China.

2018 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PDF)

2018 – Military Power Report Fact Sheet (PDF)

Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency

 

 
China appears prepared to defer the use of force as long as it believes that unification over the long-term remains possible and that the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. China argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintain the conditions for political progress and to prevent Taiwan from making moves toward de jure independence. China has refused for decades to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue. Simultaneously, China’s leaders proclaim their desire for peaceful unification under the principle of “one country, two systems,” most recently as part of President Xi Jinping’s address opening the CCP’s 19th Party Congress.

The circumstances under which the mainland has historically warned that it would use force have evolved over time in response to the island’s declarations of its political status, changes in PLA capabilities, and China’s view of Taiwan’s relations with other countries. These circumstances have included:

  • Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;
  • Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;
  • Internal unrest on Taiwan;
  • Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;
  • Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification;
  • Foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs; and
  • Foreign forces stationed on Taiwan.

Article 8 of China’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that China may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted.

The ambiguity of these conditions preserves China’s flexibility. In December 2017, Chinese Embassy official Li Kexin, in response to U.S. Congressional language recommending the U.S. Navy explore visiting Taiwan, stated that such a visit would prompt China to take Taiwan by force.

Key Takeaways

Key takeaways listed in the report include:
 

  • While China advocates for peaceful reunification with Taiwan, China has never repudiated the use of military force, and continues to develop and deploy increasingly advanced capabilities needed for a potential military campaign.
  • Circumstances that would prompt the use of force remain ambiguous, preserving China’s flexibility.
  • Multiple military options exist for a Taiwan campaign, ranging from an air and maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some or all of Taiwan or its offshore islands.
  • China could engage in a deliberate force buildup to signal an imminent military campaign or conduct a surprise campaign to force rapid military and political resolutions before other countries could respond.
  • Should the United States intervene, China would try to delay effective intervention and seek victory in a high-intensity, limited war of short duration.
  • The PLA aims to increase its ability to conduct complex joint operations.
  • Although ongoing reforms may decrease near-term readiness, in the long-term they should enable better planning and preparation for joint military operations across the Taiwan Strait. PLA services and support forces continue to improve training and acquire new capabilities for a Taiwan contingency.
  • Although the PLAN seeks to achieve maritime superiority within the first island chain and to deter a third party from intervening in a Taiwan campaign, there is no indication it is significantly expanding its landing ship force necessary for an amphibious assault on Taiwan.
  • Taiwan’s advantages continue to decline as China’s modernization efforts continue.
  • Taiwan’s transition to an all-volunteer force by 2019 will be costlier than anticipated, straining the limited defense budget and diverting funds from defense acquisition, training, and readiness.
  • To counter China’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.
  • The PLAA and PLANMC continue to equip, plan, and train for sustained amphibious operations.
  • The PLAN did not make significant additions to its amphibious fleet in 2017 but launched a YUZHAO LPD that could enter service in 2018.

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Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2019

Update, August 13, 2018

On this date, President Trump signed the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 into law (Public Law No: 115-232).

Update, August 3, 2018

On this date, Congress submitted the 2019 NDAA to the President for signature. The following Taiwan-related language was included in the final version of the bill:

SEC. 1257. Strengthening Taiwan’s Force Readiness.
(a) DEFENSE ASSESSMENT. – The Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with appropriate counterparts of Taiwan, conduct a comprehensive assessment of Taiwan’s military forces, particularly Taiwan’s reserves. The assessment shall provide recommendations to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, readiness, and resilience of Taiwan’s self-defense capability in the following areas:
(1) Personnel management and force development, particularly reserve forces.
(2) Recruitment, training, and military programs.
(3) Command, control, communications and intelligence.
(4) Technology research and development.
(5) Defense article procurement and logistics.
(6) Strategic planning and resource management.

(b) REPORT REQUIRED. –
(1) IN GENERAL. – Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing each of the following:
(A) A summary of the assessment conducted pursuant to subsection (a).
(B) A list of any recommendations resulting from such assessment.
(C) A plan for the United States, including by using appropriate security cooperation authorities, to–
(i) facilitate any relevant recommendations from such list;
(ii) expand senior military-to-military engagement and joint training by the United States Armed Forces with the military of Taiwan; and
(iii) support United States foreign military sales and other equipment transfers to Taiwan, particularly for developing asymmetric warfare capabilities.
(2) APPROPRIATE SECURITY COOPERATION AUTHORITIES – For purposes of the plan described in paragraph (1)(C), the term “appropriate security cooperation authorities” means–
(A) section 311 of title 10, United States Code (relating to exchange of defense personnel);
(B) section 332 such title (relating to defense institution building); and
(C) other security cooperation authorities under chapter 16 of such title.
(3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. – In this subsection, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means–
(A) the congressional defense committees; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 1258. Sense of Congress on Taiwan.
It is the sense of Congress that –
(1) the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the “Six Assurances” are both cornerstones of United States relations with Taiwan;

(2) the United States should strengthen defense and security cooperation with Taiwan to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;

(3) the United States should strongly support the acquisition by Taiwan of defensive weapons through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with a particular emphasis on asymmetric warfare and undersea warfare capabilities, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act;

(4) the United States should improve the predictability of arms sales to Taiwan by ensuring timely review of and response to requests of Taiwan for defense articles and defense services;

(5) the Secretary of Defense should promote Department of Defense policies concerning exchanges that enhance the security of Taiwan, including—
(A) opportunities for practical training and military exercises with Taiwan; and
(B) exchanges between senior defense officials and general officers of the United States and Taiwan
consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135);

(6) the United States and Taiwan should expand cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and

(7) the Secretary of Defense should consider supporting the visit of a United States hospital ship to Taiwan as part of the annual “Pacific Partnership” mission in order to improve disaster response planning and preparedness as well as to strengthen cooperation between the United States and Taiwan.

Update, July 23, 2018

On this date, the conference report, reconciling the House and Senate versions of the bill, was filed. The conference report was agreed to in the House on July 26, 2018 and in the Senate on August 1, 2018.

The conference report notes:

Strengthening Taiwan’s force readiness (sec. 1257).
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1253) that would direct the Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive assessment, in consultation with appropriate counterparts of Taiwan, on ways to enhance and reform Taiwan’s military forces, particularly Taiwan’s reserve forces. The provision would also require that the assessment include recommendations to strengthen bilateral cooperation and improve Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities. The provision would require the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to submit a report on the assessment and a list of recommendations and planned actions to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act.

The Senate amendment contained no similar provision

The Senate recedes

Sense of Congress on Taiwan (sec. 1258)
The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 1243) that would express the sense of the Senate on the importance of a strong U.S. defense relationship with Taiwan.

The House bill contained no similar provision.

The House recedes with an amendment that would clarify that the provision expresses the sense of the Congress. The amendment would also clarify that the Secretary of Defense should promote Department of Defense policies concerning exchanges that enhance the security of Taiwan, including opportunities for practical training and military exercises with Taiwan.

Senior Defense Engagement with Taiwan
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1262) that would express the sense of Congress that, pursuant to the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135), a service secretary or member of the joint chiefs should visit Taiwan for a senior-level defense engagement.

The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.

The House recedes.

Update, June 18, 2018

On this date, the U.S. Senate passed its version of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for 2019 by Yea/Nay Vote of 85 – 10.

Update, April 13, 2018

The NDAA, as H.R.5515, was introduced in the House on April 13, 2018. On May 24, the U.S. House of Representatives passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2019.

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October 28-30, 2018 – US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2018

US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2018

US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2018

Event: US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2018

October 28-30,2018
Annapolis, Maryland

The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2018 will be held October 28-30, 2018 in Annapolis, Maryland. This will be the seventeenth annual event in a series of ongoing conferences addressing the future of U.S. defense cooperation with Taiwan, the defense procurement process, and Taiwan’s defense and national security needs.

This year, the conference will open with a discussion on Taiwan’s role in the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, and look at how Taiwan can increase regional engagement on defense and national security issues. We will then discuss Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept (ODC) and current operational and tactical thinking, examining how Taiwan can continue to develop its capabilities in order to meet its existing and future defense needs. The third session will look at ODC implementation across the air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains, and how companies can play a role in supporting this implementation. The last two sessions will look first at offsets under Taiwan’s Industrial Cooperation Program, and will then pivot to discuss Taiwan’s industrial security in the defense sector – including personnel security issues, digital security, as well as trade secrets and IP protection.

The first conference in this series was the St. Petersburg, Florida event where former Taiwan Minister of National Defense Tang Yiau-ming gave the keynote address in March of 2002. The second conference in the series was held in February 2003 in San Antonio, Texas, the third in October 2004 in Phoenix, Arizona, the fourth in September 2005 in San Diego, California, the fifth in September 2006 in Denver, Colorado, and the sixth in September 2007 in Annapolis, Maryland. Taiwan’s Minister of National Defense Chen Chao-min gave the keynote address at the seventh conference in the series, held in September 2008 on Amelia Island, Florida. The eighth conference was held in September 2009 in Charlottesville, Virginia, the ninth in October 2010 in Cambridge, Maryland, and the tenth in September 2011 in Richmond, Virginia. The eleventh conference was held in September 2012 in Hershey, Pennsylvania, and the twelfth in September 2013 in Annapolis, Maryland. The thirteenth conference in October 2014, the fourteenth in October 2015, and the fifteenth in October 2016 all took place in Williamsburg, Virginia. The sixteenth conference was held in October 2017 in Princeton, New Jersey.

Keynote Addresses & Conference Program
Keynote speakers will include senior representatives from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and from the U.S. government.

Conference sessions at the US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference feature a moderator and several speakers on the panel, and some sessions may include additional commentators. Each speaker gives a short presentation on the session topic from his or her own viewpoint and expertise. Those presentations are then followed by a moderator-led discussion among the panelists, as well as a moderator-driven question and answer period with the attendees. This format offers the maximum amount of time for exchanges among the panelists, as well as between the panel and the audience, allowing the sessions to become a forum for substantial and valuable interaction and discussion.

Registration is now open at the 2018 US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference website.

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/october-28-30-2018-us-taiwan-defense-industry-conference-2018/

Panel Discussion on US-Taiwan Defense Industrial Cooperation

Please join the Global Taiwan Institute and the US-Taiwan Business Council for a joint event to discuss Taiwan’s indigenous defense industry development and opportunities for U.S. – Taiwan industrial cooperation. The panelists will provide an update on the recent Taiwan-US Defense Business Forum held by the USTBC (and TW-DIDA) in Kaohsiung, Taiwan. In addition, GTI will discuss its forthcoming occasional report on Taiwan’s indigenous defense industry.

Panelists:

David An, Senior Research Fellow, Global Taiwan Institute
Rupert Hammond-Chambers, President, US-Taiwan Business Council
Fu Mei, Director, Taiwan Security Analysis Center
Michael Perry, Senior Vice President, Global Aftermarket, AMS Group

Event Information

Event Registration

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Taiwan-US Defense Business Forum (台美國防產業論壇), May 10, 2018

The US-Taiwan Business Council and the Taiwan Defense Industry Development Association will be co-hosting the Taiwan-US Defense Business Forum in Kaohsiung, Taiwan on May 10, 2018. This event will bring together U.S. and Taiwan companies to discuss granular challenges of bilateral cooperation in the defense industry supply chain.

The event will offer general discussion on topics such as developing a security clearance process for Taiwan, challenges in discharging Industrial Cooperation Program obligations, and Taiwan’s existing and potential role in the global defense supply chain. The discussion will then examine ways that Taiwan defense industry can participate in the defense supply chain, and opportunities for bilateral U.S.-Taiwan cooperation in the shipbuilding, cybersecurity, and aerospace industries.

Please download the event flyer for more information about registering to attend. To check for more details about the event, please visit www.us-taiwan.org.

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/taiwan-us-defense-business-forum_2018/

U.S. Senators Cornyn and Inhofe Urge President Trump to Support New Fighters for Taiwan

In a March 26, 2018 letter, Senators John Cornyn and James Inhofe urge President Donald Trump to support the sale to Taiwan of a new tranche of modern, U.S.-built fighters – the F-35B with its vertical lift capability, or additional F-16Vs – to boost Taiwan’s air defense capabilities.

The Senators wrote, “Taiwan has a legitimate requirement to field a modem fighter fleet to address a myriad of defense contingencies. Therefore, Taiwan is requesting U.S. support in their procurement of the F-35B.” “However, if determined that release of the F-35B to Taiwan is premature, we hope that you will instead make available additional F-16Vs to address the quantitative and qualitative challenges confronting Taiwan’s fighter fleet. Taiwan already fields the F-16, and this would represent a cost-effective solution to Taiwan’s legitimate defense requirement for additional fighters.

Cornyn and Inhofe also noted, “These fighters will have a positive impact on Taiwan’s self-defense and would act as a necessary deterrent to China’s aggressive military posture across the Asia-Pacific region.

China’s force modernization efforts are having a destabilizing impact on the entire North East Asian security environment. Japan and Korea, as well as forward-deployed U.S. forces, are procuring and/or upgrading their fleets of modern fighters in response. It is entirely consistent with U.S. interests to support Taiwan’s efforts to do likewise. To maintain a credible defense against China’s coercive military posture, Taiwan urgently needs to modernize its fighter fleet.

It has now been 25 years since Taiwan last bought new-build fighters, and this has become a challenge for the Taiwan Air Force. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen recognizes this challenge, and has stated her willingness to take decisive action including budgeting significant funds to procure new fighters. A U.S. sale of new fighters to Taiwan would have a positive impact on Taiwan’s defense spending, and would represent an important increase in Taiwan’s commitment to its own defense and security.

Rupert Hammond-Chambers, President of the US-Taiwan Business Council, noted that “failing to sell new-built fighters to Taiwan is to relegate the Taiwan Air Force to marginalization and eventual extinction. That would significantly weaken the island, which is inherently destabilizing, while placing an additional burden on U.S. and allied forces to manage the airspace between Okinawa and the Philippines.

Hammond-Chambers also said, “The Council supports the sale of additional fighters to Taiwan. We believe that such a sale is consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) requirement to provide Taiwan with arms to defend itself. It would also be an important development in the Trump Administration’s policy of promoting capacity-building amongst Asian friends and allies, it would represent an important defense export opportunity for American companies, and it would be an appropriate response to China’s ongoing force modernization efforts and its constant coercive training deployments against Taiwan.

Press Release: U.S. Senators Cornyn and Inhofe Urge President Trump to Support New Fighters for Taiwan
Letter from Senators Cornyn and Inhofe urging President Trump to support new fighters for Taiwan

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