2001

2001 archive

Taiwan Defense & Security Report – Q3, 2001

In April of this year, the new Bush administration announced the approval of an extraordinary package of arms to Taiwan at what appeared to be the last formal US-Taiwan Arms Sales Meetings. Tied to the list of approvals was a decision by the new president to do away with these annual talks and instead handle Taiwan’s legitimate defense requirements in a routine, case-by-case manner as is done with other friends and allies of the United States. This and the arms sales decisions, which included breakthrough support for the sale of diesel electric submarines to Taiwan, generated speculation as to the direction the new administration would take in its relationships with Taiwan and the PRC.

In the following weeks and months, some answers began to emerge. The Bush administration allowed President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan to make transit stops in New York and Texas, en route to and on his return from an official visit to South America. Rather than being strictly constrained in his activities during these transit stops as had been the case in previous instances, the administration allowed Chen significant freedom to tour the host cities and meet with local and national political leaders. On the military front, indications were that military-to-military relations were becoming much closer and more substantive in recognition of and in response to the inexorably growing threat posed by Chinese ballistic missile deployments, military modernization, and unabated use-of-force rhetoric. At the same time, imminent WTO accession by both the PRC and Taiwan, Beijing’s being awarded the 2008 Olympics, and steadily deepening concerns about an economic recession appeared to mitigate against the possibility of conflict in the Taiwan Strait at least in the short term.

The focus of this report is to provide some thoughts on where the US-Taiwan military relationship stands; summarize the progress to date on the arms sales decisions of April 2001 and certain other key programs; and offer some brief concluding comments on Taiwan’s economic situation and potential budget problems and on the effects of the defense reorganization program and upcoming leadership changes.

 

Executive Summary: Taiwan Defense & Security Report – Q3, 2001

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Taiwan Defense & Security Report – Q1, 2001

Typically, coverage of Taiwan in general – and of US-Taiwan military matters in particular – is sparse and infrequent. Who could have foreseen therefore the combined effects of the EP-3E incident and the surprisingly detailed public dissemination of the Bush Administration’s US-Taiwan Arms Sales Talks decisions? As a result of these virtually consecutive but quite coincidental events, US-Taiwan military ties, US-PRC relations and the overall security situation in the Taiwan Strait area and Western Pacific suddenly have received an unprecedented amount of coverage in all forms of public media.

The year 2001 dawned with the Taiwan political and military leadership, and Taiwan’s supporters in the U.S., hoping that the incoming Bush administration would be an improvement over the preceding eight years of what many believed had been lukewarm support, particularly in the area of critically needed arms sales. There had been no major arms sales released for Taiwan since the outgoing Bush I administration had approved the sale of 150 F-16s in 1992.

On April 25, 2001, at the 20th annual US-Taiwan Arms Sales Conference, they got a clear and unmistakable answer. The new administration reportedly approved release of 4 ex-USN Kidd Class destroyers, 12 P-3C Orion ASW aircraft, M-109A6 SP howitzers, AAV-7 amphibious assault vehicles, CH-53 mine sweeping helicopters, other equipment, technical support and training, and agreed, after more than two decades of emphatic turn-downs, to assist Taiwan in obtaining up to eight diesel-electric submarines.

Although AEGIS destroyers, the priority request of greatest long-term importance for Taiwan, were again deferred, this is being described as the largest – potentially valued at close to $5 billion — arms sales package since the F-16 sale. However, in terms of the number and significance of the major weapons systems included in the decision, it is arguably the largest arms talks approval since diplomatic de-recognition in 1979. President Bush characterized the approvals as “the right package for this moment,” and made it clear that his administration would continue to ensure that Taiwan’s defensive needs would be met in the face of a growing threat from China. He also indicated that the annual arms sales conference with Taiwan would be phased out, and that in the future, Taiwan’s defensive arms requirements would be addressed as needed on a case-by-case basis.

And, as icing – sweet or bittersweet, depending on one’s perspective — on the cake, President Bush stated categorically during a nationwide television interview a few days later that the United States would come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of an attack from the People’s Republic with “whatever it takes.” The verdict is still out as to whether this was an inadvertent slip and that “strategic ambiguity” is still alive and well – the president modified his statement the following day and administration officials insisted that US policy had not changed. But, slip up or not, taken in context with Candidate Bush’s campaign rhetoric, the EP-3E incident, the arms talks decisions, and the reported contents of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s strategic review, it appears that the U.S. relationship with Beijing is shifting to one of strategic competition. And, relations with Taiwan, while still unofficial, are moving towards closer cooperation, particularly in the military arena.

Given the size, significance and context of this arms sales package, it deserves closer examination. Specifically, attention needs to be focused on what reportedly was approved; what was deferred or disapproved; what was decided in conjunction with the Talks; and what the implications are for Taiwan and the US.

 

Executive Summary: Taiwan Defense & Security Report – Q1, 2001

Permanent link to this article: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/taiwan-defense-security-report-q1-2001/